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CJIAP'l'ER I 
PROBLEM PEF~NlTlON 
Jntroduction 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the extent to which 
President Ly,ndon Baines Johrl,son promoted federal aid to the common 
' l 
schools between 196.:3 and 1969 •. In .order to place the study in proper 
perspective a survey of Pre~idential and Congressional action in the 
area of federal aid will be conducted. ~ollowing the survey the study 
will proceed to encompas~ the nuu,euvers ot the Johnson aclministration 
in obtaining passage ot the Elementary and Secondary Educ;at;i.on Act of 
1965, the influence of tb,e executive staff upon the .Act:, the leadership 
in ConQress in educaticm matters during the Johnson .i\clministration, 
and the eventual modification ot the A.ct between 1966 and 1969. 
The vaert; volwne and scoJ;>e of the education legislation en1:~cted 
under the leadership of President Johnson offers a ~remendous oppor-
tunity to attempt to evaluate its e1ignif;i.cance historically in terms 
of past developments, eurrent needs, and futu:rie cbanges. But some 
limits must be set in order t()· present a, topic which is digestible. 
Almost any discussiol:!, of t1;le C\'!tementary and secondary schools 
' ' 
during the Johnson period brings fortb inunediately the ~lementary and 
1'l'he collll11on school is defined a~ the elementary and secondary 
schoolt;1 of the United States, 
l 
2 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 2 A specific policy such as the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act is not enacted in a vacuum, nor 
is it a product of one event, decision, or cause, The sequence of de-
cisions, conflicts, and agreements of a complex political environment 
leads to a necessity of placing any act in its proper historical per-
spective. ln order to do this wii;b the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act and President Johnson, the larger issue of federal aid to 
education throughout this nation's history must be encountered, because 
the debates over passage of the Elrmentary and Secondary Education Act 
brought to the forefront again many old issµes affecting federal aid 
such as states' rights, separation of church ~nd,state, and fear of 
federal control. These larger national issues affecting federal aid 
to education are at least as old as the Republic; therefore, federal 
aid to education has ,probably stimul;:ited as IIIUC:h controversy as any 
other domestic aid program, and any specific act regarding federal aid 
to .education must be placed wi thin.thl's iarger framework of controversy. 
There are a number of points of view a writer may use in ap-
proaohing the history of federal aid. Since the formal institutions 
of the federal government (Legislative, Judicial, Executive) are the 
most frequent areas where official decisions are made, educational 
historians works must encompass the influence of the decisions made by 
these respective branches of the federal government. Such historians 
usually indicate which branch they feel has had the most impact upon 
2To demonstrate the potential in this area for researchers, the 
El-ementary and Secondary Education Act is probably the. one law of the 
Johnson administration which has received the most attention from the 
I 
standpoint of origin and legislative process, yet only the surface 
has been scratched. 
federal aid by tne amount of time spent discussing eac;h. respective 
brancb' s deci sion.s • .3 Very few writers present a balanced hil,;tory of 
the influence of the tbree b:rano:ttes of government upon federal aid to 
education. Most autlwrities working witb federal aid to education 
have presented the coverage from thei legislative s:i.de, that is, ana-
lyzing major legislation and del;>ates in Congress :regarding the passage 
. ·. ' ', '* 
of these acts. Historical coverage, although by no rrteans complete, 
is more pronounced on t;h.e legisl~tive side, leaving two areas which 
espjecially need study. 
The judicial branch of tbe federal government is becoming more 
and more influential upop federal aid to education and its rami{ica-
tions. The results of recent state Supren1e Court decisi oos upon 
metnods qf financing the public schools, for examp;te 1 o:flfer an e:x:.-
5 
cellent opportunity fqr furth,er study. The leading case of these 
recent court decisions is Serrano vs. Priest, decided by the Supreme 
................. - .... ~· .. ,,•·, I 
Court of California on August 30 1 1971. The court held that tne 
state's system of financing its schools 1 based laq;,ely upon local 
! ' ' ' 
3 
property taxes, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that this type of financing discriminates because it 
"makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wea.l th of 
3see Eugene EidenbeJ;"g and Roy-D. Morey, An Act of· Congl;'ess 
(NeW York, 1969), pp. 3.,.9. - --- -
. 
4Ibid. Also note Phillip. Meranto, The Po,Utics of Federal Aid ~ 
Educatlon ~ l 965 (:New ronk::, 1967 ) ., 
5see regular articles on . 11~1;1.al .Devel().pments in. Urban Education" 
in issues of Education and Urban Society. For Serrano vs. Priest, 5th 
Cal. Jrd.' 584.96 Cal. ~ptr. 601; 487 P. 2nd. 1241. Seethe February 
issue., 1972, P• 249~ 
his parents and neighbQrs,11 6 With ove;r ninety per cent of the fwids 
allocated to the public schools coming from state and local sources, 
and the majority of these funds being based on the property tax, it 
is easy to see the impact the case can have upon financing the common 
school. In addition to the question of the constitutionality of the 
traditional methods of financing the i:ichools, the judiciary is still 
involved in enfo:rcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits 
discrimination in education based on race. Also, the question of 
whether federal funds should be allocated to public schools only, or 
to public and parochial schools, will necessitate further court in-
volvement in education matters. Therefore, opportunity is abundant 
for those educational historians who wish to devote the major part of 
their discussion to the role of the judicial branch and federal aid 
to education. 
In addition to the fact that the impact of the judicial branch 
of the federal government on federal aid to education is an area 
which is lacking in historical coverage is the realization that the 
executive branch has al$o been neglected. 'l'here have been a few works, 
mostly unpublished doctoral dissertatione, concerning the executive 
6 . 
"Legal Developments in Urban Education," Equcation and Urban 
Society (February, 1972), p. 249. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court 
agreed to hear a case similar to the Califo:rnia case during the 1973 
sessi:on. This one is Rodriquez vs. San Antonio Independent School 
District, decided by a Texas District Coul;"t on December 23, 1971. For 
the details of this case and possible ramifications of the Court's 
decision, see RichardMf,Pious, 11The Judiciary and Publ:j.c School 
Financing," Current History, LXI'.U (Augm;it, 1972), p. 57. Also 
note Edwin A. Roberts, Jr,., "The Fourth R: Rodriquez,~ National 
Qbserver (February 24, 1973), p. 1. 
5 
branch and federal aid, but t,hey have in general focused on only one 
otr two Prei,;idents, and in the main, relied primarily on public speeches 
of the President ;for source material;;, 7 Over the past twenty years, 
the President's role as initiator of legislative items had gradually 
changed so that this approach of studyiJJ,g the PreE;ddent' s public 
speeches is no longer su;fficient to portray tlle total significance of 
Presidential influence on legislative matters. 
A variety of factqrs, including the emergence of 
America as a world power, the growth of the executive 
branch, the communications revplution, and the indus-. 
trialization and urbanization of American society, 
have contributed to the expansion of the Presidential 
office far beyonµ tha 1:i,mi ts conceived by the authors 
of the Constitution. 
I To help carry out his varied duties, the President has, out of 
necessity, had to develop a certain amount of dependency on executive 
aides. Thus, it is obvious that many actors with different roles are 
l 
to be found in the executive branch, with each participant having some 
influence on the final result. But documented works which deal with 
the role of the executive staff are few. Beginning with the report of 
the President's Committee on Administrative Management, chaired by 
Louis Brownlow, in 19)6, the office of President has undergone several 
studies dealing with the Presidency from legal, historical, and consti-
tutional viewpoints. However, such stuqies of the ''institutionalized 
Presidency" have not explored in detail the personalities in the formal 
and informal network of advisors who facilitate Presidential leadership. 
?Most notewortq.y is Don Thomas Martin, "The Public Statements of 
:Presidents Truman and Eisenhower on Federal Aio. to Education.lf 
(Unpub. Ph.D, dissertation, Ohio State University, 1970). 
8 Meranto, p. 100. 
6 
With reference to the executive branch, the Jopnson administra-
tion ¥as chosen because, as will be shown later, it has been the most 
successful in efforts to promote federal aid for elementary and 
secondary schools. 9 President Johnson ,:s ·administration almost doubled 
the amount of support fo;r elementary and secondary schools in one 
year, General federal aiq to education (excluding health, veterans' 
benefits, n~tional d~fense expenditures) jumped from 1.6 billion 
doHars to 2.9 billion. dollars from 1965 to J,966. lO Also, this admin-
istration, move than any other, took the major initiative in, sponsoring 
school aid legislation for th~.elementary and secondary schools to the 
point of almost dominating Congress, However, such initiative on the 
part of the President was not without its detractors as voiced by 
Senator Winston Prouty (Republican, Verm~nt) during the debates ove.r 
the Elementary-Secondary Act in 1965.: "Today may be the day when the 
Senate of the United States, after 176 years of greatness, yields to 
the insistent demand of a Ohief :E;xecuti ve its right and duty to 
perform its true lei;,islative function. 1111 
! 
9'.l'he John.son adminis.tration provides an excellent opportunity to 
portray the growing impo~·ta.qce e>:t' the e:xecuti ve staff. See Chapter 
I.II, !!The Pervasive Executive" in Stephen K. Bailey, The New Congress 
(New )'.'ork, .. 1966), .. pp.~ 2.8-J8,. for coverage of ±he recent expansion of 
the roles of the executive branch and li~ison of:t'icers. Also, Thomas 
E. Cronin .andN.orman C. 'l'homas bave published an analysis of the mem-
bership of. twenty,.,.six a-dvi.sory bodies who helped to guide the Office 
of Education and .the Johnson administration during the period 1966-69, 
in Thomas E. Gronin and Nonnan c. 'l'homas·, "Educational Policy Advisors 
and t.he Great Society," Public Policy (Fall, 1970). 
10 d . , Bureau of the Budget, 11 Fe era! Education Programs Special 
Analysi$, 11 Aides Files, CaUfano Fqleler, The Pu·b-lic P1:tpers of Lyndon 
Baines Johnison, Johnson Library. ~eprint of :PP• 11,3 ... 3.3. 
11 .· . 
Con2ressional Record (.i\pr:i,l 7, 1965), pp. 7064-65. 
7 
But, "the fact that some may view President Johnson's role in the 
proceedings as 'presidential leadership' and others as 'political 
armtwisting' is secondary. The primary fact is that he pushed for 
12 federal aid as no other postwar President had, and h,e was successful." 
The President's s4ccess witp Congress can be illustrated by the fact 
that of a total of 469 legislative proposals submitted to Congress in 
1965, 323 wer~ approved, an approval rate of 68.9 per cent, which 
exceeded all Presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1J ln addition, 
the Johnson administration was chosen because the history of what one 
does with an issue in ~he past is an important precedent for what one 
is likely to do wii:;p the same issue in the future. Recent contro-
versies concerning federal aid have shown that the traditional national 
issues of racial segregation, separation of church and state, states' 
rights, and fear of federal control, did not die with the passage of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 14 These issues are to 
remain alive, just as potentially explosive as ever, and they will 
have to be reconsidered in the futu:re, no matter what method of fi-
. 15 
nancing il:;he seh<'>Q'HL is proposed,· 
,;,_--;;,..-.}:x,.;".'i-'·· 
12see Appendix H, p. 322 0 
13Eidenberg and Morey, p. 228. 
14For example!, SE!e Presi,dE!nt Nixon's action in regard to bussing 
in 1972, see Conclusion, p. 263. 
15The tax credit, and the voucher, are two current proposals which 
are undergoing cdnsiderablE! debate. See Conclusion for fy.rther E!X-
planation of these two proposals, and possible ramifications on federal 
aid to education. Also note Ed\tcation U.S.A. (May l, 1972), for infor-
mation on tax c;redi t proposals,.· and· for ..... thE!Office o:f Economic Oppor-
tunity "Education Vouchers Experiment", see Education Reccl.ps (June, 
1970) G 
8 
There are two theories regarding President Johnson and his 
16 
success with the Eighty-Ninth Congress. One is that most of the 
bills passed during Johnson's term were originally proposals made by 
President Kennedy, and if President Kennedy had lived, they would have 
been passed anyway. The reason that they had not passed during 
Kennedy's term was that Congress was determined to make the youthful 
President sweat a little, and that Congress is a cumbersome mechanism 
which operates alowly. 17 '''l;yn.don then, inherited a ready made si tua-
tion to exploit, and he 111erely k;ept the legialative ball rolling.11 18 
The other theory credits President Johnson's leadership as the key to 
obtaining passage of legislative proposals, and maintains that 
"Johnson's fabled legislative skills took an. obstructionist Congress 
and made it work his will where Kennedy 1:lad failed.11 19 
Giving due credit to Kennedy's support o{ education, with respect 
to the Elementary and Secondary ~ducation Act, the choice of this 
writer is the position that Johnson's leadership was most influential 
in the formation, as well as the final passage, of the bill. This 
position will be elaborated upon further on in the study, so it will 
16 Eidenberg and Morey, pp. 29-33 • 
. 
17
~~·id., P•. 31. Also, Bai],ey, in The ~ Congress, p. 29: "the 
first session of the 88th Congress was so unfriendly to President 
Kennedy's legislative agenda that news commentators and serious stu-
dents of government talked of a constitutional crisii;;. The first 
session of the 89th Congress was so friendly to President Johnson's 
legislative agenda as to create c;once:i:"ns that Congress had become too 
permissive, too deferential." 
18E· b M 3 1den erg and. orey, p. 1. 
19Ibid., p~ 32. 
Giving due credit to Kennepy's support of education, with 
respect to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the choice of 
this writer is the position that Johnson's leadership was most influ-
ential in the formati9n, as well as the final passage, of the bill. 
This position will be elaborated upon further on in the study, so it 
will suffice to say 4t this point that although both Presidents did 
support federal aid to education more than their predecessors, 
President Kennedy's "willingness to exert his full re.sources on 
20 Congress to enact a program has been questioned." According to 
Hugh Douglas Price's study of the 1961 ~chool-aid legislative battle: 
11 The President was simply not prepared to jeopardize his whole legis-
lative program--and perhaps his chances for re-election--by a bitter 
fight to the death for aid to education. "21 
The Elementary andSecondary Education Act has undergone a great 
deal of criticism recently because it suppose.~Uy has not lived up 
t •t . . 22 o i .s provisions. There is some ju~tice to these remarks, and 
9 
hopefully the Elementary and Secondary Education Act will be given more 
perspective by studying briefly what happened to th,e program once it 
became law. Traditionally Preaidents have had a more difficult time 
implementing programs because one type of leadership is required to 
20 
·· Meranto, p. 103. 
21Hugh Douglas Price, ''Race, Religion, and the Rules Committee," 
in Allen F. Westin, ed., The U$es of Power (New York, 1962), p. 68. 
-~-
22Arthuryne,J.,,l'aylor, "Federal Financing of Education, 1945-
1972,11 Current History, LXIl (June, 1972), p, JOO, and Joel s. Berke, 
et al,, Federal A:id to Public Education: Who Benefits? u. s. Senate 
Select Committee on Equal Opportun:ity (Washington, D,C., 1971). 
10 
push a program through the legislative process 1 and another to imple-
ment it. Such programs sometimes become bogged down in bureaucratic 
paperwork and usually involve many additional compromises, problems, 
and issues. 
Scope and Limitations 
There were more reports, recommendations, and comments made 
public on education legislation and programs during the years 1963-69 
,f .· ... 
than ,Janyone could possibly digest thoroughly. For example, some 
200,000 documents were released for the public at the Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library on education alone, not to mention the many United 
States Office of Education reports, and a plerttiful supply of news-
paper and journal articles. 
This study is primarily concerned with the influence of the 
Johnson administration on the passage and the implementation of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Those educational programs 
which are not directly concerned with the common school, such as higher 
education and adult education, are omitted. 
An area which is an issue to some students of federal aid is the 
definition of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as a "general" 
aid to public education bill, The Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act has been compared to "categorical" programs, i.e., programs such 
as the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, which promoted vocational education; 
or to "impacted" legislation, such as the Lanham Act of 1940, which 
provided funds for school districts heavily "affected" by increase in 
11 
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enrollment due to the presence of federal personnel. The Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act does hllve some l!categorical" and "impacted" 
characteristics, designed by President Johnson to gain support, but 
even so it could be classified as a general aid to education bill, 
i.e., one which gives money to schools for the general support of 
educating the local youth. The reason for this choice of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act being classifiec:I as a general 
aid bill is that more than ninety per cent of the total school dis-
tricts in the United States received aid under the Act, and the local 
school districts were given a great deal of flexibility in the programs 
21* 
and funds they could µse. For example, Title I funds were specified 
to be spent on aiding the poverty student at the local level, but the 
local school district decided what· poverty program to promote with the 
money. But regardless of whether the legislation should, or should not, 
be termed general, it was a major new school bill and ranks among the 
most important school legislation in our nation's history. 
Sources of the Data 
This paper was conceived due to the opening of the Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, in February of 1972. The Johnson 
papers on education were opened to the public at that time, and 
subsequent studies at the Library by this author have proven very 
23Meran to, pi A • 
24,See Ibid., pp. 3-7, for further elaboration on this position~· 
Also, note the administrative provisions in Appendix A, pp. 287-288. 
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fruitfui. 25 Primary source materials obtained from this library 
were oral histories, executive memoranda, task force reports, and 
speeches of President Johnson and his staff. 
The Oral History Project at the University of Texas has taped 
over one thousand interviews with persons involved in the Johnson 
administration in one way or another. Twenty of these oral history 
reports, directly concerning education, proved very useful in the 
completion of this work. Additional reports concerning other 
topics will be available when the papers dealing with civil rights 
and poverty are opened. A list of the oral histories consulted 
is provided in the bibliography. 
In addition to oral histories, there are twelve task force 
reports which are now opened to the public. These task force reports 
made between 1964 and 1969 offer a golden opportunity for study by 
someone as a separate topic in itself. The use of the task force 
(a group of specialists in various fields related to education from 
all over the United States brought in by the White House to study a 
particular problem and issue recommendations for a course of action) 
began to increase during the Kennedy administration. Prior to that 
time, the pattern normally involved the formulation of a legislative 
program almost exclusively on the basis of proposals developed by the 
departments and agencies of the executive branch and submitted to 
25The education papers are the first category of Presidential 
Papers to be opened to the public, constituting over 200,000 
documents. Still undeveloped, the Library offers a great potential 
for future researchers. 
26 the President through the Office of Management and Budget. 
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The task forces brougq.t together so111e of the nation's best minds 
and focused their efforts on the initial problems of t:he day. They 
functioned primarily to aid the President in formulating his legis-
lative program. 
The roots of the task force idea lay in the 11]:irain trusts" of 
President Franklin Roosevelt's administration. Following Roosevelt, 
President Eisenhower used a similar idea when he called a White House 
Conference on Education in 1955. President Johnson used the task 
forces even more than President ~enredy, and to avoid some of the 
problems that President Kennedy had about the publicity of the task 
forces and their recommendations, he kept the :i;-eports secret. 27 
The first task force called by Preside~t Johnson was in 1964 on 
education problems and was primarily responsible for many of the items 
that later appeared in the Elementary and Secondar~ Education ,Act. 28 
Because of the success of the Task Force on Education, President 
Johnson utilized this procedure and ca1led several other task forces 
during his administration. All of these task force reports were kept 
26Norman C. Thomas and Harold L. Wolman, "Policy Formulati~n in 
the Institutionalized Presidency: The Johnson Task Forces," in Thomas 
E •. Cronin anq Sanford D. Greenberg, The Presidential Advisory System 
(New York, 1969), p. 125. The old Bureau of the Budget underwent a 
name. change, July 1, 1970. 
27 
· For further elaboration on this point, see William E. 
Leuchtenberg, "The Genesis of the Great Society," The Reporter,XXXIV 
(April 21, 1966), pp. J6-J9. 
28 See C. Phillip Kearney, 11 The 1964 Presidential Task Force on 
Education and the 1Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 11 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967). 
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secret until their release in the Jonnson Library, and now provide 
an untapped resource of original material on the Johnson administ:ra-
tion. The task·forces on educational problem!:! examined in connection 
with this work include: the 1964 Garqner Task Force, the 1966 Early 
Ch,ildhood Task Force, the 1967 Friday Task Force, and the 1967 Inter-
agency Task force. The bibliography conta;ins further details on the 
task force report!:! in addition to th,eir use in th.e body of th.is study. 
A numbeJ;" of documents were obtained from the ,i\.idef Files at the 
Johnson Library, wbich containeo. a variety ~f miscellaneous documents 
which were pertinent to education and. the specific dqties of the 
individual staff members. 
Other primary source· materials used were tbe Congres$ional• 
Quarterl;r, whicb provided an excellent source on issues within the 
legislative brancb, along .with the Congressional Record. The most 
important document along this line r~garding federal aid to education 
is "Federal Role in Education," published by the Congressional 
Quarterly in 1965. J\.noth.er document, 11The Federal Government and 
Education," U.S. Congress,·f{ouse I)ocument Number 159 (88th Congress, 
First Session, 1963), along with several United States,Office of 
Education publications, ~rovided an abundance 1of statistics about the 
federal government's involvement in education. 
A good explanation of the F;lementary and. Secondary Education Act 
is contained in United State:;; Senate, Committee on I.iabor and Public 
Welfare, Elementary and Seconda.J"Y Education Act of 1965: Background 
...,__ -............-
Material ~ Related Presidential Recommendation~~ (89th Congress, 
First Session, 1965). 
Also, Educational Research Information Clearinghouse on Edµcation 
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(ERIC) provided a tremendous service in locating many articles and 
publications during the past few years on federal aid to education, 
especially those areas concerning problems in implementing the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 
In the area of secondary source material a number of noteworthy 
works were consulted. One of best volu~es which presents a concise 
analysis of the historical background of the role of the federal 
government in education, as well as representative arguments for and 
against the government's involvement in education, is Sidney Tiedt's 
The Role of the Federal Government in Education (New York, 1966). A 
number of other sources consulted regarding the history of federal aid 
to education are listed in the bibliography. 
For the origin of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and 
the issues facing the nation regarding federal aid duri~g the years 
immediately prior to the Johnson administration, Frank J. Munger and 
Richard F. Fenno, National Politics~ Federal~ to Education 
(Syracuse, 1962); and H. Douglas Price, 11Race, Religion, and the 
Rules Committee," in Allen F. Westin, ed., The Uses of Power (New York, 
-----, -
1962); and Robert Bendiner, Obstacle CourE;ie 2£. Capitol Hill (New York, 
1964) were consulted. 
Phillip Meranto, The Polities of Federal ~ ~ Educatiqn in 1965 
(Syracuse, 1967), deals extensively with the intricacies of political 
maneuvering by the Johnson administration and Congress in 1965 a.nd is 
an excellent source for gaining in,sigh.t into the legislative process 
involved in the school aid figh,t. Meranto's book was published before 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was fully implemented and 
i 
therefore, t:he passage of time has 1:eft a gap. 
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Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of 
Education Ad!)linisters ~ Law (Syracuse, 1968), and Eugene Eidenberg and 
Roy D0 Morey, An Act.£.!. Congress (New York, 1969) fill the gap left by 
Meranto by covering the problems faced in implementing the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act and the various changes that have occurred 
since 1965~ Testimony by former staff members of PreE?ident Johnson 
indicates that Bailey and Mosher•s work is highly regarded in its 
effort to present the changes that occurred in the Office of Education 
after 1965 in its effort to implement the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, Eidenberg and Morey's book includes an analysis of the 
federal aid to education controversy prior to 1965, as well as a brief 
coverage of sub$equent events. It ;is an excellent work, and by far the 
best encountered. 
Insofar as educational programs and policies are changing and will 
continue to change in the future, the papers made available at the 
Presidential ~ibrary should contribute to a better understanding of 
the dynamics of educational pol1tics. The education record of the 
year$ 1963-1969 cannot be v1ewed in any.final sense. If this study 
has contributed in any way to aqding material for future studies, it 
has served its-purpose. 
Organization of the Study 
It may be noted that the vastness of the education legislation 
during the Johnson Years offers an opportupity for many types of 
studies. Therefore, studies will be extremely specific and will not 
be afforded the luxury of comprehensiveness. So the organization of 
this study has left out many areas which will be brought out in other 
17 
studies and included some areas covered by past works. Such a fact is 
a necessity for a work to become that which can be handled in a le-
gitimate manner. 
In order to portray the magnitude of the events regarding federal 
aid between 1963 and 1969, Chapter II presents a historical survey of 
federal aid to education prior to the Johnson Years. There are two 
parts; part one traces the history of legislation in the area of 
federal aid to schools; and part two traces the efforts of past 
Presidents in initiating, or sup;,.:>orting, federal aid. 
Chapter III attempts to show the influence of President Johnson's 
supporting company between 1963 and 1969. This coverage of the sup-
porting cast is divided into two parts·; part one deals with the role 
of the aides in the executive branch, and part two covers the role of 
key men in Congress in obtaining passage of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act. 
Chapter IV presents the immediate background to the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, It encompasses the Kennedy 
proposals for education, the issues facing federal aid during the 
Kennedy years, and the eventual formation of an education platform 
by President Johnson in 1964. 
Chapter V deals with the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act itself, how and why it succeeded in passing through Congress, and 
the role of President Johnson in removing the obstacles which had 
been blocking such a measure in the past. 
Chapter VI deals with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
after it became law, and the eventual modifications and amendments 
that occurred between 1965 and 1969. The nation's attention, as well 
as the President's, had been gradually diverted to other areas during 
the latter part of the Johnson Administration, and the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act encountered many difficulties in the imple-
mentation process, 
The Conclusion presents recommen~tions for the uses of the 
information treated in the body of tne study. Financing public 
education, as well as the finandng of many other social services, 
is undergoing rapid changes. No study can anticipate, nor predict, 
the changes that will occur. But in dealing with whatever ~hanges 
we mi~ht have to introduce in the future, a 1:1tudy of our past efforts 
may prove fruitful in our endeavoring to try to provide an equal 
educational opportunity for all. 
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Clf.A.PTER II 
ijISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Introductioh 
Elementary and secondary education in the United States is a fifty 
billion dollar business serving more than fifty millior:1 students at 
approximately one hundred thousand locations. Nearly ninety per cent 
of this enterprise is "public," f:j.nanced through a number of methods 
ranging from local taxes, bond ,issues, and state grants to federal 
grants and matching funds. 1 Financing education, like a number of 
public services, has been a center of controversy which can be traced 
to a time before the founding of the Republic. 2 
Providing funds ~or the operation of public elementary and secon-
dary schools has historically been a local matter; however, the federal 
government has become ~ore and more concerned with public education. 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 h~ghlighted this 
increasing federal activity in the field of public education, and.con-
stituted a major breaktprough in th,e long and .controversial fight over 
federal aid to education. 
1D. Bruce Johnstone, "Ji'inancing American Education Today: An 
Overview," Current History, LXU (June, 1972), p. 1. 
, 2Ibid. 
19 
20 
In order to portray the significance of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act as a legislative measure in aiding the common 
schools, as well as President Johnl!lon's initiative in obtaining 
passage of the bill, a framework of past activities of the federal 
government in the field of education must be understood. The magni-
tude of the measure passed in 1965 cannot be adequately judged unless 
one looks at both the past actions of Congress, as well as Presidential 
initiative, in .the field of federal aid to education. 
Education Congress 
Former House Speaker, .John McCormack, was hintin:g at the role of 
history when he stated: "The business of Congress today was conceived 
yesterday and will be amended tomorrow •••• ,,J Such a statement 
reflects the fact that one of Congress's most effective tools in 
performing present functions is past experience. The Eighty-Ninth 
Congress has been calle(l tbe "Education Congress" because of its co-
operation with President Johnson in pas~ing many education measures, 
but the lUghty-Ninth Congress was not the first to be noted for its 
role in education. President Johnson indicated this when, in 1964, 
he summarized the accomplisl;J.ments of another so called"Education 
Congress," the Eighty-Eighth Congress. 
Ttte Eighty-Eighth Congress established new landmarks 
in the field o:f education: aid for academic facilities in 
higher education and community colleges; vc;>eational educa-
tion; improvements and extensions of the National Defense 
·Education Act; manpoweJ;" development and training; medical, 
dental, and nursing education; educational television; 
JQuoted 'in Eugene Eid~nberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of 
Congress (New York, 1969), p. 15. 
education for the handicapped; library services and 
construction; the education provisions of the recently 
passed anti-poverty program; and other special pro-
grams. For these outstanding accomplishments, the 
Congress has earned our gratitude. This Congress 4 
will go down in history a13 "The Education Cong:r;-ess. 11 
The accomplishments of the Eighty-Eighth Congress were indeed 
impressive, but even more were the accomplishments of the 
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Eighty-Ninth. The Eighty-.Ninth Congress authorized more than a billion 
dollars annually for improving the education of the handicapped 
alone. 5 Many other areas of education, such as higher education and 
international education, were aided by the many legislative measures 
that were enacted by the Eighty-Nin-th Congress. In additipn, for the 
first time in history, a bill for the support of elementary and secon-
dary schools was enacted by Congress. 
Speaking at the White House following the enactment of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act, President Johnson stated: 
I am very proud of your House of Representatives and 
your United States Senate, and I know every American who 
looks to our future will join me in applauding the historic 
action that Congress has just taken. Since 1870, almost a 
hundred years a:go, we have been trying to do what we have 
just done--pass an e~ementary school bill for all the 
children of America. 
· And again two days later, April 11, 1965, the President declared 
'*Quoted in American Association of School Administrators, The 
Federal Government and Public Schools (Washington, 1965), p. 7.--
5Ibid., p, 413. 
6Lyndon Baines Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
·United States, Containing Ute Publfc Messages, Speechei;;, and Statements 
of the President, 1965 (Washington, 1965), p. 407; (Hereafter cited 
as Johnson, Public Papers). 
upon signing the bill, that the measure represented a "major new 
commitment of the Federal government to quality and equality in the 
schooling we offer our young people. 117 The President then applauded 
the members of Congress who had supported the legislation saying: 
"They will be remembered in h;istory as men and women who began a new 
day of greatness in American Society," and that no measure had 
"signed or ever will sign, means more to the future of America. 118 So 
it can be seen that the Eighty-Ninth Congress did have a legitimate 
claim to being called the Education Congress. But this claim, like 
all others, has roots deep in the past, 
Although the financing of education. hap been for the most part 
a state and local matter, the politics of education on the national 
scene has been a persistent part of our history. Since even before 
the founding of the Republic, the national government has acted in 
many areas to promote the cause of education. 
For example, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had 
not mentioned education in the drafting of the Constitution. 9 There 
has been considerable scholarly discussion about this omission of 
education from th~ United States Constitution, and it is an issue 
which will be examined later. 
7Jo~son, Public Papers, p. 413. 
8rbid. 
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9 Sidney W. Tiedt, The Role of the Federal Government in Education 
(New York, 1966), p. 16:--11.-.-. of the many reasons for th-;-omission 
the Jost plausible appears to be that the writers of the Constitution 
could not foresee the comple~ity and immensity of the present system 
of education." See this chapter, pp. 42-44. 
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The fact that dele9ates to the Constitutional Convention did not 
mention education did not necessi;trily mean a lack of interest in edu .. 
cation. There has always been a national interest in education. How-
ever, this interest in education has been the result, in a number of 
cases, of more pressing concerns with other areas such as war, poverty, 
and unemployment. TJ,.us,.education ;Legislation has been typified as 
a "broken front" approach .in which various gaps in education are filled 
as a result of pressures only indirectly related to education. lO 
Land Grants 
The first e~ample of legislation specifically involving the 
national government in education was the Land Ordinance of 1785. 
The act set aside one section of every township of t:be Northwest 
Territory for the support of public schoojs by the states or terri-
tories. This policy was reaffirmed with the passage of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 wnich stated; "Religion, morality, and knowledge 
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
11 
schools and the means of education :;;hould foreveri be encouraged." 
Thus a policy of granting tand for the support of the public schools 
was established, This policy of land granting was continued under the 
Statehood A~ts, beginning with the Ohio Enabling Act of 1802. 12 
10Howard R, .. Jones, F:i.nan¢in'1 PubJ_ic Elementary and Secondary 
Educat:i,on (New York, 1966), p. 102. 
11 Quoted in Tiedt, p. 16. 
12Ibid., p. 17. 
The policy of setting aside the sixteenth section of 
each township for the public schools was followed for 
states admitted between 1802 and 1848. When the Oregon 
territory was established in 1848 1 Congress set a$ide 
two sections of e~ch township for the public schools. 
This policy was continued until 1896, when Utah was granted 
four sections in every townsh;ip. Similar grants were made 
to other western states, admitted after that year.13 
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According to a study of the land grants by Fletcher H. Swift, the 
land granted to schools by the Federal government under the land grant 
policy totalled over one hundred thousand square miles. 14 For a few 
states, the income from these lands was substantial, but in a number 
of other states, the money was wasted due to poor handling of the funds. 
Swift classified eleven of the thirty land grant states as ones which 
15 badly handled their funds from school lands. 
It was the hope of some in the early days that the 
income from school lands would oe sufficient to pay fo;r 
most of the cost of the public schools. However, this 
was a vain hope .and would have been so even if the public 
lands had been well managed in all cases. But the early 
grants of land and of ;funds had great significance for 
the public schools. These Federal grants stimulated 
the interest of the states in public schools. When the 
states found that income from Federal grants was in-
sufficient to support their schools, they began to 
provide state grants-in-aid. Therefore, the early 
Federal grants in effect established the precedent for 
state aid for the public schools, 1 6 
Besides aiding in the area of state aid to the public schools, 
other items of i;;ignif,i.cance regarding these early land grants which 
13 Roe L. Johns and Edgar L. Morphet, The Economics and Financing 
of Education (New Jersey, 1969), p. 418. 
14Fletcher Harper Swift, Federal ,and State Policies in Public 
School Finance in the United States (B~on, 1931), p. 59. 
15r "d bi • ' p. 
16 Johns and Morphet, p. 421. 
25 
affected the federal aid to education issue. First, these +and grants 
were classified as general aid to the schools; and second, the federal 
government had no control over the way the money was spent. This was 
the first, and last time that the federal government gave aid for 
general sch,ool purposesi without any controls until the passage of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Yet even here the federal 
government had some control over the method of allocating the funds. 
The departure from the policy of general a;i.d with no control came with 
the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862. 
The Morrill Act of 1862 is considered to be the first attempt to 
establish through Congressional action a national policy with regard 
to federal aid to education. 17 The act is a departure from the earlier 
land grants in tnat the federal government enumerated a specific type 
of education to be supported, i.e., Colleges of Agriculture and the 
"Mechanic Arts." 
The original provisions of the act granted thirty thousand acres 
of land to the individual states for each of its Senators and Repre-
sentatives. Under the Morrill Act seventeen mil'lion acres of land was 
given to the various states for the support of education. 18 This act 
is of great significance because it again demonstrated tne national 
interest in education. It ~lso showed that "when existing educational 
l 7 Gordon c. Lee, ~ Struggle for Federal Aid (New York, 1949), 
quoted in Tiedt, p. 18. For the contrasting Presidential views of 
Presidents Lincoln and Buchanan on the Morrill Act, see pp. 48-49 of 
this Chapter. 
18 Don Thomas Martin, riThe Public Statements of Presidents Tr.uman 
and Eisenhower on Federal A:id to Educationll (unpub. Ph.D. disser-
tation, Ohio State University, 1970), p. 2. 
institutions did not provide adequately for the 'general welfare,' 
the federal government could and would take action.1119 
26 
At the time the Morrill Act was passed education was, in the main, 
academic in character, The institutions of higher education that 
existed at that time were aiming at training the select few in classi-
cal pursuits. The new colleges authorized under the Morrill Act marked 
a turning point in the nature of the curriculum of higher edu.ca.tion 
institutions. Their curricula now included subjects that broaden.eo 
the scope of higb,er education, and as a result their educational pro-
-grams grew in pQpulari ty, stimulating other phases of education such as 
secondary education. "The influence of these land grant colleges has 
been so great that they have contributed substantially to liberalizing 
20 the educational programs of many nonland-grant colleges." In 
addition, a land ~rant college is also the principal state university 
in thirty-two states. 21 
Also, because of the importance placed upon science and agricu1-
ture, the land grant institutions evolved into major research stations 
for agricultural and scientific expe!'imentation and have been credited 
as a major factor in helping promote a rising industrial nation. 22 
Because of their value in promoting education, Congress has con-
tinued to support the land grant institutions authorized under the 
19Johns and Morphet, p. 421. 
20rbid. 
i 
21 Ibid. 
22 For further discussion on this point, see Frederick Harbison 
and Charles A. Myers, Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth (New 
York, 1964), p. 15i. 
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Morrill Act; "Under this act and subsequent additions and amendments, 
the present total annual appropriations by Congress to the 68 existing 
land grant colleges in the United States and Puerto Rico is 14.5 
million dollars a year. 1123 Following the Morrill Act, no new federal 
act of any major significance to the publio schools was passed by 
Congress until 1917. 
Vocational-Categorical 
As mentioned, land grants were obviously a general aid to edu-
cation measures because the federal government did not have a great 
deal of control over how the revenue was spent. The move toward 
specific, or "categorical," aid came wit'.11 the passage of the Smith-
Hughes A.ct of 1917. Originally t;t'ie act authorized "approximately 
seven million dollars annually for the promotion of vocational edu-
cation in agriculture, in trade and indu~trial education, and in home 
economic.s. 1124 'l'he funds provided by the act were for educational in-
stitutions below college ~evel and provided the first special purpose 
grants m1:tde available. to. the pu~l:i,G ·ec.hools by Congress. 25 
23John J~ Whealen, Ph.D. 11A History of Federal Aid to Education, 
1785-1965; 11 Legislation, Federal Aid to Education File (Ex/Le/Fa2), 
The Public Papers of ~yndon Baines Johnson, Johnson Library, p. 7. 
-- ' .. ~ . 
24 
· The Federal Government and Public Schools, p. 20. 
-------.... 
~5 . Johns and Morpl'let,.. pp. 1.t.-22 .. 42,3. The original Smi th .... Hughes Act 
required dollar-for-dollar matching by the states and local units. 
Some states provided all the matohing funds required from state reve-
nues. Other states required local units to match the state funds 
dollar-for"'."dollar and thereby provide half the matching fwids required 
by the federal government. This retarded the develop~ept of vocational 
education in some of the least wealthy districts because of their in-
ability to provide the required matching funds. 
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The passage of the Smith-Hughes brought the federal government 
into curriculum planning of the public schools in that it changed the 
nature of the high school fro~ an academic setting to a more compre-
hensive school. In other words, the Smith-Hughes was doing a similar 
thing to the public schools that the Morrill Act had done for the 
higher education institutions. The development of vocational educa-
tion, promoted by the Smith-Hughes Act, expanded the public schools 
in the direction of becoming a mass educational institution. 
"Between 1917 and 1963 the pattern of Smith-Hughes assistance 
was extended somewhat by a series of acts: the George-Reed Act 
(1929); the George-Ellzey Act (1934); the George-Dean Act (1936); and 
26 the George-Barden Act (1946). 11 As a result of these acts, by 1965 
"the annual Federal appropriation fo,:- vocational education rose to 
about 57 million dollars. 11 27 
National Crisis - War and Poverty 
One of the patterns of federal aid to education which has evolved 
has been the tendency of the federal government to pass legislation 
affecting education during a ~a:r or national emergency. This has, of 
course, tended to accentuate the staggering front of educational legis-
lation. For example, the Morrill Act was passed during the Civil War, 
26Howard R. Jones, Financing Public Elementary~ Secondary 
Education (New York, 1966), p~ 87. 
27Whealen, p. 21. This figure included app:ropriations for the 
Vocational Education Act of 1963 which could also be considered an 
extension of this type of assistance. Under the 1963 act, 806 
million dollars over fiscal years 1964-68 was authorized, plus 225 
million dollars for every year thereafter. 
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and the Smith,-Hughes Act was enacted during World War I. Educational 
activities by the federal government during times of crisis have been 
justified on the basis that they were necessary to provide for the 
common defense and to p~omote the general welfare of the nation. In 
terms of money expended, ~hese activities have been very large and, 
for· the :most. part, have passed Cohgress with little opposition. 28 
One of the major pieces of legislation affecting the schools in 
the 'twentieth century was the Serviceman's Readjustment Act (G. I. 
Bill of Rights) of World War II. The act was enacted in order to 
promote education and training for returning veterans whose education 
had been interrupted by the war. The G. I. Bill was a departure from 
prE1V.ious veterans' legislation in that instead of providing cash and 
land, this legislation attempted to provide training. 29 The G. I. 
Bill was extended following the Korean War to include servicemen from 
this conflict, so that there was a total of four basic pieces of 
legislation covering educational benefits for veterans. 30 
The impact of the G. I, Bill was both immediate and long range 
in nature. "The immediate impact on the colleges by returning veterans 
28J· ,Ohn· S u h t '·25 and 1 .. orp e , p. '* · • 
29Alice M. Rivlin, The Role. of the Federal Government in Fi-
nancing Higher Educatic>n (Washington":-I"961), pp. 64:-70. - -
30Ibid., p. 65. ( l) Public Law 16 (?8th Congress) provided vo-
cational rehabilitation and training for disabled veterans of World 
War II; (2) ,Public Law 894: (8lst Congress) extended similar benefits 
to dis~bled veterans of the Korean War; (3) Public Law 34:6 (78th 
Congress), as amenc;led, provided.educational and training allowances 
for al1 veterans for periods up to 48 mqnths, depending upon length 
of service; (4:) f>ublic Law 550 (82nd Congress) extended similar 
benefits to Korean veterans for perio'ds up to 36 months. 
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of World War II was tremendous. Male enrollment, which had already 
regained its prewar level by 1945-46, jumped from 928,000 in that year 
to 1,836,000 in 1947-48, almost all the increase being accounted for 
. 1131 by returning veterans. The huge increases in enrollments caused 
tremendous shortages in cl~ssroom space and fayilities. The G. I. Bill 
created an almost instant demand for higher education far beyond the 
expect~tions of anyone connected with education. The stimulation the 
G. I. Bill provided for higher education was also felt in the common 
schools. There were benefits available through the veterans program 
for less-than-college level eduqation, but the main stimuli came from 
the fact that the huge increase in the availability of higher education 
created larger enrollments for the public schools because a high school 
education was necessary to enter.college. Too, popularization of 
higher education by veterans raised the expectations of their children 
and created an increasing demand for education by the public. 
The G. I. Bill was a very. successful venture on the part of the 
federal government. "Approximately 7,800,000 veterans of World War II 
were sent to school under this act, which cost the government in the 
neighborhood of 14.5 billion dollars. 11 32 In addition, some 2.3 
million veterans of the Korean War attended school under veteran 
benefits. 33 
Federal aid to veterans has undeirgone some sign~ficant changes 
since its inception in World War II. "Initially, financial support 
31Rivlin, p. 69. 
32Tiedt, p. 25. 
33The Federal Government and Public Schools, p. 34. 
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was paid to the individual as well as the institution in which he was 
receiving his education or training. For Korean conflict veterans, the 
total payment was made directly to the individua1. 1134 Presently, not 
only Vietnam veterans, but all vet(;:lrans are receiving benefits at an 
ever increasing rate. Also President Nixon recently authorized a 
raise in the basic benefits for veterans and their families. 35 Thus 
it can be seen that the experiences of veterans' legislation has had a 
tremendous impact upon the American educational scene, and these legis-
lative measures connected with war set an important precedent for 
another educational measure which is also linked with a national 
crisis, the National Defense Education Act of 1958.36 
Congress explicitly recognized the relationship between education 
and national defense in the National Defense Education Act. 
The Congress reaffirms the principle and declares 
that the states and local communities have and must 
retain control over and primary responsibility for 
public education. The national interest requires, 
however, that the Federal government give assistance 
to education for programs which are important to 
our defense. 37 
The National Defense Education Act was an omnibus act, one which 
grouped together somewhat unrelated provisions, containing ten separate 
34 
.The Federal Government and Public Sc~ools, p. 34. 
3511News You Cari Use," U. s. News~ World Report, LXXIIJ 
(October JO, 1972), p. 69. 
36For further discussion, see Sidney Suffrin, Administering the 
National Defense Education Act (Syracuse, 1963). 
37Quoted in The Federal Government and Public Schools, p. 41. 
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titles. 38 The various titles of the bill affected both secondary and 
higher education in the United States, and authorized the expenditure: 
of federal funds for the following purposes: 
1) Providing loans tci students in institutions of higher learning.; 
,2) Providing equipment for and remodeling of facilities for 
science, mathematics, and foreign language teaching; 
3) Providing graduate fello~ships for those interested in 
teaching in institutions of highE)r learning; 
4) Providing assistance for guidance, counselin1;1, and testing 
services and for identification and encouragement of able 
·students; 
5) Providing centers for teaching modern foreign languages; 
6) Providing assistance for research and experi~entation in 
the more effective use of television.and other related 
audio-visual media; 
7) Providing assistance for certain area vocational programs. 39 
The primary reason for the formulation of the program came from 
the scientific advances made qy Russia, dramatized by the launching of 
Sputnik I in 1957. The military significance of such advances by the 
Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War spurred the United States 
into action, and the result was the National Defense Education Act. 
In total over one billion dollars was authorized under the program: 
Although NDEA was later criticized for warping the 
educational curriculum away from the humanities and the 
social studies, it was :nonethele_ss an important harbinger 
of .t.he kinds of Federal l,;upport for American education 
that blossomed in the mid-1960 1 5. It was categorical aid; 
it affected both secondary arid higher education; it was 
substantial in the volume of funding; some of its titles 
included religiou:;; affiliated institutions among NDEA's 
beneficiaries; and it p:roclaimei;l that education was a 
matter o:f national, concern.4:o 
38Jones, pp. 92-93·, There were ten titles in the original bill,· 
the eleventh was added :i.n 1964. Less than one-)1.alf of the titles 
provided money for the common school. 
39Jonns and Morphet, p, 430. 
40steph~n K. :Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of 
Education Administers !!. Law (NE;!w York, 1968), p. 20. 
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One of the biggest criticii;;ms aimed at the Act was the fact that 
many of the titles required matching funds in order to receive federal 
aid • 
• • • the Act tended to strengthen superior and wealthier 
secondary schools that had the staff, the equipment, the 
matching funds, and the students to profit from marginal 
infusions of Federal money for science, mathematics, and 
foreign languages. Poorer schools in the countryside41 
and in the urban ghettos were left largely untouched. 
Despite the criticisms aimed at the National Defense Education 
Act, it was an important forerunner of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 and was a major commitment on the part of the 
Federal government to aid education. 
It does not solve all of today's educational 
problems, yet never before in the Nation's history 
has there been so comprehensive a program of federal 
assistance to strengthen education at critical 
points 4~om the elementary grades through graduate 
school. 
During World War II large military posts were built rapidly in 
many locations throughout the United States. These installations 
created hardships for schools. because of the unusually large number 
of school children (dependents of ~ervicemen) who flooded local school 
systems.. The rise in tne number of children was not foliowed by a 
rise in the tax base of the school district because of the tax-exempt 
status of these military installations. To aid these communities, 
Congress passed the Lanham Act of 1941 which authorized aid for those 
"affected" or "impacted" districts in direct proportion to the number 
41stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of 
Education Administers a Law (New York, 1968), Po 20. 
~~
42Lawrence G. Perthick, 11 Box Score on the National Defense Edu-
cation Act, 11 ~Journal, XLVII (Sept.,1959), p. 37, quoted in: 
Jones, p. 95. 
of children involved. 4:3 
This-policy was continued in the postwar years with the passage 
of Public Laws 815 and 874 in 1950. 
~pproximately 5,100 school districts qualify 
for aid under the federally impacted programs. They 
enroll about U million children, or abou,t one-tb.ird 
of all public elementary and secondary school students 
in the United States. Of these students, a~~roximately 
1,7 million are term~d ;federally connected~ 
34 
Since 1950 the growth in popularity of the "impacted aid" programs 
has paralleled the growth in size and numbe:i;-s of federal installations. 
Even the. most implacable foe.\:! of federal aid 
share this enthusiasm--Senator Barry Goldwater, for 
example, whose state of Arizona received more than 
$84 m:i.llion in impacted aid f1,mds between 1951 and 
1965. During this same period the f~deral government 
spent over $3.5 billion on this program and,_has 
obligated almost $3 billion for future use. '*5 
Ai;iother area in wh,ich the federal government has enacted legis-
lation which. affected education as a result of a r:i,ational crisis bas 
been in the area of poverty and unemployment, i.e., economic crisis. 
During the depression years of the 193o•s, several programs were 
est~blished which aided education, but were set up as a means of coping 
with other national problems. These programs included th,e Civilian 
Conservation Corps, the National Youth. Aaministration, the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, the Public Works Administration, and 
431. M. Labovit~, Aid for ~ede:i;-ally Affected Public Schools 
.......---.. -. (New York, 1963). · 
44 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, The 
Federal Government ·and Educat;i.on (B-8th Cong., 1st Sess,, 1963) 
(Washington, 1963),-;:- 63. 
45Eidenberg and Morey, p. 17. 
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the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation. 46 
As indicated, many of these specific programs ended after the 
immediate crisis was over, but the principle remained and other 
measures were substituted. For example, the National School Lunch Act 
of 1946 was inaugurated as a result of surplus agricultural supplies 
and the experiences gained under the Federal Surplus Commodities 
Corporation program. Also, the justification of giving lunchroom 
assistance to both private and public schools was based on the concept 
that the assistance was going to the child and not the school. 
President Johnson used this same principle to help get around the 
religious issue in distributing funds for the Elementary and Secondary 
46Johns and Morphet, pp. 424-25: The CCC was established in 1933 
and abolished in 1943. 1his agency carried on or~anized educational 
activities for men in CCC camps, with over 2.7 million men partici-
pating. The NYA was established by executive order of the President in 
1935 and was liquidated in 1944. This organization provided work 
relief for thousands of secondary school and college students and 
enabled them to continue their education. The NYA also established 
special schools in some states. The FERA was established in 1933, 
superseded by the Works Progress Administration in 1939, and 
abolished in the early 1940•s. ~hese organizations carried on exten-
sive programs of school building construction, maintenance, and repair; 
paid the salaries of many teachers on.a relief basis in a number of 
states; supported educational projects for adult education, nursery 
schools, vocational rehabilitation, part-time employment of college 
students, and literacy and naturalization classes.; and provided labor 
for school lunchrooms, The PWA was established in 1933 and abolished 
in the early 194o•s. ):t made grants :for school buildings (first on 
the basis of JO per cent federal, funds and 70 per cent state and local 
funds and later on a 45-to-55 basis) and made loans for school building 
construct.ion. This matching requirement limited the benefits of the 
PWA largeiy to the school districts of greatest wealth. The FSCC was 
established in 1935. J;t purchased and distributed surplus commodities 
to school lunchro.oms operated on a nonpro:fi t basis. Some cash as-
sistance to lunchro9ms was also provided primarily1 for the purchase 
of surplus foods locally. This organization was administered by the 
Department of Agriculture. These aids were made available for lunch-
rooms operated by private, as well as by public schools. This was 
justified on the basis that lunchroom assistance 'is an aid to the 
child and not the school. 
Education Act of 1965. 
In s~mmary, there are several characteristics of the actions of 
the federal government in the area of federal aid to education which 
36 
can be garnered from the preceding survey of past legislation. 
Although education is primarily a state function, there has always 
been concern at the national level that each state assume its function 
of providing an adequate educational program. This concern was early 
shown in land grants for educational purposes and was voiced in the 
Northwest Ordinance: "The means of education sh,all forever be 
encouraged." In addition, federal grants-in-aid have frequently been 
pointed toward those parts of the educational program which appear 
to have been lagging in terms of national interest. The Smith-Hughes 
Act encouraging vocational education is a case in point. And too, 
many of the federal programs whi<::h have entailed the greatest 
expenditure of money have been by..:products of pressing problems on 
national concern other than education. Witness the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958. Also, when the federal government through its 
action creates conditions which place a hardship on local school 
districts, federal assistance is invoked. ;rhe "federally impacted 
areas" program illustrates this po;i.nt~ And finally, federal programs 
have been developed on a piecemeal basis, and there has been no 
over-all coordination. 47 
Thus it can be seen that.President Johnso;n was following a well 
beaten path when he labeled his educational program of 1965 as a 
4:?This summary based on Jones, p. 102. 
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11 war on poverty." Congress appears to have operated most effectively 
by basing its actions on past experiences, and President Johnson, 
being a former member of Congress, used those past experiences of 
Congress which were most :favorable toward gaining the paesage of his 
program. The time honored principles of "impacted f:1.id, 11 "national 
interest," and "categorical" programs were used by the President 
because he knew how Congress would respond. 
Not surprisingly, the Eighty-Ninth Congress proved receptive 
to this approach and responded with one of the major legislative 
' landmarks in American history, the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965. 
The relationship of past legislation affecting the common schools 
and the Elementary and Secondary iducation Act is best illustrated by 
a recent study which showed that more than 8q per cent of total 
federal revenues actually going to school districts are appropriated 
for the eight programs listed below: 
1) Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 (ESEA), financial assistance to local 
educational agencies for the education of children 
of low-income families; 
2) Title II of ESEA, school library resources, textbooks, 
and other instructional materials; 
J) Title TU of ESEA., supplementary educational centers 
and services; 
4:) Title XII of the National Defense Education Act 
of 1958 (NDEA), financial assistance for strengthening 
instruction in science, mathematics, modern foreign 
languages, and. other critical subjects; 
5) Title V-A of NDEA,·guidance, counseling, and testing; 
6) Vocational Education (aid for vocational education 
from all federal programs); 
7) School Lunch and Milk Program; and 
8) School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas, 
including Public Law 874 (general aid to offset 
increased school costs related to federal em-
ployees,) and Public Law 815 ( school construction 
money for similar purposes).48 
To underline the magnitude of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act and its relationship to its forebears, of the total 
revenue receipts from fede;i::-al sources for the school year 1970-71, 
which totalled a little over 3.1 billion dollars, the appropriations 
for Elementary and Secondary Education Act programs totalled over 
one-third of this amount. 49 
However, Congress does not act alone in passing legislation. 
Much of the credit for the passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
38 
Education Act in 1965 must go to President Johnson for his sponsorship 
of the bill, and pressing Congress to action. If this were true of 
President Johnson and the Eighty-Nineth Congress, · some truth can be 
held for past legislative action by Congress. So before an accurate 
judgement is possible concerning President Johnson and the Eighty-
Ninth Congress, a survey of past Presidential.init;i.ative regarding 
federal aid to education must also be made. 
Education President 
Taking office in i;he fall of 196), President Lyndon Baines Johnson 
48Joel s. Berke et al., federal Aid to Public Education: Who 
Benefits? U.S. Senate Select Committee~ Equal Educational Oppor-
tunlty (Washington, April, 1971), quoted in Arthuryne J. Taylor, 
"Federal Financing of Education, J,.945-1972, 11 Current History, LXII 
(June, 1972), p. JOO. 
49 Taylor, p. 301. 
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brought to the White House an image of an 11Education President. 11 With 
a legislative record of support for ed~cation and a background of some 
teaching experience, he had reason to be watched by educators for 
continued support of educational programs. 
Johnson demonstrated continuously that he deeply 
cared about maximizing educational opportunities, 
particularly for the disadvantaged. As a young ele ... · 
mentary anq secondary school teacher, and later as 
regional administrator of the National Youth Adminis-
tration, he had seen at first hand the difficulties O 
of teaching in :poverty a:r;-eas with inadequate facilities.5 
This concern witb the educational opportunities of the disadvantaged 
was very much evident while he was P:re1;ddep.t, as he indicated: 11 1 
believe that every child has the right to as much education as he has 
the ability to receive. 1151 
Personal and political ambitions are often interwoven so closely 
in a politician that it is difficult to comprehend what motivates that 
individuai.52 Sometimes ~ey iss~es are se;i.zed as an opportunity to 
promote self-interest. 
Whei:i Lyndon assumed the presidency, educat;i.on 
was both a major political item and the source of 
cleavage at\d tension among Congre$smen ;md education 
lobbies. Kennedy's stand on tne issue had attracted 
understanding, some support, and unprecedented 
public attention •• • 53 
50Thomas E. Cronin, "Tbe PFesidency and Education," Phi Delta 
Kap.pan, XLIX (February, 1968) , p. 29,5. 
51Johnson, "Presidential Policy Pape;r.Number1 One: Education," 
Public Papers, 1964, P• 754. 
52For further discuasion on politics and personal ambition see 
Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago, 1967) • 
....,......... 
53cronin, p. 295, 
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No doubt the President was aware of the political gains to be made 
from promoting education, but that is speculation. What is known is 
that most of his contemporaries testify to the fact that his interest 
in education was genuine. Typical of this testimony is one given by 
DougJ.ass Cater, Special Assistant to the President, and primarily 
responsible for drafting Johnson's speeches: 
Question: Did you find the President receptive to 
your ideas about education? 
Cater: I found he was very receptive, yes. I 
would not $ay "my idea.s. 11 lie was receptive 
to ideas which I forwarded for his con-
sideration. 
Question: So his reputation for interest in this 
area was genuine? 
Cater: Oh, very genuine, yes. He was in fact 
always urging. me on to bigger. tnd bolder 
ideas in the education field.5 
However, Presidential involvement in education is as old as 
federal aid to education, so perhaps a better perspective of Johnson's 
claim as an education President might be better served by a glimpse of 
past Presidential support of education. Although rankings of Presi-
dents according to their comparative achievements have been made, 55 
these rankings have not held true to form in regards to federal aid to 
education. For example, Presidents like Franklin D. Roosevelt, who 
have normally ranked high on the charts.of great accomplishments 
I 
regarding domestic i~sues, have taken a somewhat smaller part in 
54 Douglass Cater Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library (interviewed by David G. McComb, April 29, 1969, 
Tape Number One ) , p.. 12 .• 
55see Arithur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Paths to the Present (New York 
1949), pp. 93-111, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr:7'"°110ur Presidents: 
A Rating by 75 Historians," The New York Times Magazine (July 29, 
1962), p. 12. -. -. - -
promoting education; whereas Presidents like Ulysses S. Grant, who 
normally rank low on most measuring scales of Presidential greatness, 
have taken a great deal of initiative in the field of federal aid to 
education. Although ~h~re are some exceptions to this rule, for 
example, Presidents like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson would 
rank high on botn types of scales, it do~s point out the ;inherent 
weakness of any type of scale which purports to measure Presidential 
greatness. 
Early Presidents 
Lyndon Jonnson was the tenth President to enter the White House 
with a background of classroom teaching •. James Madison, John Adams, 
John Quincy Adams, Millard Fillmore, James A. Garfield, Chester A. 
Arthur, William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, and Warren G. Harding at one 
time or another had taught schooi. 56 In addition, numerous Presidents 
have voiced public support of education, beginning with George 
Washington's support of a proposed national university. 57 The idea 
that the promotion of education is an obligation of the national gov-
ernment, and that it should provide a national seat of learning was 
very close to the President's heart. 
The first word on the subject of a national university appeared 
in an article written by Benjamin Rush entitled 11Address to the 
People of the United States," in The AQterican Museum, a new magazine 
5611washington News," ~ Education Digest (January, 1964), p. 57. 
57For a complete and thorough discussion of the national university 
in American bistory see Dhvid Madsen, The National Univ,el,"sity (Detroit, 
. _,... 
1966). 
published in Philadelphia in 1787. In this article Rush laid out 
his proposal for the univerS1ity; 
To conform the principles, morals, and manners of 
our citizens to our republican form of government, it is 
absolutely necessary that knowledge of every kind should 
be disseminated through every part of the United States. 
For tnis purpose, let Congress, instead of laying 
I out half a mill.ion of dol;l.ars in building a federal town, 
appropriate only a fourth of that sum in founding a 
federal university. In this university, let everything 
connected with government, such as history--the law of 
nature and nations--,,the civil law--thE;i municipal laws of 
our country--and the principles of commerce--be tal,lght 
by competent professors •••• 58 
The articl~ was published four months before the convention of 
the Constitutional Convention, and possibly was read by some of the 
delegates, because the topic was discussed during the convention. 59 
It came up during the debates at the Convention in the form of a 
question to the chair relating to the power under the proposed Con-
stitution to establish. a national university. 60 Apparently, 
Washington, Madison, Pickering and others 
desired to pave a provision,insertea for the creation 
and maintenance of a national university at the' seat 
of government, but the general opinion was that the 
federal 6ower to do so was ample without specific 
mention. 1 
Despite subsequent proposc;1.ls by ooth James Madison and Charles Pinckney 
to authorize the establishment of a university, nothing came out of the 
58Froni Benjamin Rush, 11Address to the People of the1United States," 
American,Museum I (January, 1787), pp. 8-11. 
59Madsen, P. 21. 
60 Ellwood P. Cubberly, Public Education in the United States 
(Cambridge, 1934), p, 84. 
61 Ibiq., p. 266. 
Convention on the subject. 62 
Based on the opinions of the people at the Constitutional Con-
vention that the federal government had the power to establish a 
university, President Washington sought support from Congress to 
establish the institution beginning with his first message to Congress 
on January 8, 1790, in which he mentioned the national university and 
the need to establish one. Speaking about the need for promoting 
education, Washington said: 
Whether this desirable object will be best 
promoted by affording aids to seminaries of learning 
already established, by the institution of a national 
university, or by any other expedients will be well 63 
worthy of a place in the deliberation of the Legislature. 
Despite the President's urging however, Congress did not respond until 
1796 when a bill to create a national university was brought before 
Congress, but it failed. 64 The argument against the institution was 
based largely on the idea that it was too expensive and that the 
federal government had no right to interfere in state and local 
education efforts. 65 Despite the general opposition of Congress, 
Washington continued throughout his two terms of office to press for a 
national university but to no avai1. 66 Following President Washington, 
62 Madsen, p. 22. 
63James D. Richardson, A Compilation of t;he Messages and Papers 
of the Presidents, 1789-1897-;- I (Washingto~ 1899), p. 66.--
64 Madsen, p. 36. 
65 Ibiq., p. 37. 
66Ibid., pp. 25-34. ln addition, Washington donated stock in the 
Potom.ac Navigation Company in his will to be used in developing a 
university, but the Co~pany failed in 1828. 
Presidents John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, 
and John Quincy Adams all voiced support of the university, and pro,... 
posed such a program to Congress, but nothing ever came of the 
program. 67 
Desp;i. te the wishes of the 'founding fathers,' 
interest in the proposal seems to have lapsed -until after 
the Civil War. In 1869, John W. Hoyt began a long 
and ardent campaign for a national W1iversity by 
winning the.support of the National Teachers Associa-
tion (later called the National Education Association) 
for the me(:l.gure. .A whole series of bills in the 1870' s 
called for the establishment of a national university. 
Presidents Grant and Hayei;; called on Congress for 
favorable action, but still without results. Another 
flurry of legislative proposals occurred in the late 
1890's and another around 1905-07 •••• 
• • • In recent years, support for the proposal seems 
to have died out, although bills calling for the 
establishment of a national university were intro-
duced as late as the 1930' s, and proposals for 
national institutions of more limited scope haia 
appeared from time to time since World War II. 
So Washington's dream remained a dream, but the idea of federal 
involvement in education,, and Presidential support of education 
measures, did not and has not, disappeared, 
Of the founding fathers, the one that.promoted the establishment 
of public schooling the most was Thomas Jefferson. As a member of the 
Virginia State legislature, prior to becoming President, he had 
sponsored three important bills regarding education: one for tbe es-
tabli shment of religious freedom (enacted in 1785); another for the 
creation of free public libraries; and a third for the establishment 
67Rivlin, p. 116, 
68Ibid., pp. 116,...117, 
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of free public schools. Introduced in 1779 the plan for the free 
public schools was, and since has been, the cause of considerable 
debate. 
Jefferson's plan, like Jefferson nimself, has been 
the caµse of cor:isiderable contention. That its under-
lying ideas are not original, but probably French, is 
not unlikely--but it is also beside the point. That it 
accepts the doctrine of an intellectual elite, that it 
approaches the problem of educa.t;ing the poor in the 
sp;iri t o.f charity, that it fails to make school at-
tendance compulsory, that .it would have naught to do 
with the useful and practical subjects so necessary for 
the economic well-being of the masses--all this can be 
easily supported. Yet it is also true that Jefferson's 
proposal embodies the first thoughtful specific summons 
in America for the general diffusion of knowledge at 
public expense. And if Jefferson inclined toward an 
elite--something which in our current democracy has 
acquired a connotation of ,c~ntempt--then let it not 
be forgotten that he did not assume, as did nearly 
all the others of his era, that the common people have 
no business within this cultivated circle. For them 
the door was left ajar-.-narrowly to. be sure--but 
nevertheless ajar.7° 
The plan failed, and in 1817 Jefferson drew up another similar 
plan, but it also failed, Only one of Jefferson's educational ideas 
was ever realized--the establishment of tl:le University of Virginia. 
1,i,5 
Most of Jefferson's accomplisnments re~arding education we're fulfilled 
outside the office of President, and on the state level. But that 
does not necessarily mean that he did not try to obtain federal aid 
to education while he was President. In fact, Jefferson went so far 
as to propose in 1806 the use of a tariff on imports for public 
improvements, including the support of education. 
69Adolphie E. Meyer, Ph.D. An Educational History~~ 
American People (New York, 1967),p. 127~ 
?Oibid., p. 128. 
••• but the great mass qf the articles on which 
impost is paid are foreign luxuries, purchased by 
those only who are rich enough to afford themselves 
the use of tbemw Their patriotism would certainly 
prefer its continuance and application to the great 
purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, 
canals, and such other objects of public improve-
ment •••• 71 
However, Jefferson did hedge o~ the po1:1sibility of the federal gov ... 
ernment having the power to promote such activities under the 
Constitution. He indicated that he thought an amendment to the 
Constitution might be in order: 
I .suppose an amendment to the Constitution, by consent 
of the States, necessary, bec.ause the opjects now 
recommended are not among those enumerated.in the 
Constitution,, an('! to which it permi.t1;1 the public 
moneys to be applied.72 
46 
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison believed that the federal 
government should go beyond land granting to actual granting of money 
to improve the states• educational system. Madison felt that the 
national government should spend more money for the public schools 
and also tried to get a national university established in the 
District of Columbia • 
• I cannot presume it to be unseasonable to invite 
your attention to the advantages of superadding to the 
means of education provided by the several States a 
seminary of learning instituted by the National Legis-
lature within the limits of their exclusive juris-
diction, the expense of which might be defrayed or 
reimbursed out of the vacant grounds which have accrued 
to the nation within those limits.73 
71
~ichardson, p. 409. 
72Ibid., P• 410. 
?Jibid., p. 485. 
But a great deal of fear was present over whether tne federal govern-
ment had the power to ~pend public m9ney for something that was not 
enumerated in the Constitution, so nothing was done regarding Madison's 
recommendations. 
Another President of significance who affected our early edu-
cational pattern was .Andrew Jaclt'$on. His impact however, came in a 
different way: 
His election was a react;i.on against trained 
leadership in governmental affairs and was a precursor 
of a change in the cqaraeter of education itself. The 
period when the p_eople were to follow men of education 
and good breeding was now for a time largely past. 
The people had become impatient of the old claims 
as to the superiority of any class, and the demand 
for equal suffrage and for full participation in the 
functions of government now became too insistent 
to be disregarded longer.74 
The extension of suffraQe under the Jackson administration abruptly 
. change.d the role of. the common sGl:lools: 
With the extension of the suffrage to all classes 
of the populat;i.on,-poor as well as ric~, laborer as 
well as employer, the whole situation was changed, and 
there came to thinking men, often for the first t~me, 
a realization that general education had become a 
;fundamental necessity for t):l.e State • • • • 75 
The demand for equality of educational opportunity created new 
d~mands for support of the common schools, mostly on the state level, 
but the demand was present. T~e new feeling toward education brought 
about by the election of Jackson is best illustrated by the eloquence 
of Daniel Webster, in an address in 1837; 
74cubberly, p. 152. 
?Sibid., P• 153. 
Education, to accomplish the ends of good govern-
ment, should be universally diffused. Open the doors 
of the school houses to all the children in the land. 
Let no man have the excuse of poverty for not edu-
cating his off.!;lpring. Place the means of education 
within his reach, and if he remain in ignorance, be 
it his own reproach. • •• on diffusion of education 
among the peopl<;! rests the preservation and perpetua-
tion of our free institutions.76 
But despite the eloquence of Daniel Webster and the stimulus to 
education provided by the election of Andrew Jackson, the move was 
toward upgradt'ng education by state and local efforts, not by federal 
aid. President Jackson opposed aid to education on the national level, 
t 
believ;ing it to be a responsibility of state and local governments. In 
addition he vetoed a measure wnich1 called for utilizing proceeds from 
the sale of public lands to further education in the states in 1833, 
stating: 11The leading principle then asserted was that Congress 
possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys 
of the. United States for objectE;; of a local character within the 
States. 1177 
President Jackson was not the only President who opposed the 
national government's involvement in education. President Buchanan 
voiced doubts about the constitutionality of federal aid in his veto 
message of the first Morrill Bill in 1859: 
But tloes Congress possess the power under the Con-
stitution to make a donation of public lands to the 
different States of the Union to provide colleges 
for the purpose of educatin~ their own people? 
76cubberly, p. 156, 
77Richardson, III, p. 65. 
I presume the g.eneral. propo.si tion is undeniable 
that Congress does not possess the power to appropriate 
money in the Treasury, raised by taxes on the people 
of the United States, for the purpose of educating 
the people of the respective States.78 
Thus an old issue regarding federal aid--its constitutionality -
and an issue which had ca1,1sed some doubts among Congressmen when 
Washington's national university proposal was made, was raised again. 
The same question was raised again artd again far into the twentieth 
century without settlement. 
Three years after Buchanan's veto of the Morrill Bill, President 
Lincoln apparently seeing no constitutional barrier, signed the Morrill 
Act of 1862 into law. Lincoln, however, was an avid supporter of 
federal aid to education, as witnessed as early as 1832 in an article 
written by the future Pres~dent when he was campaigning for a local 
Congressional seat in Illinois. 
To the Peo.ple of Sangamo (N) County: 
Fellow citizens: Having become a candidate for the 
honorable office of one of your R,epresentatives in the 
next General Assembly of this State, in accordance with an 
established custom.and .the principles of true republi-
canism, it becomes my duty to make known to you, the people 
whom I propose to represent--my sentiments with ;regard to 
local affairs • , • • 
Upon the subject .of education, not presuming to 
dictate any plan or system respecting it, I can only say 
that I view it as the most important subject which we as 
a people can be eng~g,ed in.. That every man may receive 
at least a moderate·education, and thereby be enabled to 
read the histories of his own and other countries, by 
which he may duly appreciate the value of our free 
institutions •••• 
78The Federal Government and Public Schools, p, 8. 
••• For my part, I desire to see the time when 
education, and by its means, morality, sobriety, 
enterprise, and ind~st:ry, shall become mmch more 
.general than at the present, and should be grati:fied 
to have it in my power to contribute something to the 
advancement o:f any measure which might have a ten-
dency to accelerate the happy period. 79 
. A. Lincoln 
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President Lincoln's e:f:forts in promoting education :for the newly 
:freed Negro are well known, but it is o:f interest to note that a 
little over one hundre~ years later President Lyndon Johnson in his 
program to establish equality of educational opportunity, was still 
attempting to provide education :for those deprived o:f a full oppor-
tunity to participate in the American experience. 
Following Lincoln, the majority o:f the Presidents in the late 
nineteenth century :felt :federal aid to education was a necessity. 
Presidents U. s. Grant, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, and Ruther:ford 
Hayes all supported some :form o:f federal aid to education. Their 
reasons :for supporting federal aid is best reflected by President 
Hayes in 1877 in an Annual Mess&ge to Congress: 
) 
The wisdom o:f legislation upon the part o:f the 
Congress, in aid o:f the States, :for the education o:f the 
whole pe.ople in those branches .o:f study wqich are taught 
in the common schools of the country is no longer a 
question. • •• lt is vain to hope :for the success o:f 
a :free government without the means o:f insuring the 
intelligence o:f those who are th,e source o:f power. No 
less tp.an one-.seventh o:f the .entire voting population 
o:f our country are yet unable to. read and write. 
• . • I sha.l 1 be glad to give my approval to any appro-
priate ,measure,s which.may be enacted by Congress :for the 
purpose o:f supplementing. with national aid the local 
systems83:r education in th~se States and in all the 
States. 
79Quoted in Cubberly, pp. 156..,157. 
80Richardson, VII, p. 479. 
President Hayes also indicated in his speech that the concept 
of a national university was not dead. In connection with his dis-
cussion of some particular needs of the public school system of the 
District of Columbia, he said: 
I here add that l believe it desirable, not so much 
. with reference to the local wants of the District, but 
to the great and lasting bepefit of the entire country, 
that this system ,should be crowned with a university in 
all respects in keeping with the national capitol, and 
,thereby reali~I the cherished hopes of Washington on 
this subject. 
For those who feared the constitutionality of federal aid as 
voiced earlier by President Buchanan, President Benjamin Harrison 
gave an answer in 1889 in llis annual Sta.te of the Union Message: 
National aid to education has heretofore taken the 
form of land grants, and in that form the constitutional 
power of Congresi;; to promote the education of the people 
is not seriously questioned. l do not thi:qk it can be 
successfully que$tioned when the form is c):langed to that 
of a direct grant of money from the public treasury.82 
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Despite the passage of over one hundred years, dur'ing which time 
the majority of American Presidents supported federal aid to education, 
only a few legislative measures granting federal funds· for the support 
of education had been enacted~ The question that comes to mind, of 
course, is some possible reason for this lack of activity on the part 
of the federal government tow&rd granting federal aid to education. 
There is a difference between Presidential support of education, 
and Presidential initiative in sponsori~g aid bills and working for 
81Richardson, VII, P• 479. 
82 Fred L. lsrael, ed., The State of the Union Messages of~ 
Presidents, 1790-1966, II (N;-York, 1966),p. 1650. 
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their passage. The number of Presidents who have exercised Presi-
qent;i.al initiative in actively working for federal aid to education 
is relatively small. One of the possible reason~ for this is that 
until the Second World War, federal aid to education was not a major 
national domestic issue. With the advent of World War II and the 
usnering in of a new te·chnological age,· education became a major means 
of coping with the New World: 
Although many Prel;ilidents from Washington through 
Roosevelt gave some support tor federal aid to e·duca-
tion, and some federal aid was provided, it wa·s not 
until Truman .c.ame .. into office that a Pre.sident began 
to speak frequently about the subject and that it 
became an import~t national political issue. Hence-
forth, Presidents.have iqcluded f~deral aid to edu-
cat;i.on ptor.e frequently in their public statements, 
especially in their ~essages to Congress, and . 83 
· signi;ficantly more federal aid, ·has been appropri,.ated. 
Post World Wa:r· II Pre·sidents 
President Harry S. Truman was tne first to face the serious 
crisis in the common schools across the nation following World War II 
and called for federal aid to al~eviate the shortages in educational 
facilities. In his State of the Union Message of 1946, he indicated 
that he felt the federal government should aid those areas which could 
. . 84 
not support elementary and. secondary schools. And again in his 
Annual Buqget Message of 191,:7 he stated: "l have long been on record 
83 Martin, p. 5. 
I 
84Harry S. Truman, Public Pa.pars of the Presidents of the United 
States, ~ontaininf ~ Public Messa.ges7""°Spe;ches, anq S.trle~ts of 
the President, 19 6 (Washington, 1964), p. 65. """""'l 
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·for basic legislation under·which the Fedeval Government will supple-
ment the states to assist them to achie,re satisfactory educational 
standards.1185 
With Truman's Presidency, education became an issue which was 
tied up with many other major national problems, such as race, 
religion, and states' rights. 'In 1949, a bill was introduced into 
the legislature, and: 
Although a school~aid bill di~ pass the Senate 
during that year, the House proposal launched a bitter 
controversy over parochial school aid that bas only 
been matched by the 1961 conflict •••• When the 
bill created a deadlock over aid to private schools at 
the full comm;ittee levE)l, the issue gained nationwide 
attention as Francis Cardinal Spellman and Mrs. 
Eleanor Roosevelt became involved in a public conflict 
over the dispute.86 
President Truman, although favoring federal aid to education, 
was caught in the middle of the argument without much hope of sue-
cessf'ully obtaining any aid for the common school: 
Although President Truman did not engage in a 
major effort to resolve the ,impasse, the intensity of 
the conflict makes it doul;>.tful that action on his part 
would have settled the question. Additionally, his 
attention to school aid was necessarily limited because 
other aspects of his domestic program, such as his 
compulsory health insurance plan, the establishment 
of' a new executive .Department·of Health, Education, 
and Security, the repeal of the Taft,..Hartley Act, and 
abolishment of the poll tax, were all experiencing 
difficulties. Consequently, although President Truman 
favored federal assistance, his difficulties with his 
85ttarry S. 'l'rumap., Public Papers of' the Presidents of~ United 
States, Containin~.~ Puplic Messages~S~hes, and Statements of 
the President, 194:7 (Washington, 1961*), p. 76. 
86 
. Meranto, p. 101. 
over-all domestic program, and the heated religious 
conflict surrounding the aid issue during his term, 
afforded him little opportunity to assume a leadership 
role in federal aid for education.87 
l3ecauE;1e of Congressional opposition, Truman was unable to provide 
much aid for the common school, but "he was instrumental in es-
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tablishing the National Science Foundation and in preparing the way for 
88 the creation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare." 
Also, under Truman's administration, the full effect of the G. I. Bill 
was beginning to be felt on the national educational scene. 
In contrast to Truman, Dwight D. Ei~enhower came to the Presidency 
opposed to federal aid to education. "With his concept of federal aid, 
and given the fact that he was elected on a platform clearly opposing 
aid to education, it is not surprising that President Eisenhower was 
opposed to school aid during his first term. 1189 
An idea of what was coming under the Eisenhower administration was 
expressed in his Budget Message to Congress in 1954: 
I (lo not underestimate the difficulties facing the 
states and communities in attempting to solve the problems 
created by the great increase in the number of children of 
school age, the shortage of qualified teachers, and the over-
crowding of classrooms •••• At the same time, I do not 
accept the simple remedy of federal intervent;i.on.90 
87Meranto, p. 101. 
88Martin, p. 96. The history of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and ·Welfare can be traced 1:;>ackto 1867 when Congress established, 
and President Andrew Johnson approved of a Federal Department of Edu-
cation. In 1869 Congress reduced the Department to a Bureau of the De-
partment of the Interior. In the 1930's it was moved to the Federal 
Security Agency and finally, in 1953, under Eisenhower, the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare was created with a Bureau of Education. 
89Meranto, p. 102. 
9oibid. 
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Throughout h;i,s administration, F>resident Eisenhower stressed the 
concept that the federal government sb.ould only aid in school con-
struction, and ne went so far as to propose a s~ven million dollar 
program in 1955 for aid in schooi construction. 91 Nothing came of the 
proposal, however, According to one supporter of federal aid to edu-
cation it was the President's inaction which hurt most in the killing 
of the Presi'dent•s subsequent proposals; 
.It was what the administt~tion did--or didn't .do--
that killed the legislation. The truth of the matter was 
that Eisenhower never-wanted federal aid. I think some of 
his friends on the golf course ·~st have told him tna.t it 
was creeping socialism., I really do~ In 1957, the bill 
lost in the. House by five votes. He could have had a bill. 
A few phone calls to Members of Congress, t.This is the 
Prt3sident of the United Stat~s calling Congressman So and 
So,1 ... -and he'd have gotten :the votes. If he had cal bid 
Charlie .Halleck. and Joe Martin and said ·,r want the·votes,' 
he could .have gotten them. The struggle would never have 
been as close as it was.. He just didn't want a bill.. lie 
did nothing ~d in that situation inaction meant 1:fNo. ·1 92 
One thing that President.Eis~nbower did which promoted the.cause 
of federal aid tq educatipn, was the calling of a White House Conference 
. . 
on Education in 1955. This conference did bring to the fore:fr.ont the 
idea that equcation was in dire need of. some type of help by the 
federal government, although the re:gort generally favored, as the 
Presid~nt did, aid for schooil- construction. 9.3 
. 
91Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers £!.. ~ Presidents of the 
United States, Containing ~ Public Messages, Speeches, and statements 
£!.. the President, 1955 (Washington, 1959), pp. 243-50. 
9
~Quoted in Meranto, PP• 102-lQJ. 
93For contents of the report see The Committee for the White 
· House Conference on Education, A Report 12. the President (Washington, 
1956). 
As a result of the Wll.ite House Conference on Education which 
pointed out the need for federal aid, and the Cold War tensions with 
the Soviet Union, the President moderated his stance somewhat on 
federal aid during the latter part of his administration. It had 
become more and more li~ked with national defense. At any rate, the 
President signed into law the National Defense Education Act of 1958, 
which ranks among the largest of federal aid bills ever passed by 
Congress. The result was that federal funds for the public schools 
increased much more rapidly under Eisenhower's administration, than 
under any other previous administration, despite the President's 
fiscal conservatism. 
One writer has aptly compared the Truman and Eisenhower adminis-
trations by saying that Truman saw the need for federal aid to the 
schools and had conviction in trying to obtain this aid, but was 
hampered by Congress, while Eisenhower saw the need, but due to his 
fiscal conservatism, did not take advantage of the opportunities to 
promote education that were avc1ilable. 94 As a result "neither 
President was an overly enthusiastic supporter of federal aid to 
education." 95 
Yet, these Presidents had voiced an increased concern for the 
crisis that was apparent in education in the United States. They had 
spent considerable more time than any of their predecessors on the 
education issue, and more money had been appropriated for the public 
schools under their terms of office than any other. But the surface 
94Ma t' 3 r 1.n, p. 2 9. 
95 rbid., p. 241. 
57 
had only been touched, and the next President would certainly have to 
deal even more with the problem of adequately financing the common 
school. 
With the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency in 1960, 
a new era in federal aid to education was born. The youthful President 
was vitally concerned with education and felt that 11 our progress as a 
nation can be no swifter than our progress in education the 
96 human mind is our fundamental resource." President Kennedy came to 
the White House after eight years of Republican rule during which time 
supporters of federal aid were without the help of strong Presidential 
support, and he had an outstanding record for support for education 
while in Congress. 97 As a result, he was in a position of being able 
to strongly aid education, and he wasted little time in attempting to 
do so. Even before he assumed office, he called into being a Task 
F Ed t . t h 1 "d h" f t" 98 F 1 orce on uca ion o e p gui e im on a course o ac ion. o -
lowing the recommendations of this Task Force, he requested from 
Congress in his first education message a program of over five billion 
d 11 f ·d t d t· f" · d 99 o ars or ai o e uca ion .over a ive-year perio. Since the 
Kennedy. program will be discussed further in Chapter IV, it will 
96 John F. Kennedy, Public Papers~ the Presidents of the United 
States, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of 
~ President, 1961 (Washington, 1962), p. 107. 
97For President Kennedy's voting record see Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report, 1960 (Washington, 1960), p. 1280. 
98For the task force report summary see u. S. ~ and World 
Report (January 23, 1961), p. 59. 
99Kennedy, Public Papers, 1961, pp. 107-110. 
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suffice to say at this point that, as in the case of President Truman, 
federal aid to education again became mixed in with other national 
issues and the program was defeated, Similar requests were made in 
1962 and 1963 but no aid to the common schools resulted~ Concerning 
the common school, Kennei::ly, in his Education Message of February 6, 
1962, had this to say; 
Elementary and secon~ary schools are the foundation 
of our education system. There, is little value in our 
efforts to broaden anq improve our higher education, ·or 
increase our supply. of such· skills as science and engi-
neering, without a. great.er effort. for excellence at 
this basic level of education. With our mobile :popula-
tion and demanding needs, this i1:;1 not a matter of local 
or State action alone~-this is a national concern. 100 
But despite the zealous support of education as a national concern 
by the President, many of nis educational programs were defeated. The 
common school program never made it out of committee. The scene was 
thus set for President Johnson when he assumed the Presidency following 
Kennedy's assassination: 
All the ingredients· of the current scene appear 
propitious to the educators. They have a.president who 
lacks the handicap of being Catholic, as John Kennedy 
was, or.ambivalent on the issue of federal aid to the 
schools, as.Dwiglit Eisenhower was. 
The educators see Lyndon Johnson as a one time 
teacher who is genuinely ;intent upon his opportunity 
to break the long impasse and wily enough to accomplish 
this objective. 101 
100 Kennedy, Public Papers, 1961, pp. 107-110. 
101charles Bartlett, "News Focus," Chicago Sun-Times (Washington, 
January 10, 1965), pre-release paper located in ~islation-Federal Aid 
to Education Files (Ex/Le/Fa2), Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
The educators were not disappointed, because it soon became ap-
parent that the new President intended to lead in the educational 
field. The difference in Presidential leadership and simple public 
support of education is best described by Richard Neustadt: 
the very senior chairman of a major House Committee 
reportedly ad~onished an administration witness, 
'Don't expect us to start from scratch on what you 
people want. That's not the way we do thin~s here--
you draft the bills and we work them over.' 02 · 
Thus one can see that the President and the executive branch is ex-
pected to initiate a number of the legislative items. Without such 
initiative action, a program is not likely to gain much support. 103 
In addition, the President is the top political figure in the United 
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States, and his active support of a progr~m lenq.s more influence to the 
program than might ordinarily be the case. 
President Johnson was an e~perienced legislator, and he knew how 
Congress and public opinion operated~ ~dd to this skill a need for 
educational change and a President committed to support of education, 
and the result is what educators and columnists alike called "the most 
104 historic legislation in the past hundred years." 
102Richard E. Neustadt, "Planning the Pres;ipent•s Program," in 
Theodore J. Lowi, ed., Legislative Politics, USA (Boston, 1965), 
PPG 123-24. 
103 . '' • ... "' 
Stephen K. Bailey, .!.he New Congress (New York, 1966), 
pp. 28-J8. 
104 Whealan, p. 1. 
CHAPTER III 
THE A.RCHITECTS: THE PRESIDENT, THE EXECUTIVE 
STAfF, AND THE CONGRESS 
Introduction 
When Lyndon Baines Johnson won a four-year Presidential term in 
his own right in 1964, he garnered the largest vote of any Presi-
dential candidate in l;listory. The landslide victory made him a 
"consensus President," both in his own eyes and in the public's view of 
his conduct of the nation's affairs. 11 Consensus politics" became 
not only a description of the Johnson Administration, but also a key 
to the President's mode of op~ration. 
The historic record of the first session of the Eighty-Ninth , 
Congress stands as a lesson in Presidential power and leadership, as 
it was as a lawmc;l.ker that Johnson realized his full potential. Among 
the legislative accomplishments of 1965 were medical care for the 
aged, a voting rights act, and federal i:lid for elementary and second-
ary schools. 
However, by 1966 the status of, Johnson as a "consensus" President 
was a topic of national debate, as well as a growing concern to the 
President.' His policies, especially in foreign affairs, were under-
going increasing challenges by both the public and Congress. 
By 1968 the President had reached an intolerable pqsition of 
disappointment and frustration, and announced that he was not going 
60 
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to.r\Ul for re ... election in the fall, becoming the seventh President of 
the United States not to seek re~nomination to a second full term of 
office. 1 
One of the reasons given for the President's decision not to run 
for re-nomination was the awei;ome burden that the office of President 
had .p.laced upon him: 
With America ' s · sons in the . fields .far away, with 
America's future under challenge right here at home, 
with our hopes and the,.wor;I.d•s hopes for .peace in the 
balance every c,lay f · L do··no:t .. believ,e, that l should devote 
an .. hour -or a .day of.my time. to any ,per~nal partisan 
causes or to an,y duti.e.s other than the awe·some duties 
of this office--the Presidency of your country.~ . 
.. The efforts of President Johnson to obtain federal aid for the 
nation's sch~ol chUdren between 1963 and 1969 cannot be totally 
' . ·, . 
i separated from the larger concept of the relationship of the office of 
President to the nation· and Congress. As a result of his effort to 
conduct both an e:itpanded foreign and domestic i;;pending program, 
. . ., . . 
President Johni;;on experienced the full scope of a President's powers 
and· limitations. And in the process of carrying out his legislative 
program, President Johnson touched upon i;;ome fundamental changes that 
have occurred in the American sy~tem Qf government. The office of 
1The other ~esidents were James K. Polk ( 1845~49), JamE)s Buchanan 
(1,~57 .. 61), Rutherford J3. H~res (1877~8l), Calvin Coolidge (1923 ... 29) 
and, Harry S. Truman {19,45.,.53). President Theodore.Roosevelt announced 
he would not seek re.;,.eJ.ection in 1908, but did run unsuccessfully for 
the ~esidency in 1912. 
· 
2Lyndon;.Baines jobnson, ""~'he President' S,> Addr.ess to the Nation 
Announ.cing, Ste,ps to Lifl\i:t ,the Wair' in Vie·tnam• and.; Reporting His Deci .!;Ii on 
. .I . . ,. . 
not to seek Re-Elect.ion,·,"· March ·,31, .. 1968, 'J,'h,e l\.lbJj .. c Papers .2.f ~ 
Presidents of the United States, Containing the Public Messages, 
§peaches, a'ii°4 ;Statements o;f 'the President, 1968 (Washington, 1970), 
p. 476. ~· . . . --- . . · 
President of the United States has grown sm enormous since its in-
ception that it has been said that no one man can possibly fill the 
office. 3 This view is best reflected by one author, who recently 
wrote: "The Presidency may no longer be manageable by one single 
individual, however wise and resourceful," and furtnermore, "No one 
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can stand up against that type of pounding, or deal with such powerful 
cross-currents, or have the emotional and physical resiliency to cope 
with the demands of the qffice. /:1: 
As a result of the growing responsibilities of the office of 
President, an executive branch of increasing magnitude had been 
created to enaole the President to implement his programs. Therefore, 
any study of a President must encompass those staff personnel who were 
key contributors to the President's program. This study of the 
Johnson years must also take into account those individuals who were 
especially important to Johnson's educational program. This will be 
accomplished by studying Johnson's advisors on education matters in 
two separate categories: those within the official organization of· 
the Cabinet, such as Secretaries of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Anthony Celebrezze (1962-65), and John Gardner (1965-68); and those 
personnel who are a part of the President's personal staff, such as 
Special Assistant to the President, Douglass Cate:r. 
The power of the Presidency is such that it may no longer be 
meaningful to characterize Presi<lents as "strong" or llweak. 11 In the 
3see Chapter I, p. 5. 
4Norman CousiIJa, "Is the Presidency Manageable?", Saturday 
Review, LI (April 13, 1968), p. 23. 
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modern age the President is forced by the nature of his job to be a 
strong executive in order to be in command of Jlis many responsibilities. 
The powers of the office of President are not only those enumerated in 
Article II of the Constitution, but also those established by precedent, 
or authorized by Congress. 5 It is in the President's relationship with 
Congress that some of the most frustrating battles occur over what the 
President can, or cannot, do. Presi!'.lents themselves often contetjd that 
their power is more potential than real. For example, in 1952 Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman, describing the problems Eisenhower would en-
counter if elected President, said: 11 He 1 ll sit here and he'll say, 
1Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike--it won't be a 
bit like the Army. He'll find it vel;'y frustrat:j_ng.11 6 President 
Johnson also echoed this feeling when he stated: "Power? The only 
power I 1 ve got is nuclear"":-and I can't use that. 117 
On the other hand, every activist President has been accused of 
being domineering and assuming too much power. President Johnson's 
experiences with the unusually active Eighty-Ninth Congress were not 
unique, because comparisons can be made with the Seventy-Third Congress 
of 1933-31* ( tbe first two years of. the Franklin D. Roosevelt Adminis-
tration) and the Sixty ... Thirq Congress of 1913-11* (the first two years 
I 
5For a historical survey of the Office of President, :see such 
works as Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of 
Leadership (New. Yo;rk,,· ,l,960),, and, <J.a~,13; MacGregor Burns, Presidential 
,...;:1,;.§io\rernmerit: The Crucible .2.! Leadership (Boston, 1966) • 
... ~-.,,.. __,...... 
6 Quoted in Neustadt, p. 9. 
7Quoted in Saul K. Padover, 11The Power o;f the PresLdent, 11 
Commonweal, LXXXVIJI (August 9, 1968), p. 521. 
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of the Woodrow Wilson Administration). One writer has expressed this 
view of the President having too much power this way: 
Liberal advocates of an aggrandizing Presidency 
now sense uneasily that they qave created a Fran~enstein; 
an executive which., in the name o:f ·leadership and 
patriotism may respond to the de~and for spectacular 
Presidential direction by acti~ in the only untrammeled 
way open to it~-belligerently. 
The second s~f:l~"ion of the Eighty-Ninth Congress was less re-
': 
sponsive to President Johnson than the first, and the Ninetieth 
Congress often displayed considerable antagonism toward the President's 
proposals. For example, the President's reque·st for a ten per cent 
surcharge on income taxes was approved only after Johnson agreed to a 
provision calling for a six billion dollar reduction in his budget 
. 9 
proposal. 
Hence, the education legislai:ion obtained by President Johnson 
between 1963 and 1969 is tied up w.ith many other issues between the 
Congress and the President, and it is a tribute to Presidential 
leadership iri that there were significant gains made for the common 
schools during those years. But in doing so, President Johnson had to 
rely on congressional help and became involved in the power struggles 
within this branch of government. For example, Representative Adam 
Clayton Powell (Democrat, New York),Chairman of the Committee on 
Education and Labor whom the President had always counted on as a 
friend of education, became involved in a power struggle over the 
8Marcus Ctinliffe, 11A Defective Institution?" Commentary,XLV 
(February, 1926), p. 32. 
9see Chapter VI, p. 254. 
. 10 
right of Congress to seat an individual member. As a result, 
Presideht Johnson's education proposals encompassed a wider area of 
conflict than simply the educational issues. And too, in the Senate, 
Senator Wayne Morse (pemocrat, Oregon), Chairman of the Senate Sub-
committee on Education, challenged the President's power to send 
troops to Vietnam, and the result was a split between the Senator 
11 
and the President which affected education proposals. Therefore, 
those key members of Congress who became essential ingredients to 
successful education legislation will have to be examined for the role 
they played in obtaining federal aid to education. 
The Executive Branch 
Until recently, the m,;1.ny studies of the Presidency have rarely 
explored in any detail the multitude of advisors and aides that the 
President must utilize, as well as supervise, in order to properly 
12 
execute his legislative programs. One of the reasons for this lack 
of coverage has been that the executive branch has undergone tre-
mendous changes in the modern age. Every President has had his 
entourage of advisors, but none to the extent that recent Presidents 
have employed. For example, speaking in 196~ on the use of advisors 
by President Johnson, Stephen K. Bailey, a noted authority on Presi-
dential politics, stated: "Within a f~w weeks time the President and 
lOS t . ee his chapter, pp. 97-99. 
11s Ch VI ee apter , pp. 225-227. 
12s Ch I ee apter , p. 5. 
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White House staff organized the largest, most detailed, and most 
highly differentiated ad hoc mobilization of expertise in our country's 
-, ---
13 history." In comparison, most Presidents in the past had very little ,, 
.... 
help from outside their cabinet: 
.l\.ndrew Jack1mn had to turn to his 'kitchen cabine,t' 
for' advice, Lincoln had to pay a single male secre:taty 
out of his own pocket. Tbeodore Roosevelt (who had a 
' tennis cabinet' ) .managed to exp~d the White House • • • 
by adding.the west wing, but not to staff it adequately. 
Herbert Hoover had to battle with Congress to add a 
third secretary to his staff, which otherwise consisted 
of a military aide, a naval aide, and fewer than 4o 
clerks. The Presidency was still a powerhouse without 
transmission· lines. 14 · . 
President Johnsonis staff, on the other hand, was the biggest 
in United States histo:ty. It consisted of 250 workers in the White 
House offic;:e, and another 1,J.50 in the Exectit,ive office of the 
President. 15 
As . ih any' ·play, there are several characters who compose the cast 
in addition to the lead. This is especially true of the common 
schools relationship'.with the fede:ral government between 1963 and 
1969. E.ssential to the President's program were a group of skilled 
professionai innovators, botb in t'.lle Cabinet and members of the White 
House staff. This section will covev briefly some of these key people, 
realizing at the same time that there are many other individuals who 
played a smaller, but sti.11 important, role. One of the difficulties 
13stepqen K. Bailey,' nA. White House-Academic Dialogue, 11 in 
BertramM. Gross,'AGreat Society? (New York, 1968), p. xii • 
..,.. 
14 Charles Robel;'ts, LBJ's Inner Circle (New Yorlc, 1965), pp. JJ-J/,,,. 
15eongressioQal Quarterly Service, Congress~~ Nation, 1965-
1968 (Washington, 1969), p. 655. 
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in attempting such a task is the fact that most Presidential advisors 
are kept in the background, and their true roles are seldom fully 
exposed. Because of their anonymity the following evaluation of the 
Johnson men important to education is only a partial one. 
The President's Cabinet 
The President•'s Cabinet is a creation of tradition and necessity, 
dating back to George Washington's PJ'esidency. By custom, it consists 
of the heads of the executive departments, which now number twelve 
with the inclusion of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
in 1965 and the Department of Transportation in 1966 0 Cabinet members 
are appointed to office, not elected, and their influence normally 
depends upon the use made of them by the President. The Constitution 
states in Article l:I, Section Two, the President "may r~quire the 
opinion ••• of the principiil officer in each of the executive de-,, 
partments, 11 but gives no details on how such opinions may be obtained. 
President Washington secured advice by presiding over a Cabinet made 
up of such intellectual opposites as·Hamilton and Jefferson: 
By staying somewhat above the battle, Washington 
consolidated the people 1 s,support for him, lent his name 
and prestige to the new republic, and ultimately helped 
convert his charismatic appeal an.d authority into the 
popular and constitutional legitimacy so badly needed 
by the. new country,16 
Following Washington, the Cabinet became permanent, but many of 
Washington's successors tii.ought somewhat less than he about its 
wisdom. President Jackson took advice from his kitchen cabinet rather 
16 Burns, pp. 8-9. 
than his official one, and President Lincoln once polled his Cabinet 
and q.etermined, 11 Seven noes, one aye--the ayes have it. 1117 
Recent Presid~nts have used the Cabinet to varying degrees. 
President Eisenhower made Cabinet meetings formal, named a Cabinet 
secretary, and attempted to obtain major policy decisions from the 
group. President Kennedy relied heavily on staff assistants for 
. 18 
advice rather than the Cabinet. · 
President Johnson's view of Cabinet meetings was similar to 
Eisenhower's in that he kept the tradition of formal meetings and an 
agenda. He met regularly with the Cabinet and encouraged full par-
ticipation from.all of the members, Often summoned to some of these 
Cabiriet sessions were otber officials within the various agencies 
such as· the head of the Bureau of the Budget or, in the case. of 
education, the Commissioner of Education. 
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In connection with his edu~ation program, there were four promi~ 
nent individuals within the executi.y~ branch who played important 
roles during Johnson's administration~ These people are in the order 
of discussion: Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1962-65), 
Anthony Celebrezze; h;i,s suc:cessor, John Gardner (1965-68); United 
States Commissioner of Ed~cation (1962~65),. Francis Keppel; and his 
successor, H;arold Howe:, Il (1965-69). 
Anthony Celebrezze. Anthony Celebrezze, an Italian and Roman 
Catholic, was an ideal selection by President Kennedy in 1962 to 
bridge t:h,e gap between the religious groups and the education 
17.Quote.d 1' n Roberts p 128 . , . . 
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associations who were fighting over federa.l aid to education. 19 
Replacing Abraham Ribicoff, who resigned to run for the Senate from 
Connecticut, the popular Ohioan had served four terms as mayor of 
Cleveland and was serving his fifth term when appointed to the Cabinet 
post as Secretary of Health, ~ducation, and Welfare, in July, 1962. 
In addition to his experiences as mayor of Cleveland, Celebrezze 
had served both Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower as a member of the 
Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Affairs. With such a broad 
background in government experience, the new Secretary took over the 
Cabinet post's duties at the heigpt. of the religious conflict over 
0 20·· 
federal aid to the schools. . Along with Francis Keppel, Celebrezze 
remained in the Cabinet of Preside:nt Johnson long enough to be instru-
mental in steering the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
through Congress. In addition to his duties as coordinator of the 
many sub-agencies within the D~partment, as well as testifying before 
several Congressional hearings, the Secretary was primarily responsible 
for obtaining suppoFt from the Catholic groups for federal aid in 1965. 
In reflecting on those years in the White House, Celebrezze 
stated that he felt his greatest successes were in participating in 
the decision-making process involving the Eleme:ntary-~econdary Act 
and the Medicare Bill: 
I. tbink the greatest breakthrough was the passing 
of the secondary and primary education bill. Of course, 
the other great piece of legislation which had been 
l9See.Chapter IV, PP• 117-122. 
20Ibid. 
pending for twenty years and no 
through Congress was medicare~ 
passed.21 
one could get it 
They were both 
Celebrezze's performance irl support of the two measures was, 
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according to President Jol:µison, 11phenominal". As a lobbyist :for the 
education bill, and as a Catholic who pulled a great deal of re-
ligious support, he was important to th,e success o:f the proposal. 
i 
At one point he sent identical 520 word telegrams to every member o:f 
the House voicing su~port o:f the President's program, especially 
medicare. 
In July o:f 1965 the President rewarded Celebrezze :for his efforts 
by appointing him as a :fed~ral judge in Ohio22 and, in a letter 
to the J;"etirin9 Secretary, praised him for hi.s outstanding work in 
health and education: 
/}'!: 
You leave this.Admiri.:l,stnation to sit on the bench 
of one of the highest courts in the land. I am aware that 
this new calling coincides with your own desires, and no 
man .is more deservirt_g •. 
You go with my reluctance. No Cabinet officer has 
worked·longer, harder, with a IJl()re zestful spirit, ·than 
you~ The results of what you have done are plainly 
evident in the Congress, and will leave even larger im-
prints in the objective scrutiny of history.23 
21 .·; . · · · 
Anthony Ce:J;ebrezze Folde.r, Oral Histories .,Files, The Papers 
ol L1hdon Baines Johnson, Johnson Library •. (Hereafter .cilid as 
Jo-hn-son·Ba;per-s). · (Interviewed by Page Mulholl,en, January 26, 1971-), 
p. 11.· 
22Jo~son, "Remarks. on Announcing the Nomination o:f Anthony J. 
Celebrezze·as Ju«i9e, U. s. Court of-Appeals, Sixth Circuit," 
July 27, 1965, Public Papers, 1965, p. 788. 
23 : · · · Lyndon Baines .. Jollnson, "Letter Accepting Res.ignation o:f Anthony 
J. Celebrezze as Secretary o:f Health, Educat:i,op, and Welfare," July 28, 
1965, Executive Files, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. Also located 
in Johnson, Public Papers, 1965, p. 803. 
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To replace the Secretary, President Johnson appointed John W. Gardner, . 
the fifty-two year old president of the Carnegie Corporation. 
John Gardner. As president of the Came9ie Corporation from 1955 
until his appointment to the Cabinet post in 1965, John Gardner was 
recognized as a leader in the field of education. President Johnson 
was obvit>u~ly pleased with nis choice of Gardner, as he ~uoted from 
'. 
one of Gardner's books, Excellence·: Can We Be Equal and Excellent 
---
. Too?24 as he. announced h;i,s appointm.ent: '' 
The Society whi:ch scorns·expellence' in plumbing 
because plumbing-is a humbl~ act;i.vity and to'lerates 
shoddine s:;;. in philosophy becaus.e it is an exalted 
activity will have neither.good plumbing nor good 
philosophy. Neither.its pipes nqr its theories will 
hold water. 25 
Gardner became the sixth Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare since it was created in 1953, and the fifth former college 
' ' 
'.. . 26 
professor in the Johnson Cabinet. A graduate of Stanford, he held 
a Ph.D. from the University .of California. The appointment of Gardner 
to the Cabinet post was considered a reversal of the aims of that de-
partment, as compared to the history of Health, Education, and Welfare 
Secretaries: 
.fres;i.dent Eisenhower appointed three Secretaries, 
President Kennedy two •. None got more than minimal 
White House suppor!. ln~eed b~th 1~eside~ts som~times 
put political considerations first··· in ma.lung their HEW 
appointments. Though Anthony Celebrezze had been a 
24 John W. Gardner, Excellence: Can ~ ~ Equal· and Excellent Too? 
(New York, 1961). 
25 Johnson, "Reiparks Announcing the Nomination pf John W. Gardner 
as Secretary, HEW," July 27, 1965, Public Papers, 1965, p. 789. 
26 The. other college professors were Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, 
Nicholas Katzenbach, and John J. Gronousk:i. 
successful mayor of Cleveland, he was also 'the Italian 
appointment' of the Kennedy years, just as the capable 
Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, the department's first Secretary, 
was an Eisenhower way of saying 'Thank you, ladies,' 
ai'ter the 1952 election. Oddly, it was LBJ, the most 
policital animal of them all, who turned to John Gardner, 
a man with no political following, no political claims, 27 
no visible political talents--and a Republican to boot. 
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The appointment of Gardner as the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare was a reflection of President Johnson's concern for 
educati9n and the Great Society. Gardner was widely respected at the 
time as a man of vision and co~cern for the ills of society. His 
appointment was Johnson's way of expressing his own concern for society 
and an indication of what the President envisioned his domestic program 
to be. 
Gardner, in addition to his experiences with the Carnegie Corpo-
ration, had served on President Kennedy's Special Task Force on 
Education in 1960. He had also chaired President Johnson's Task Force 
on Education in 1964, which played a valuable part in the formation 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 28 President Johnson 
paid tribute to Gardner for his work in this area when he announced 
his appointment by speaking about the 1965 Act: 
It has been successful because of the spadework and 
the thinking and the sacrifice of men like Mr. Gardner, 
and those thinkers and doers who had on the drawing boards 
months ahead of the assemblage of Congress the ideas and 
programs that the Congress has evolved. 29 
2711Gardner Hews Out the Great Society," Newsweek, LXVII (February 
28, 1966), pp. 22-23. 
28 See Chapter IV, pp. 139-141. 
29Johnson, Public Papers, 1965, p. 789. 
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In addition to chairing the 1964 Task Force, Gardner also chaired 
the 1965 White House Conference on Education. 30 It also helped that 
Gardner was a Republican since this type of appointment would enhance 
any education program because of the connotation of a non-political 
concern for society. 
Although Gardner took no official part in the passage of the 1965 
Act, he was responsible in 1966, 1967, and 1968 for applying continued 
pressure on Congress for enactment of the Great Society's programs. 
Like Celebrezze, Gardner's job as Secretary of the sprawling Department 
required constant attention. Describing his job as being one which 
covered "everything from Cuban refugees to thyroid modules," Gardner 
was responsible for dealing with eight committees in the House and nine 
in the Senate on Health, Education, and Welfare matters. 31 Meeting 
with President Johnson anywhere from tpree times a week to three times 
a day, Gardner relentlessly pursueq. the aims of the Great Society. In 
fact, Gardner's pursuit of the Great Society's aims was so relentless 
that he soon grew to disagree with President Johnson over social legis-
lation because he felt that the President was not devoting enough time 
and money to the Great Society. The disappointed Secretary, in a way a 
symbol of what the Vietnam conflict had done to Johnson's Great Society 
program, resigned his post in 1968.~2 
JOSee Chapter VI, P• 215. 
JlQuoted in Newsweek, LXVII (February' ~8; 196~), p. 25. 
32"Another Vacant Chair in LBJ's Top,Circle, 11 U.S. News and World 
Report (February 5, 1968). Gardner became a leader-i;;:- the Urban Co-
ali tLon following his resignation. '.J.'he Urban Coali t;ion wa's a group of 
leaders from business, labor, local government, religious and civil 
rights organizations that was formed to attack civic problems. See 
"Mr. Gardner -:Joins th~ Coalition,"~ (February 23, ~1968), p. 18. 
Despite his eventual resignation the influence of John Gardner 
upon the Johnson Administration was profound. He has been a primary 
influence upon the formation of the 1964 task force proposals, and 
during his reign as Secreta~y he had continued to represent the Johnson 
image of an individual devoted to social improvement. John Gardner was 
an epitome of what the Great Society was all about--the improvement of 
the conditions of those people who were not a part of an enriched 
society. 
Francis Keppel. Probably the most influential person in working 
out the political compromises prior to the passa1;1e of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, aside from President Johnson, was the 
United 'States Commissioner of Education, Francis Keppel. Brought to 
Washington in late 1962 by President Kennedy, like Celebreeze, he 
arrived after the 1961 federal aid fight, but it did not take him long 
to see the obstacles facing federal aid legislation. 33 Keppel, unlike 
most of his predecessors at the Commissioner's post, did not come from 
the public school system. At the age of 23 he had become Assistant 
Dean of Harvard College, and in his early thirties he had become Dean 
of the Harvard Graduate School of Education. While Dean, he trans-
formed a 11 sl@epy institutional meiocrity into a vibrant center of 
educational innovation. 1134 And as a result of his efforts at Harvard, 
33A c'over story was written on Keppel by Time (October 15, 1965), 
pp. 60-68. Time reported that in the first inTc;;;a1 meeting, President 
Kennedy asked Keppel: "Weren I t you in my brother Joe's class?' 1 Yes,' 
re·plied Keppel. 1 Didn't you run against Joe for some office?' •Yes, 
for class mar shall. 1 1And didn I t Joe beat you? 1 1 Yes, 1 Recalls 
~eppel in 1965: 'Those Kennedy I s never forget an election. 1 11 
Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of 
Education Administers a law (Syracuse, 1968), p. 35. 
' --
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"Kennedy called Keppel to Washington charging him to do for the U. s • 
. Office of Education and for federal educational policy what he had done 
for the Harvard School of Education. 1135 Also, Keppel, like Gardner, 
at one time had headed the giant Carnegie Corporation. 
Keppel's major concern once he arrived in Washington was to find 
a path for federal aid through which he could avoid the thicket of race, 
religion, and fear of federal control that had defeated prior education 
proposals. An untiring negotiator and salesman, it was Keppel more 
than any other person who persuaded the National Education Association 
and the National Catholic Welfare Conference to accept the compromises 
in the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act.36 Both sides in 
the negotiations in 1964 credit Keppel's work with producing the 
"understandings" which led to the passage of the 1965 bill. As put 
by one participant: 
He never made anyone feel he was shooting for the honor 
of authoring the first general aid bill. This was a mag-
nificently orchestrated effort of many people of good will. 
The process was one of extended conferences aimed at a-
chieving a legislative vehicle to which we. could withhold 
objections. 
By the time the bill was introduced all the formerly 
used pressure tactics were unnecessary. Our group gives 
credit for the bill from its origin to passage.to absolutely 
nobody but the Administration, and particularly Mr. 
Ke.ppel. 37 · 
It·was also Keppel who set in motion the re-organization of the 
35st.ephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: ' The Office of 
Education Administers!.~ (Syracuse, 1968), p. ·35. 
-. ·, 
36see Chapter V, pp. 175-180. 
37Quoted in Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, ~~2£ Congress 
(New York, 1969), pp. 87-88. 
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Office of Education following the passage of the 1965 act and supported 
Henry Loomis, Deputy Commissioner of Education, in his efforts to re-
vitalize the Office. 38 It was Keppel, too, who organized the efforts of 
the Johnson staff in regard to testimony presented to Congress in 1965 
and who initiated the Tyler Committee project which aimed at studying 
national assessment. 39 
One of the tools that Keppel used in his efforts to promote 
federal aid was his accessibility to the Whit~ House. He frequently 
called Special Assistant Douglass Cater and used his office when the 
physical presence of the White House would give him a psychological 
advantage over the people with whom he was meeting. 
In essence, then, it was Keppel who was responsible for the con-
ducting of the affairs surrounding the for~ation of the 1965 school 
bill from the time it came out of Gardner's task force proposals until 
it went to Capitol Hill. From that point Lawrence O'Brien, legislative 
consultant to the President, and Special Assistant Douglass Cater took 
over. Once the Act passed Congress :Keppel began the implementation 
process, then turned the next stage of the operation over to his 
successor, Harold Howe, II. Testimony by most of Johnson's staff 
members indicates that Keppel was highly respected for his role in 
4:o 
obtaining educational legislation during the Johnson years. 
38see Chapter VI, p. 212, 
39Ibid., p. 215. 
40see the testimonies of Joseph Califano, Douglass Cater, and 
Anthony Celebrezze in Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, Johnson 
Library. 
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Presid€nt Johnson praised Keppel's work when he appointed him to a new 
post as Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare in September, 1965: 
My appointment of Dr. Keppel recognizes his out-
standing performance over the past three years in helping 
meet th~ greatest education tasks of the Nation.41 
His appointment to a new poi;;ition did not mean that Keppel's 
duties in regard to education legislation had ended, as the President 
noted: 
His promotion to a new position of Assistant Secre-
tary will enable him better to serve the needs of the 
Department and to stimulate education actiyities that do 
not lie strictly within the jurisdiction of the Office 
of Education.42 
Keppel 1 s work in regard to the educational efforts of the federal 
government continued at his new post. In 1966 he headed a committee 
that studied the educ~tional efforts of forty-three federal agencies. 
He also chaired a group that proposed the education amendments of 1966 
and decidedly influenced the educational legislation of 1967, especially 
in the area of spreading research grants to the nation's institutions 
of higher education. 
In essence Keppel's role was viewed both by himself and his 
colleagues as one of representing an effort by the federal government 
to successfqlly establish the concept of creative federalism. Keppel 
saw the federal government as being a junior partner to the state and 
41Johnson, "Statement of the President on Appointing Dr. Francis 
Keppel as Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare," September 4, 1965, Public Papers, 1965, p. 971. 
42Ibid. 
local efforts in education, 43 and his colleagues saw Keppel as the 
leader in that effort, as best reflected here by Columbia University 
Professor of Education, Lawrence A. Cremin, talking about Keppel in 
1965: 11 He is a political animal in the Aristotelian sense--a man 
4/± 
who understands power and wants to use if for decent purposes." 
Harold Howe 2 II. In a sense the appointment of Harold Howe, II 
to replace Keppel as Commissioner of Education by President Johnson 
was similar to his appointment of John Gardner to the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. In Howe, Johnson felt that he had 
found an individual who was deeply committee to assuring every indi-
vidual an equal opportunity for education. Just as Gardner had repre-
sented Johnson's visionary image of the goals of the Great Society, 
Howe represented the President's efforts to break the racial barrier in 
education. Howe's views in regard to educational change were expressed 
as early as 1960, when writin~ in the Saturday Review he warned that 
serious inadequacies existed in the public schools, and that such 
inadequacies "gave rise to the prediction that, unless radical changes 
occur, our boys and girls will receive poorer education in 1970 than 
45 they do today." 
Howe's educational background prior to becoming Commissioner in-
; 
eluded three years as principal of,Newton High School in Massachusetts 
43Francis Keppel Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. 16. 
44 Quoted in Time (October 15, 1965), p. 61. 
45Harold Howe, II, "Needed: A Radical Change," Saturday Review, 
XLVII (September 17, 1960), Po 73. 
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(1957-60), superintendent of schools in Searsdale, New York (1960-64), 
and director of the Learning Institute of North Carolina (1964-65), 
a statewide research agency that was seeking new methods of improving 
the educational surroundings of the disadvantaged. 46 
Once he arrived in Washington, it did not take Howe long to be-
come embroiled in the politics of implementing the massive new federal 
aid programs authorized under the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act and subsequent amendments to that Act. The massive infusion 
of federal money that was going into the public schools at the time of 
Howe's appointment was by itself a revolution in the structure and 
economics of education. Add to this the Civil Rights Act and the 
Office of Education's responsibility under this program, as well as the 
programs authorized under legislation initiating the War on Poverty, 
and the result was a tremendous involvement on the part of the Com-
missioner in almost every phase of education in American society. As 
a result of this increased activity, especially in the area of inte-
gration, the new Commissioner soon became unpopular, especially in 
the South. 47 
Because of his actions, as well as the actions of the Office of 
Education, in setting up guidelines to determine the distribution of 
federal funds under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Howe was 
48 the object of several attacks on the part of the public and Congress. 
46For further background information on Howe, see "Education in 
America," Saturday Review (January 15, 1966), pp. 57-58. 
47see Chapter VI, p. 217. 
48Ibid., pp. 232~233. 
He inherited the unpl~asant duty of enforcing the rule prohibiting 
racial discrimination in the public schools. It is a tribute to both 
Howe and President Johnson that despite the constant criticism, the 
Commissioner remained in office throughout the Johnson Years. Howe, 
like Gardner, was committed to educational change, and he certainly 
did not retreat on the integration h1sue as reflected in his speech 
at Hampton Institt.Jte meQtioned later in this work. 49 Howe saw in the 
1965 ~ct a catalyst for change, and he certainly intended to spur 
the change on as far as possible. 50 
Under the leadership of Howe, the Office of Education grew into 
one of the most active agencies of the federal govern~ent. Although 
he was in some cases a liability to President Johnson politically 
because of his views on integration, he represented the President's 
deep commitment to equality for the blacJ<; man. Unlike Keppel, who 
was a smooth political compromiser, Howe irritated a number of col-
leagues as well as Congressmen in his steadfast insistence upon 
breaking down the barriers of racial isolation. 
It was also Howe who was responsible for directing the process 
of evaluation of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act. A 
mammoth project, the implementation and evaluation of the program was 
a tribute to any man who could supervise such a project. 51 
49 See Chapter VI, p. 2JJ. 
50Harold Howe, II Folder, Oral Histories :File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. 10. 
51see Chapter VI,". pp.· 210-2ll. 
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Althou,gh not as popular as Keppel, nor as respected as Gardner, 
the role Harold Howe, II played in the Johnson educational program is 
not to be minimized. It was Howe, more than any other person who was 
respqnsible for carrying out the revolution begun in 1965. And, as is 
true of most revolutionary programs, once the novelty wears off, the 
battle to resist change resumes. 
The White House Staff 
The President's Cabinet is a normal structure of government which 
each President has utilized in varying degrees. Outside of this formal 
structure is another core group of people who are vitally important to 
any President's program, as witnessed by Pierre Salinger, a former 
staff aide to President Kennedy: 
The Presidency is indeed the 'center of power.' 
Everything that stems from the office is molded in the 
image and desire of the President. But collectively 
outside the President, the 'center of power' is his 
staff.52 
The importance of this inner circle of advisors cannot be mini-
mi zed: "Members of the President's staff are extensions of the Presi-
dent's eyes, ears, and will; they are his political antennae, legmen, 
and ghost writers; they are conservators of his time and energy; they 
help him determine and articulate policy. 1153 
Forty-one men and two women served as special assistants, or 
aides, to President Johnson from the time he assumed office in 196.3 
52Quoted in ~oberts, p. 1.3. 
53Ibid., pp. 32-JJ. 
until the expiration of his term in 1969.54 
These men and women were key figures in the White House office, 
performing the many detailed duties required of them. Their role has 
been best summarized by Johnson's former Press Secretary, Bill Moyers: 
Our job, after all, is to help gather facts and infor-
mation for the President--to help him find and draw from 
Pierian springs, not to muddy those waters. We serve as 
a channel of communication with him, a channel that ought 
to be free of extraneous pressures and conflicts~55 
President Johnson inherited a staff that had been assembled by 
82 
President Kennedy, and one of his first acts was to invite the Kennedy 
staff to stay with him. At first many of these staff members stayed 
on, but gradually they began to drift away. Theodore c. Sorenson was 
the first of the Kennedy aides to leave, resigning his post in January, 
1964. By 1968 only one member of the Kennedy staff, Mike N. Manatos, 
administrative assistant, remained as a Presidential advisor. 56 
As in the case of the President's Cabinet members, there were many 
key figures who advised the President. However, only those people who 
were directly responsible for working in the area of education will be 
discussed at this point. For example, Presidential aides Bill Moyers 
and Richard Goodwin were used by the President in many areas, including 
education, but their primary responsibility was not education legis-
lation. The exceptions to this are that Lawrence O'Brien, legislative 
liaison, and Jack Valenti, Special Assistant, will be included because 
54 . 
For a capsule summary o:f The President I s advisors, see Appendix 
I. ,PP• 324-325. I 
55Quoted in Roberts, p. 51. 
56Manatos 1 job was keeping tabs on the itinerary of all fifty 
Senators, which proved very helpful to President Johnson if he wanted 
to contact a key senator in a hurry. 
they were especially important to the passage of the 1965 education 
bill. 
The primary responsibility for education legislation during the 
Johnson Years fell to two people in particular, Douglass Cater and 
Joseph Califano. To illustrate, when questioned later about the 
President's staff in relation to education, Francis Keppel named 
these two immediately: 
Question: 
Keppel: 
Question: 
Keppel: 
He had a good staff? 
Yes. 
You could work with them? 
Yes. Califano, Doug Cater. 
bunch.57 
They were an able 
The basis upon which O'Brien, Valenti, Cater, and Califano were 
chosen to be discussed in this unit was the fact that as a result of 
BJ 
surveying the names of the people most often found in connection with 
federal aid in the communications between President Johnson and his 
staff in the Johnson Papers, at least one of these four was almost 
always involved when educational matters were brought up. 
Lawrence O'Brien and Jack Valenti. These two individuals are 
discussed together because their roles in education legislation 
primarily revolved around the passage of the 1965 Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, whereas Califano and Cater remained on the 
President's staff throughout Johnson's term.of office. 
Lawrence 0 1 Brien came to the White House in 1961, as President 
Kennedy's Chief Assista.nt for Congressional Relations. He had served 
as President Kennedy's national organization director for the 
57Francis Keppel Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. ~6. 
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Democratic nomination in l960 and soon became the key legislative 
architect of the New Frontier. He remained in the White House at 
President Johnson's request to di:rect the legislative program for 
Johnson. 0 1Brien, once called the "Krn~te Rockne of Congressional 
Relations, 11 was one of tµe first Ken:i'ledy staffers that Johnson asked 
to stay on, and he was instrumental in marshalling support for 
Johnsori•s legislative program in 1965.58 To illustrate how well 
O'Brien was respected in his job, Business~ in April, 1965, ran a 
story on O'Brien and called him "the 11th Cabinet member 0 1159 It can 
also be noted that O•Brien and his legislative liaison team kept tabs 
on almost every member of the Eighty-Ninth Congress as witnessed by 
the detailed account of Congresswoman Edith Green's activities in 
relation to the education bill. 60 O'Brien's job was to know at all 
times how each member of Congress stood on almost every piece of 
pending legislation, and this he did to perfection, elilpecially on the 
Elementary .and Secondary Education Act. Following the passage of 
most of President Johnsonls leg~slative program in 1965, O'Brien was 
appointed, as a reward for his efforts, to ~ostmaster General. As he 
announced the appointment, President Johnson praised O'Brien for the 
excellent job he had dpne: "I knpw of no single individual who has 
contributed more to the enactment of legislation that touches the 
58Roberts, p. 122. 
59"They Twist Arms Without tturting," Business Week (April 24, 
1965), Po 84. 
60see O'Brien Memorandum in Appendix E, pp. 310-JU. 
lives of more Americans than Larry 0 1 Brien.n61 
Jack Valenti was probably the closest to Johnson of all of the 
Johnson aides during his tenure as Presidential assistant. President 
Johnson reportedly stated in 1965 th.at Valenti was "the only man who 
62 
sees every paper that crosses my desk. 11 
Valenti, a native Texan, first met Lyndon Johnson while writing 
a weekly column for The Houston Post in 1956. Impressed by the then 
Senator, Valenti wrote in his next column, "ff Henry Clay was justly 
called the Great Compromiser and Oliver Wendell Holmes the Great 
Dissenter, then Lyndon Johnson is the G.reat Persuader~ 1163 
Obviously, the column pleased Johnson. Valenti met Johnson again 
when he worked in his campaign for the Democratic nomination for 
President in 1960, and in 1962 Valenti married Mary Margaret Wiley, 
Johpson' s secretary of eight ye.ars. The then Vice ... President gave the 
bride away at a big June wedding in Houston in 1962. 
Valenti 1 s role in the 1965 passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act was three-fold. First~ he served as Johnson's liaison 
man to the Vatican's Apostolic Delegate to the Vnited States, Arch-
b . h E . d. V . 64 is op 91 10 agnozzi. · In this role, Valenti successfully persuaded 
the Catholic leader to support the 1965 education proposal. Second, 
he was also Johnson's liaison man with Senate Minority Leader Everett 
61 Johnson, "The President I s News Conference at the LBJ R,anch, 11 
August 29, 1965, Public Papers, 1965, p. 9~8. 
62 Roberts, p. 83. 
63Quoted in Ibid., p. 85. 
64 . 
See Chapter v, pp. 168-169. 
Dirksen, who became very important to Johnson's education proposals 
in 1966 when Senator Morse refused to cooperate with the President. 65 
Third, Valenti served as a sort of contact man for the President in 
charge of keeping the President·a1;:>reast of the work of all the other 
staff members such as Cater, O'Brien, Keppel and'Califano. 
Valenti•s role in the Johnson Adll).inistration ha1;1 been summarized 
something done give it to a busy man. 1166 
11 Jack epitomizes the old saying tqat if you want 
I 
by one observer: 
In 1966, after serving the 
' 
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:President faithfully for three years, Valenti resigned his position to 
become the pres~dent of tqe Motion Picture Association of America. 67 
Douglass Cater. A native of Alabama, Douglass Cater graduated 
from Harvard with a masters degree in Public Adm~nistration. Similar to 
Jack Valenti, he first met Lyndon Johnson in 1952 when he wrote several 
68 
stories for the magazin,e, .!!!!:. Reporter, about the 'then Texas Senator. 
Shortly after Johnson's heart attack in 1955, Cater visited the Senator 
at the LBJ Ranch. 11 There has; been speculation," Cater recalls, "that 
Johnson was becoming a regional figure, the neW' leader of the nation I s 
conservative forces.11 69 After visitini;i with Johnson, Cater reported 
that Johnson's "interests were stil'l national interests," a report that 
65 . See Chapter VI, p. 226. 
66Quoted in Roberts, p. 87. 
67,,R.evolving Door at 1600, 11 Newsweek, LXVII (May 9, 1966), 
pp. 26-27. 
68For example, see "Lyndon Johnson, Rising Democratic Star," The 
Reporter, VII (January 20, 1953), pp. 3~~37. 
69oouglass Cater, 11 The Trouble in Lyndon Johnson's Back Yard," 
The Reporter, XIII (December i, 1955), p. 31. 
pleased Johnson. 70 As a result in 1959, when Cater was appointed to 
a one-year visiting professorship in public affairs at Princeton, 
Lyndon Johnson rose on the floor of the Senate tq. congratulate him. 71 
Then in 1964 Cater published a book called Power in Washington. 72 
Reportedly, while leafing through the book, President Johnson remarked 
to an aide, "He I s pretty rough on Kennedy,'' and th.en a few pages later 
stated: 11And he's pretty rough on me, too. 1173 At any rate Cater and 
Johnson were well acquainted when he was appointed Special Assistant 
to the President in May of 1964. His duties were to think ahead about 
health, education, and welfare problems and be a part-time speech 
writer. It was Cater who wrote the President's campaign speech which 
he delivered at the Coliseum in Denver in the fall of 1964 which was 
devoted entirely to education matters. 74 In addition, Cater worked 
with Francis Keppel in meetings with the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference in late 1964.75 Cater, along with Richard Goodwin, was 
also responsible for writing the President's 1965 State of the Union 
Message and the Special Message on Education. 
Following the passage of the 1965 school aid bill, Cater was 
assigned a new task--that of exploring the possibility of stamping 
70nouglass Cater, "The Trouble in Lyndon Johnson's Back Yard," 
The Reporter, XIII (December 1, 1955), p. )1. 
71congressional Record (April 16, 1959), p. A6884. 
72Douglass Cater, Power~ Washington (New York, 1964). 
73Quoted in Roberts, p. 105. 
74 Douglass Cater Folder, Or~l Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library. Also note Denver Speech, Chapter IV, p. 147 • 
. ' 
·75See Chapter V, pp. 164-165. 
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out poverty on a global basis. The results of Cater•s efforts in this 
area show up in President Johnson's international education proposals 
of 1966.76 
Just as Keppel was the most influential of the men in the formal 
structure of the executive branch in the formation of the 1965 edu-
cation proposals, Douglass Cater was the most important of the Johnson 
aides outside the formal structure in connection with education 
issues. Not only was Cater infh,iential in 1965, but he remained 
prominent throughout the Johnson Administration, as evidenced in a 
description of his duties in 1968 by one authority: 
Cater•s assignment has evolved informally since he 
joined the staff just prior to the 1964 campaign, 
initially involving speech--writing and editing functions, 
but soon in<;:luding responsibility for acting as the "eyes 
and ears" for the President in education and health 
matters--with other specialized interests such as inter-
national education, public television, and stud~nt 
affairs. Generally acknowledged as the White House liaison 
with HEW, he is especially charged with trying to keep 
the President's program from bogging down at key points 77 
where congressional or bureaucratic resistance threatens. 
It was quite evident in the communications found in the Johnson 
Papers between Cater and other White House officials, that Cater and 
his staff were constantly in communication with Health, Education, 
and Welfare officials, other White House aides, and representatives 
from the National Education Association and the American Federation 
of Teachers throughout the Johnson period. President Johnson 
76 Johnson, '"Special Message to the Congress Proposing Inter-
national Education and Health," February 2, 1966, Public Papers, 1966, 
p. 128. 
77 Thomas E~ Cronin, 11 The Pre~ddency and Eq.ucation, 11 in Thomas E. 
Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg, The Presidential Advisory System 
(New York, 1969), p. 227. ----
recognized eater's aqilities in this area anq called him a man who had 
the ability to "scholarly analyze th<':! issues. 1178 He might have added 
a note to that and included his ability to reach compromises between 
opposing ideas, an asset similar to that exhibited by Keppel. 
Joseph Califano. Joseph Califano, a g:raduate of Holy Cross 
College and Harvard Law School, joined the White House staff in July, 
1965. The appointment of Califano was µnusual in that he was already 
employed by the executive branch as a special assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense when President Johnson tapped him to be a part of 
the President's staff. His duties as a White House aide included co-
ordination of policies on domestic issues with department heads, 
direction of staff work on Presidential messages, and management of the 
President's legislative program. 
When Bill Moyers, President Johnson's ace troubleshooter, re-
signed in early 1966, 79 Califano gradually replaced Moyers as the 
top-notch expert on all around domestic affairs. His increasing 
prestige within the Johnson Administration is illustrated by the fact 
that at a Cabinet meeting in 1966, while discussi:ti(!f the make-up of the 
new Department of Transportation, ;president Johnson stated: "When Joe 
80 
speaks, that's my voice yc:,>u hear." One of the reasons for Califano 1 s 
popularity with the President was the fact that he applied the systems-
analysis approach to domestic affairs similar to McNamera•s national 
78Quoted in 
p. 29. 
"lnside the White House, 11 Newsweek (March 1, 1965), 
79Moyers became publisher of Newsday, a. Long Island newspaper. 
Bo Quoted in Patrick Anderson, "Joseph Califano: Deputy President 
for Domestic Affairs," ~ York Times Magazine (March J, 1968), p. J4. 
90 
defense program. However, othel," than with :President Johnson, Califano 
was not very popular. One of the reasons for his unpopularity was the 
fact that he often times appeared to be the hatchet man for the Presi-
dent on domestic affairs, as one veteran news reporter wrote in 1968: 
11 Part of Cali;fano•s job is to knock heads together, and this wins him 
•. 81 
no friends among those whose h~ads are knocked." 
Actually, one might :cornpare 1 Califano and Moyers to the two United 
States Commissioners of Education, Francis Keppel and Harold Howe,II. 
Keppel and Moyer$ were in on the creative part of Johnson's Great 
Society (1964-66), while Califano and Howe inherited the jobs of im-
plementation (19661 68). And as a :result neither Howe nor Califano were 
very popular except with the President who backed them both. 
Regardless of his popularity, Califano was a problem solver and a 
great asset to the Johnson program, as one aide so aptly put it, 11 You 
can't imagine how many hang-ups are straightened out at that big table 
in Joe's office. 1182 
During the fir$t session of the Eighty~Ninth Congress, President 
Johnson went furth.er than any .other recent President in cultivating a 
harmonious relationship with ·congress. Both personally and through 
the White House legislative liaison staff he had kept in close touch 
81Quoted in Patrick Anderson, 11Joseph Califano: Deputy President 
for Domestic Affa;i.rs, 11 NE:!w York Times Magazine (March 3, 1968), p. lll.1;. 
---
82Ibid., P• J4. 
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with Democratic members. But by 1966, the President's relationship 
with Congress had begun to decline. Newspapers of September 23, 1966, 
noted on that date Joqnson 1 s occupancy of the White House equaled that 
of President Kennedy--1,037 days and looked ahead to what they called 
the "second thousand days. 1183 However, the future did not look as 
rosy for President Johnson as had been his first thousand days. Pro-
tests against the war in Vietnam were being conducted on college cam-
puses throughout the countpy, and almost daily the President's 
credibility was being questioned. The best ref~ection of the attitude 
of the country in 1966 was summed up by Senate Republican Leader 
Everett M. Pirksen on October 14,, 1966: "Today, what appeared to be a 
golden glow only two years ago has been broken by rolls of thunder ... 
and uncertainty, queasy doubts, bewilderments, have spread across the 
84 
country. 11 · 
! i 
In 1967 Congress bega.11 to debate more heatedly the budget sub-
mitted by the President, mainly over the stepped up war effort and on 
expansion of the Great Society domestic programs. Despite the fact 
that in 1966 President Johr).son maintained that the country could afford 
both, Congress in 1967 and 1968 threatened to cut into the funding 
of new social legislation as war costs rose. 85 
The President nevertheless persuaded Congress to pass consumer-
oriented legislation, including a strong meat-inspection bill, in 1967. 
83Quoted in Congress ~ the Nation, p. 626. 
84congressional Record (October 14, 1966), p. 26748. 
85see the Vietnam issue 1 Chapter VI, P• 223. 
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The Senate in 1967, and the »ouse in 1968, passed a comprehensive 
truth-in-lending bill requiring creditors to disclose the true cost of 
borrowing. A civil rights open-housing bill, proposed by the President 
in 1966 and 1967, became law in 1968, The President also managed to 
increase funding for the nation's educational system. Reflecting upon 
the growth of federal activity in social legislation, the President 
struck back at his critics in 1968: 
In health, education, welfare ~nd security, President 
Eisenhower was spending $19 ... billion. President Kennedy 
moved that up to $24-billion. The budget this year has 
$48-billion, and some people think that we are neglecting 
the home front while we defend freedam.86 
However, without some form of Congressional help, it would not 
have been possible for President Johnson to have accomplished as much 
as he did in the area of common school legislation. This help came in 
the form of cooperation, especially in 1965, from the key committee 
chairmen in both chambers of the legislature. In the House it was 
chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, Adam Clayton Powell, 
and his subcommittee chairman, Representative Carl Perkins (Democrat, 
Kentucky), who we:re th.e most prominent figures in connection with 
federal aid during the Johnson Years~ In the Senate, the federal aid 
advocates were led by Senator Wayne Morse. Th~ importance of these 
three individuals to federal aid is well documented by Johnson's 
former staff members, For examp1.e, asked later who, ;he thought were 
the most important people in Congress in connection with the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Douglass Cater replied: 
86Max ,Frankel, 110n the Trail: Johnson Has Answers," The New York 
Times Magazine (March J, 1968), p. 45. --.---.-
••• In the House the~e was Chairman Powell-~Adam 
Clayton Powell. The subcommittee chairman was Perkins 
of Kentucky--Carl Perkins. He was quite a force for 
good in getting the bill passed • 
• • • In the Senate I worked closely with Wayne Morse, 
who was the sub-committee chairman for education. 87 
Commissioner Howe also felt that the top three were Perkins, 
88 Powell and Morse. Francis Keppel was especially complimentary to 
Senator Morse: 
••• The tactic on the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Bill was a tactic that really was an unusual one pol:i, tically, 
which was to get one bill as dre.fted, up there and get it 
through the House and past the Senate without a change of 
a single word, so that you.woulqp't have the problem of the 
conference committee, because we id been burned on conference 
committees before. Now, that required obv:lously the whole-
hearted collaboration of Wayne Morse. And this may be an 
.important part of hi story because. of Morse I s relations with 
the President on the Vietnam·4~hing. But. Wayne Morse was 
magnificent in this. • • • 9 
• Hence it can be seen that the importance of these individuals 
to the President's program is not to be minimized. Each played his 
93 
part with the skill that only he could provide, and together they made 
up the supportive cast that is so necessary to the success of a good 
drama. 
In a way the relationship between President Johnson and the three 
committeemen is reflective of the problems, as well as the successes, 
that education legislation experienced under the Johnson Administration. 
87 Douglass Cater Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, pp. 13~14. 
88 Harold Howe, II Folder, Ibid., p. 13. 
89Francis Keppel Folder, Ibid., P• 9. 
By examining their roles,,briefly, one can get a glimpse of the quag-
mire that federal aid to educatipn became embroiled in during Johnson's 
term of office, as well as the initiative the President took to promote 
federal aid for the common schools. 
Wayne Morse 
First elected to the Senate in 1944, the former dean of the Uni-
versity of Oregon Law School soon made a name for himself in Congress. 
A Republican until his switch to the Democratic party in 1955, Senator 
Morse was a constant critic of America's foreign policy throughout the 
1950's and early 1960 1 s. 90 When the United States began to increase 
its commitment of arms and troops to Vietnam in 1965, the Senator's 
attacks on Presidential foreign policy became even sharper. As one 
writer described him in the 1960 1 s, he was: "the Senate's Lecturer in 
Residence on the Higher Disciplines of Good Government and World Peace, 
and commands more pages in the Congressional Record than any other 
member of Congress."9l 
But despite his constant criticism of American foreign policy, 
the Senator was well known for his promotion of efforts to aid the 
common schools. This unique combination of attitudes is best illus-
trated by one writer who described Senator Morse's relationship with 
President Johnson: 
9°For Senator Morse's background, see A. Robert Smith, The Tiger 
in~ Senate (New York, 1962). 
91A. Robert Smith, "Senator Morse's Advice and Consent," ~Mew 
York Times Magazine (April 17, 1966), P• 128. 
The verbal cat-o-nine~tails he uses almost daily on 
the Chief Executive concerning foreign policy is laid 
aside occasionally just long enough for him to steer a 
major Great Society bill t~rough the Senate~-with 
astonishing tact, adroitness, and appeals. to sweet reason 
and unity. 92 
95 
In the Senate the escalation of the war in Vietnam caused serious 
dissention between the President and key Senatorial leaders. By 1966, 
in addition to Morse, Senator J. w. Fullbright (Democrat, Arkansas), 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Mike 
Mansfield (Democrat, Montana), the Majority Leader, had begun to criti-
cize the Administration's war policies. Such dissension made passage 
of educational legislation even more difficult for President Johnson. 
The effect of the embroiling of the Vietnam issue into the educational 
arena is exemplified by two events in 1966. First, Senator Morse dis-
played hostility to President Johnson's education budget in 1966, and 
as a result the Republican Minority Leader, Senator Dirksen, beame the 
chief spokesman for the Administration's position on education. 93 
Second, despite the fact that in the 1966 hearings John Gardner ~/ 
publicly paid tribute to Senator Morse's role in the, passage of the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 94 the gulf between Sena-
tor Morse and President Johnson grew wider. The quarrel culminated 
in the fall of 1966 involving the Oregon Senatorial race. The other 
92A. Robert Smith, "Senator Mor,se's Advice and Consent," The New 
York Times Magazine (April 17, 1966), P• 129. ~--.~ 
93see Chapter VI, pp. 226-227. 
94u. S. Congress, Senate, Sub-committee on Education, Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings on Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Amendments of 1966 Part I (89th--"cong. 2nd Ses;:-; 1966) 
(Washington, 1966)~p. 344. · -
Senate seat from Oregon, formerly occupied by Maurine Neuberger, was 
open. Democratic Congressman Robert A. Duncan sought the vacant seat 
with President Johnson's backing. Senator Morse, on the other hand, 
endorsed Republican candidate Mark Hatfield, the former Governor of 
Oregon. 95 Hatfield won the Senate seat, and as a result the relation-
ship between Senator Morse and Pres;ident Johnson continued to be 
strained. 
Despite their differences of opinion over foreign policies and 
the Oregon Senatorial race, it is somewhat of a tribute to both men 
that the promotion of education was vital to both their interests. 
It would be pure speculation to hypothesize about accomplishments that 
might have occurred if other ingtedients had not been injected into 
the educational arena, but at least one is sure that such an oc-
currence would have enhanced educational legislation during the 
Johnson period. But one should npt dwell long on things that might 
have been. The differences of opinion between Johnson and Morse did 
not totally prevent them from agreeing on educational issues, as ex-
emplified by Senator Mori;;e in 1968 in response to President Johnson's 
education proposals: 
There is nothing more basic to the welfare of the 
American people than insuring th,e qual~ty of education. 
This is the task o:f the Ninetieth Congress. President 
Johnson has told us how- to achieve this purpose...,.-and 96 
-we now must act quickly to pass this vital legislation. 
In~ sense, the difficulties experienced between President Johnson 
95smith, The New York Times Magazine, p. 128. 
--.--- ... 
96congressional Record (February 5, 1968), p. 206~. 
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and Senator Morse are also a reflection of the difficulties experienced 
by the entire nation over an unwanted war in Southeast Asia, and to 
detract from either man's accomplishments in the educational field 
because of it would be a difficult, if not an unwarranted, task. 
In the fall of 1968, Senator Morse lost his bid for re-electia:r 
to a fifth term in the Senate, and as a result, proponents of federal 
aid lost an old friend. 
Adam Clayton Powell 
The entanglements of federal aid to education and Vietnam did at 
times spark heated debates during the Johnson Period. But one of the 
stormiest episodes of modern Congressional history was the precedent-
shattering case of Representative Adam C. Powell. 
Powell was first elected to the House of Representatives from 
New York in 1944, and from then on was reg4larly elected by large 
majorities. In 1961 he became chairman of the Education and Labor 
Committee, the second Negro crairman in Congress. His position as a 
powerful Negro in politics and his flamboyant style attracted con-
siderable publicity for the Harlem Democrat. 
During the 1960 1 s the controversial Powell came under fire on a 
variety of counts, ranging from a libel action against him in New York 
State, to charges of misusing government funds. However, his downfall 
began in 1966 as a result of a revolt by his Education and Labor Com-
mittee. 
As chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, Powell angered 
a number of Congressmen by delaying action on bills in return for 
House action on other measures. 97 As a result, and following a pre-
liminary investigation by a House subcommittee, Powell was stripped of 
his chairmanship of the Education and Labor Committee and temporarily 
denied a seat. In March of 1967 the Ninetieth Congress continued the 
battle when they excluded Powell. He was then re-elected at a sub-
sequent special election but did not present himself for swearing in. 
Re-elected to the Ninety-First Congress in 1968, Powell was 
t . J 1 6 b th h l th" · "t 98 sea ed in anuary, 9 9, u e ad .os His seniori y. Although 
the Powell issue was an internal problem over parliamentary procedure, 
it had repercussions for education, as well as other social issues. 
For example, the Johnson forces filled Powell's position as 
chairman of the Education and Labor Committee with Congressman Carl 
Perkins, a staunch supporter of federal aid, but the rules adopted 
while Powell was chairman handicapped the new chairman. 99 Also, the 
Powell issue was in a sense, like the Vietnam problem, a reflection of 
Johnson's problems with civil rights and education in general. Powell 
was long known for his stringent anti-discrimination riders which he 
often placed on liberal-backed bills and often spoke out against 
t . 100 segrega ion. President Johnson, a strong advocate of civil rights 
legislation, supported the efforts of his staff in promoting de-
segregation in the schools, and as a result, education and civil rights 
97see 0 1 Brien Memorandum, Appendix E 
98The Supreme Court declared in 1969 that Congress had acted il-
legally in unseating Powell. For more details on this issue, see 
11 Poweli. Decision," Newsweek,, LXXIII (June ;30, 1969), pp. 45.,..46. 
/ 
'99see Chapte:r VI, p. 244~ 
100see Powell Amendment, Chapter IV, Footnote 59. 
99 
became intermixed, and the explosive debates over Adam Clayton Powell 
spilled into the education arena. 
Despite the fact that on some occasions Powell did more harm than 
good, his efforts to insure an equal educational opportunity for all 
101 
will be long remembered. The magazine The!!_.~· Ne~s ~ World 
Report paid one of the highest tributes, although unintentional, that 
could be awarded to Powell in 1967 when it labelled him as simply 
"a friend of education. 11 102 
Car 1 Perkins 
Elected to Congress ;in 1948, and subsequently every election 
thereafter, Carl Perkins was totally different than Powell or Morse 
in his attitude toward education, as well as politics. Whereas Morse 
and Powell were at times mavericks of the party system and somewhat 
103 
uncont7ollable, Perkins was always a "team player." Assuming the 
post of sub-committee chairman of the Education and Labor Committee 
in 1963, he quietly supported and worked throughout the post-war era 
for federal aid, to education. And it was Perkins who served as floor 
leader in the House for Johnson's education proposals. 
Whereas Johnson experienced continuous difficulties with Powell 
and Morse, Perkins was a constant supporter of the President and his 
policies. It was, according to testimony from Johnson's former staff 
101Powell died following abdominal surgery, April 4, 1972. 
102u. S. News. and World Report (January 23, 1967), p. 14. 
--, -.-
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members, Perkins more so than Powell, who led in the 1965 education 
104 debates. And, despite the fact that his powers as chairman of the 
Education and Labor Committee were somewhat limited after 1966, Perkins 
continued to push for education legislation throughout Johnson's term 
of office. Perkins' attitude is best reflected in his response to 
President Johnson's Education Message of 1968: 
We in the Congress who have supported the President 
on historic acts such as elementary and secondary edu-
cation, the higher education facilities, economic oppor-
tunity, and many others, now will stand with him as he 
proposes the fulfillment of America's phidge to give its 
children the best in education. 
I am proud to be a leader in this effort. I am proud 
to serve a President who does not believe in looking back, 
but always forwara.105 
The last line of that statement is, in a sense, the true Carl 
Perkins, a quiet but steadfast Congressman, always looking forward 
with optimism. 
In summary, the emergence of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act as well as subsequent educational policy during the Johnson 
Years was in part a result of a great deal of teamwork. Aside from 
President Johnson who, as President, was in a way responsible for 
initiating the educational program, there was no master draftsman--
not Keppel,not Gardner, not Morse, not Powell. The real draftsman was 
the bargaining process between the Pre~ident and his political sur-
roundings, informed and influenced at intervals by the skills of a 
few participants sensitive to, the emerging designs of a, hew era. 
1048 ee, for example, eater's testimony on Perkins. 
105 . ( :68) I. Congressional Record February 5, 19 , p~ 200'*• 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GROWING NEED FOR AID 
Introduction 
Although federal aid to education is not new from a conunon school 
financial point of view, it is rather new as a major topic of interest 
on the part of educational historians. Prior to the Second World War 
the financing of education was considered a local matter and did not 
attract nationwide attention as a domestic issue. Therefore, there 
were very few works of consequence regarding federal aid to education. 
But in a short period of twenty years (1945-1965), the financing of 
education became not only a nationwide concern, but also a top item 
in Congressional debates as well as a major issue in Presidential 
campaigns. 
Consequently, federal aid to education has become a lively topic 
for educational historical research and discussion. This chapter will 
examine briefly some of the reasons for the sudden concern over the 
financing of education and also look at some of the factors which caused 
a rising demand for some type of financial assistance to the common 
schools by the federal government. 
In addition, despite over one hundred years of failure in enacting 
a federal aid bill for the common school, Congress, in 1965, enacted 
what has been called "the first program of general aid for elementary 
1 ()1 
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and secondary education in America's history. 111 In view of the 
history of the failures of such proposals in the past, it should be 
more enlightening to examine some of the larger national issues which 
led to consistent defeats of education bills in order to show how the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act was a departure in national 
educational policy. 
And too, no piece of legislation is passed through Congress 
without some sort of framework for the bill constructed beforehand. 
In the case of the 1965 education bill, it would be impossible to tell 
how many influences entered into its formation. However, some major 
determinants, or background events, can be related to the bill which 
might throw some light on the task of understanding the process of 
Presidential influence upon Congressional action. 
New Educational Demands 
The time period between 196J and 1965 was the era in which federal 
aid to education received as much, or more, attention than any other 
domestic issue. Those hectic four years of renewed concern over 
federal aid to education was partially brought about by an increased 
demand by the nation's hard pressed schools for financial assistance. 
The post-war years had produced a number of events which brought about 
a gradual realization that the public schools were in dire need of 
financial aid from the federal government in order to provide an 
adequate education for the nation's school children. 
1Phillip Meranto, The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 
1965 (Syracuse, 1967), ~J. _,.. - -
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Numbers and Technology 
One of the biggest strains placed upon the local schools was the 
sheer pressure of numbers. The increase in enrollments in the public 
schools was b~ought about by two major factors; that of an increasing 
number of children, and an increased attendance rate of school age 
children. 
One of the more sobering reasons for the increased numbers en-
rolling in the public schools was the rapid growth of the total pop1,1-
lation in the United States following World War II. Medical science, 
aided by new methods and improved instruments for diagnosis and treat-
ment, was responsible for reducing the death rate, especially among 
children, and to prolong life. Other developments in the United 
States also contributed to the rapid population !;lrowth. Prosperity 
enabled young people to marry earlier and to raise larger families. 
A pdstwar babyboom also contributed to the swelling nu~bers. This 
upward surge of population in tne United States promised not only 
pressure for immediate finances for the public schools, but an ever 
increasing need for future resources to meet continued growth in 
public school attendanc:e. 
For example, on the secondary level in 1949-50, there were some 
6.4 million st~dents, but by 1965 this number had almost doubled. In 
the elementary schools the enrollments during the decade following 
World War II did·double. 2 This expansion is compared with total public 
2 u. s. De.partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Progress of 
Public Education in the United States of America, 196J-64 (Washington, 
1964), Po ·10; u. S.: Department of HEW,Projections of Educational 
Statistics ti> llZ.2.-2.§. (Washington, 1964), p. 5. Al-;; quoted in 
Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education 
Administers a Law {Syracuse, 1968), p. r;:-- ----
~~~~~~ -----
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school enrollment statistics which show that enrollment actually de-
clined between 1930 and 1950 from 25.6 million to 25.1 million. Total 
school enrollment, on the other hand, by the school year 1959-60 
jumped to 36.1 million, an increase of about 43 per cent in ten 
years. 3 The greatest increases came petween 1951 and 1965 when the 
G I 
growth rate averaged over one million per year. 4 
Parallel with the rapid rise in total population, was an in-
creased retention rate of school age children in the public schools. 
For every 100 persons aged 17 in 1945, 47.9 graduated from high school. 
' ' 
\ 
In following years this rate increased to 59.0 in 1949, 65.1 in 1959, 
and 78.4 in 1968. Also, in the decade from 1954-55 to 1964-65, the 
number of students graduating from high school jumped from over 1.3 
million to almost 2 0 6 million. 5 
In addition, education was expanding at the other end of the 
scale. Kindergartens were available to 74.4 per cent of the popu-
lation in 1950, and to over 80 per cent in the 1960 1 s. 6 In an auto-
mated and computerized world it was becoming ~pparent to many that 
education was assuming a major role in enabling youngsters to partici-
pate in that world. 
3u. s. Department of Health, Education,and Welfare, Office of 
Education, Digest 2.f. Educational Statistics, 1965 (Washington, 1965), 
p. 10; also quoted in Meranto, p. 14. 
4Peter D. Veillette, "State and Local Efforts to Finance Schools 
since 1945, 11 Current History, LXII (June, 1972), p. 294. 
5u. s. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of 
Education, Digest of Educational Statistics, 1970 (Washington, 1970), 
p. 49. ---
6rbid. 
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The effect that the pressure of numbers was having on the public 
schools is best reflected in testimony given by Abraham Ribicoff, 
Secretary of Health, Educ~tion, and Welfare, before the Senate Sub-
committee on the School Assistance Act of 1961: 
It is evident that we do not have enough classrooms 
to meet our needs. We s)lould not allow a condition to 
continue in which several million pupils are studying 
under overcrowded conditions, in half-day or curtailed 
sessions, or in substandard, obsolete, or dilapi,dated 
classrooms. 
The problem of meeting the need for instructional 
space is complicated and made more difficult by the fact 
that the bulge of school age population has now begun to 
be felt to the fullest extent in the secondary schools, 
thus increasing the cost of instructional facilities.7 
The need for school buildings, as testified by Ribicoff's 
statement, is made more evident by a survey conducted in the spring 
of 1962 by the Office of Civil Defense, the U. s. Office of Education, 
the Bureau of the Census, and state departments of education. Cover-
ing ninety-six per cent of the elementary and secondary schools of 
the nation, this survey revealed a need for over one-third of a 
million new class:rrooms to replace those which were not firepro.of, 
were temporary, or built before 1920.8 
In addition to the pressure of numbers on the public schools, 
there was an increased concern voiced over the adequacy of the 
American educational system to meet a challenging technological world. 
7u. s. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Education, Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings on the Public School Assistance 
Act of 1961 (87th Cong., 1st. Sess., Part I, March; 1961) (Washington, 
1961T,'" p. 95. 
8Sidney W. Tiedt, The Role of the Federal Government in Education 
(New York, 1966), P• 35:--- -- - -
'. 
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As a result of highly organ:fzed scientific activities following World 
War II, new knowledge began to accumulate so rapidly that educators 
began to speak of the "knowledge explosion." The amount of infor-
mation becoming available to the human race was staggering to even the 
boldest imaginations. In addition, the launching of the Soviet 
sputnik in 1957 instigated a drive to advance even more rapidly in 
science and technology. 
As the educational system tri.ed to adapt to the pressure of tech-
nology, writers and educators began questioning the value of the 
methods utilized in educating the youth for a new age. 9 In brief, 
the writers were asking questions st,1ch as "what kind of education 
should the schools provide to equip the students for life in a rapidly 
changing world?" "How could the schools best prepare young people to 
grasp the opportunities and to meet the challenges of the modern 
world?" 
Peter T. Schoemann, vice-president and chairman of the Education 
Committee of AFL-CIO, indicated the magnitude of the challenges of the 
modern world and their influence on the public schools, in his testi-
money before the Subcommittee on Education in 1961: 
We are seriously concerned today with the status and 
the immediate future of public education in the United 
States. The challenge confronting the public schools is 
different and critical. Education must prepare us to 
solve the problems of a new age. Americans of the 1940 1 s 
and 1950 1 s helped to fight the greatest of wars, es-
tablish the United Nation.s, p:r;-ovide unprecedented aid to 
9see John Hersey, The Child .Buyer (New York, 1960); · David Riesman, 
Constraint and Variety in American Education (New York, 1958); James 
BQ Conant, The American High School Today (New York, 1959); Slums and 
Suburbs (Ne;-york, 1961 )--;----
less fortunate peoples and fight the Communist world 
tyranny. These were monumental jobs. Compared to the 
jobs facin9 Americans of the 1960 1 s and 1970' s, how-
ever, these past accomplishments shrink.!n pro-
portion •••• 
• • • Th,e critical vehicle for advancing our way 
of life and rolling back the menaces of totali-
tarianif~' ignorance, and hunger is our education 
system. 
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At the same time, other writers played with the concept that edu-
t . ' t t . . t t ll ca ion was an 1mpor an economic 1nves men. The evidence was over-
whelming that poorly educated, poorly trained men and women had little 
hope of earning an adequate living in an increasingly complex society, 
As a result of these new pressures on the public schools, demands 
for vast increases in federal money became more insistent. It was 
obvious that the educational crisis confronting the United States 
could not be solved without additional money. 
Poverty, Urbanization and Civil Rights 
The enrollment explosion and technological change of the post-
war years with their resultant fiscal strain on the public schools 
were several of the major factors that proponents of federal aid to 
education were using to plea for more money for the schools. Equally 
important as catalysts for promoting federal aid were three other 
larger social issues which were becoming visible on the American 
scene; the increasing recognition that large segments of the American 
10 u. S. Senate Hearings, p. 390. 
11see Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Value of Education 
(New York, 1963). 
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population were in poverty, the emergence of the United States as an 
12 
urban society, and the civil rights movement. All three issues 
became so inter-related that action in one area affected the condition 
of the others. 
Following World War II most Americans were convinced that the 
United States had conquered the problem of poverty. It was easy to 
convince oneself that the elimination of poverty had occurred. The 
United States was the richest nation in the world, and general pros-
perity reigned supreme. Encouraged by mass purchasing power, the 
American consumer believed that, except for a few isolated cases, 
poverty had been forever removed from America. 11 Such was the pre-
vailing American faith throughqut the 1950's. It was encouraged by 
many spokesmen for the Eisenhower Administration and by the mass 
media (press, radio, TV) • 11 13 
However, by the early 196o•s, the existence of poverty among a 
large number of Americans was becoming apparent. Two books were 
especially effective in focusing the attention of the nation upon 
11* poverty or, as one writer called it, "the rediscovery of poverty." 
The first book was John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society 
(1957) which, although the major portion of the work was devoted to 
elaborating upon American prosperity in general, did contain a 
12For a more complete coverage of these three areas see Meranto, 
pp. 16.-33. 
13Kenneth S. Davis, ed., The Paradox of Poverty in America, The 
Reference Shelf, Volume 1*1, No~ (New York, 1969), p-;-1*. 
11* Meranto, p. 16. 
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section on the new poor in the age of affluence. The other work 
was Michael Harrington's The Other America (1992) which argued that 
Galbraith, although recognizing that poverty e~isted, had grossly 
underestimated the extent to which it existed in the United States. 
Harrington's point was that poverty was largely invisible in the 
United States, and thus people tended to underestimate its severity. 
He argued that during the Depression of the 19JO's, it was easy to 
find the poor. They could be seen everywhere. But during the late 
1950's and early 1960 1 s they were Qecoming more diversified and out 
16 
of the social m~instream and thus harder to see. 
Both books stimulated much activity among economists 
and sociologists. And both books, Harrington's especially, 
affected national policy as regards the poor. John F. 
Kennedy as a presidential candidate had been shocked by 
what he had seen and heard when campaigning in the crucial 
Democratic primary in West Virginia in the spring of 
1960. John F. Kennedy as President was therefore pe-
culiarly vulnerable to the message of The Other America 
when he read it in 1962.l? 
With the realization that poverty exi~ted in larger numbers than 
most Americans had imagined came the question of the relationship of 
education to the nation's economic well-being. People wanted to know 
what the schools were doing, or not doing, to meet the needs of the 
18 poverty student. The result was an increased emphasis upon using 
15John Kenneth Galbraith,~ Affluent Society (New York, 1958). 
16Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United 
States (Baltimore, 1962). 
17Davis, pp. 5-6. 
18see Frank Riessman, The Culturally Deprived Child (New York 
1962); and C0 W. Hunnicutt, ed., Urban Education~ Cultural De-
privation (Syracuse, 1964,). 
llO 
education as the vehicle with which the poverty student could break 
out of the poverty cycle. The educational implications of poverty 
were the subject of several studies which attempted to bring out the 
. . . 19 A 
relationship of a low educational achievement to a low income. s a 
result of all of the concern over the new poverty areas, more pressure 
was placed upon the public scqools, and therefore more pressure was 
developed for federal aid to alleviate the financial shortages. 
Closely tied with the existence of large 11 pockets 11 of poverty in 
the United States was the establishment of another social pattern, 
that of the urbanization of America and its resultant effect upon 
large city schools. 
For example, from 1950 to 1970, the number of persons living in 
urban areas increased from 6~.o per cent to 73.5 per cent of the total 
population. Even more significant for the public schools was the 
rapid growth of suburban areas around central cities. The percentage 
of persons living in tho~e areas rose from 13.8 per cent in 1950 to 
21.2 per cent in 1960.20 One veteran school administrator describes 
the effect the process of decentralization had upon the city school 
system: 
The new automated industry or bui;;iness which had moved 
to the suburb leaves behind in the city many citizens least 
able to move with the business or to be retrained for new 
jobs. It removes from the city as residents increased 
numbers of those whose leadership in business, industry, 
and the professions has been important to the economic 
and cultural life of the city• ••• The economic problem 
l9S Pt · · S t Ed t" d I I l"t" . ee a r1cia ex on 1 uca ion an ncome: nequa i ies ~ ~ 
Public Schools (New York, 1962). 
20 U. Ss Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract~~ United States, 1971 (Washington, 1971), p. 16. 
of the city schools is thus one of decreasing sup-
porting base, greater difficulty in mobilizing support 
from units of large taxpaying ability that are con-
trolled by absentee landlords, an increasing proportion 
of the voters who are retired home owners who resent 
increased property tax •••• 21 
As a result the city schools spent less money per student than the 
surrounding suburban areas. This trend was exemplified by a recent 
study of twelve metropolitan areas by the Civil JUghts Commission, 
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which found that in ten of the twelve areas, central cities spent more 
per pupil than did the suburbs in 1950. However, by 1964, in seven of 
h b b t d 11 ·1 22 t e areas, the average su ur spen more o ars per pup1 • 
• • • These basic population tremds take on even 
greater significance for the education function when they 
are examined in relationship to such factors as race, 
income, and educational attainment •••• The population 
shift is not only a matter of number of people, it also 
involves a sorting out process. In general, it is the 
poor, less-educated, non-white Americans who tend to 
remain in the central city and the higher-income, better-
educated whites who tend to move out •••• 23 
The publication of Harrington's volume, The Other America, was an 
important catalyst in creating renewed interest in eliminating 
American poverty. James B. Conant's work Slums~ Suburbs (1961) 
performed a similar function for the big city school systems. Conant 
stated: 
21Taken from an address delivered by S. M. Brownell, superin-
tendent of public schools, Detroit, Michigan, and former United 
States Commissioner of Education, at a symposium on urban problems at 
John Carroll University, Cleveland, Ohio, January 27, 1965. Vital 
Speeches.£!~ Dar (April 1, 1965), p. 38~. 
22Report of the Na~ional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(New York, 1968T,p. 435, quoted in Veillette, pq 294. 
23 Meranto, p. 22. 
••• The building up of a mass of unemployed and 
frustrated Negro youth in congested areas of a city is 
a social phenomenon that may be compared to the piling 
up of inflammable material in an empty building in a 
city block. Potentialities for trouble--indeed possi. 
bilities oJ disaster-~are surely there.24 
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The forces that plagued the cities~ and the consequent pressure 
on the city school systems, is best summed up in 1966 by Detroit's 
Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh, president of the National League of Cities: 
We have four great revolutions going on today--that 
of urbanization, the population explosion, the startling 
revolution of science and technology, and the civil rights 
revolution. The impact of any one of these by itself 
would be awesome, but we have the impact of all four in 
the cities of America.25 
The only way out of the financial problems of the big cities and their 
school problems seemed to be massive infusion of federal aid. 
Directly related to the 0 plight of the large cities and doing a 
great deal to attract attention to the educational system was the 
civil rights movement. As in the case of poverty and city schools, 
the question was raised concerning the extent to which the schools 
were perpetuating, instead of reducing, the problem of providing equal 
opportunities for the underprivileged. 
Black Amerisans by the end of World War II had made--although 
still drastically limited--progress toward fuller political and social 
rights. During the postwar years the movement to end discrimination 
began to accelerate. Under President Truman's administration segre-
gation was ordered to end 1 in the armed forces and in the government. 
24 Conant, P• 24, 
25 · u (A · 66) 6 Business ~ pril 2.3, 19 . , p. ,'.3 • 
llJ 
Under President Eisenhower, progress in civil rights continued. On 
May 17, 195~, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Brown vs. 
Board.£!. Education.£!. Topeka overturned the Plessy vs. Ferguson case 
of 1896 by ruling that segregation by race in the public schools was 
unconstitutional. This historic dec'ision set up a series of events of 
closing dual schools, busing students, and integrating large city 
systems: 
In term1=1 of dynamics of national educational 
policy, Brown vs. Board of Education had a number of other 
consequences, Perhaps the most.impressive of these was 
that it made visible the condition of Negro education in 
America and thereby highlighted the social and economic 
costs and co~gequences of prejuclice, cultural deprivation, 
and poverty. 
Encouraged by the Supreme Court ruling, civil rights supporters 
redoubled their efforts to break down discrimination: 
The rallying cry of the early 1960 1 s was that 
integration would provide quality education for all 
pupils in the city. The effects of segregation were so 
debilitating to Negro children that civil rights forces 
reasoned integration was the only way to grasp equal 
opportunity--as well as to open the multiracial world 
to whites,27 
Thus, the demand was placed upon Congress for legislation in the 
area of the public schools to prevent discrimination. This demand was 
culminated later in the Civil Rights Act of 196~. But the immediate 
effect was, of course, to place more pressure on Congress to do some-
thing in the area of federal aid to education~ 
26Bailey and Mosher, pp. 7-8. 
2711 The School Cri1:1is: Any Way Out?", Newsweek, LXX (Septemner 25, 
1967), p. 71. 
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Inadequate a.esou;rces 
The series of new demands on education just summarized fell on the 
educational system ter:ribly sho:rt of resot.1.rces; 
The effects of World War II upon the American school 
system were manifold, but one of its most profound effects 
was to defer capital outlays for schools. l'his deferment 
came on top of ten years of de~ression during which time 
capital outlay for public elementary and secondary schools 
had dropped from $370 million in 19.29-30 to only $258 
million in 1939-40. By the late 194-0•s, America's school 
plant was by and large old, dilapidated, and over-
crowded.28 
The public schools were in dire need of a massive number of con-
struction projects to update school facilities. But this need came at 
a time when the United States was being hit with postwar inflation. 
"Between 19'=i:6 and 1953 the va],ue of the dollar--including the tax 
29 dollar--was cut br '=i:o per cent.'' Efforts by State and local school 
districts to close the gap caused by inflation were unsuccessful, even 
though well intended: "Revenue receipts of State and local governments 
for education jumped from just over $2 billion in 1939-'=i:O to over 
$5 billion in 19'=i:9-50, to $7,5 billion in 19?3~54, and to $11.7 billion 
in 1957-58. 1130 
The fiscal pinch for funds was felt not only on the local level, 
but all along the scale to the federal level: 
• the demands for new buildings, e~uipment, staff, 
and services continued to outrun revenues. As local school 
districts and their p;roperty~tax payers came to feel the 
28Ba1"ley and M h ll os er, p. • 
30u. s. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Statistics 
of State School Systems, 1963-.§i (Washington, 1964), p. 21. 
fiscal pinch, both local and professional educational 
interests pressured State governments to increase both 
general and categorical aid to education. But States 
were also suffering from fiscal rigidities and in-
adequacies and were for,rd increasingly to turn toward 
the federal government. 
As a result, in 1960, the pressure of fiscal need for federal 
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money to aid the common school was to assume national attention with 
the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency, His election and 
subsequent introduction of a general aid bill to Congress began a four-
year struggle which resulted in the Johnson Administration's triumph 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
National Issues Affecting Education 
In 1961, largely in response to inyreased pressures for federal 
aid from school officials and to fulfill his campaign promises, Pre~i-
dent Kennedy introduced a proposal to Congress which called for general 
federal aid to education. The three key provisions of the plan were: 
(1) to grant states 2.J billion dollars over a three-year period for 
aid to public schools; (2) to grant states some 577 million dollars 
over a five-year period to be used for granting college scholarships 
on the basis of ability and need; and (J) to expand the federal loan 
program for college dormitories to 250 million dollars a year, and to 
set up a new 1.5 billion dollar program for a five-year period for 
loans for new college buildings. 32 
31Bailey ~nd Mosher, p. 11. 
32John F. J(ennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Containing the 
Public Message-;;- sj;;eches, and st";t~nts of the President, 1961 
(Washington, 1962), pp. 107-111. . - -.-
ll6 
In May of 1961 the Senate approved the President's request by a 
vote of 49-34. But trouble developed in the House of Representatives 
where a similar proposal was under consideration. The House proposal 
was a three-part bill consisting of: (1) 2.4 billion dollars for 
public schools; (2) 300 million dollars for college scholarships; and 
(3) a 325 million dqllar extension of the National Defense Education 
Act. The House bill became bottlenecked in the powerful Rules Com-
mittee and was tabled by a vote of B-1. 33 "When an attempt was made in 
August to present a compromise bill (H.R. 8890), the House refused to 
consider the bill (termed 'hastily conceived' and 'woefully in-
adequate•) by a floor vote of 24:2 to 170. 113t.i, The President's school 
aid plan went down to defeat. 35 
From the beginning Congress put ~ajor emphases upon the money 
earmarked for the public schools, and surrounding the public school 
aid proposal was a whole host of larger national issues affecting the 
federal aid question. If the issue of federal aid to education could 
have been isolated from other important national issues, it probably 
would have been settled. But federal aid to education has become the 
battleground for testing many other questions regarding government, 
law, economics, and philosophical values, And, more often than not, 
debates over these other questions resulted in forcing the federal aid 
JJRonald Steel, ed 0 , Federal Aid to Education (New York, 1961) 
p. 41. 
34Tiedt, p. 146 0 
35For a complete account of the 1961 federal aid fight see Hugh 
Douglass Price·, 11:Euice, Religion, and the Rules Committee, 11 in Allen F. 
Westin, ed., The Uses of Power (New York, 1962); and Robert Bendiner, 
Obstacle Cour-;;-o~p"[t'ol Hiil (New York, 1964). 
- -
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to education pro:posals in the middle, and the consequence being a 
quick death for federal aid bills. And th!s was essentially what 
heppened in 1961. 
, 
It is the purpose of this sect!lon to analyze briefly some of the 
major issues involved in the 1961 debate and to cover some of the 
reasons for the defeat of the President's proposal. The larger national 
issues involved are old questions which have appeared throughout 
American history whenever federal aid to education has been brought 
before Congress. Therefore, the issues are too lengthy to be given 
full coverage here. To illustrate, from 1948 to'l961 
the Senate has formally debated federal aid bills five times. 
During that period the relevant House and Senate committees 
have conducted hearings whose published record, by con-
servative estimates, runs to over 10,000 )tges and includes 
more than six million words of testimony. 
Thus, only the major highlights which affect the 1961 debate will be 
subjected to analysis at this time. 
ReUtion 
The Senate and House hearings on the legislation proposed by 
President Kennedy in 1961 reveal that the major issue involved was the 
· 37 
conflict over aid to private and parochial schools. Proponents of 
aid to private and parqchial schools wanted both types to share in any 
36 Frank J·. Munger and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., National Poli tics and 
Federal Aid~ Education (Syracuse, 1962), p. 2. 
37senate, Hearings, Parts I and II; U.S. Congress, House, Sub-
committee on Eouoation, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings on 
Federal Aid· to Schools (87th Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. 4790 and H. R.-
19180, Maroh-,-1961) (Washington, 1961 ). 
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federal program, while opponents wanted federal aid limited to public 
schools. However, beneath their arguments lay the broader issue of the 
question of the separation of church and state. 
The relationship of the public schools to religion, and to the 
separation of church and state, is regulated by the First Amendment 
to the Constitution which states in part: "Congress shall make no law 
respect,ing an establishment of ~eligion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof." Also, in Supreme Court cases involving thi$ Amendment 
38 
and the public schools, the Court had declared that the Federal and 
State governments could not levy any tax, large or small, to support 
religious activities. Nor could they use for religious instruction 
property provided from tax funds; or provide for an established 
church 0 39 But these cases did not resolve the argument over the sepa-
ration of church and state and the public schools. No one argued with 
the Supreme Court that separation of church and state was essential, 
but the issue that caused debate was the meaning of the word 11 sepa-
ration." The crux of the problem centered on the question of when a 
parochial school taught subjects common to a high school curriculum, 
was it performing the role of a religious institution, or a school? 
To illustrate the effectiveness of this issue in blocking school 
aid, following the Second World War: 
38ruinois ex rel McCol},um vs. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 0203 
(1948); Eve:rson vs.~arc{ ·~ Ed{ication, 3JOU. s. 1 (191±7). 
39Edgar L. Morphet, Roe L. Johns and '.L'heodore Reller, Educational 
Organization and Administration (New Jersey, 1967); p. 215 •. 
Major proposals for substantial federal aid to 
public schools were seriously advanced by Senator Robert 
A. Taft (in 1947 and 1948), strongJ,y backed by President 
Truman (in 1948 and 1949), a,nd requested--somewhat 
reluctantly by President Eisenhower (in 1955, 56, and 
1957). 40 
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All of these programs went down to defeat due in large part to the 
unsettled religious issue. And with the election of John F~ Kennedy 
in 1960, the religious question was raised again. 
During the presidential campaign, Kennedy, a Catholic, had en-
dorsed federal aid to education. He also left no doubt concerning his 
opinion on aid to the parochial schools: 11 1 believe in an America 
where the separation of church and state is absolute--where no church 
41 
school is granted any public funds or political preferences." 
Following his election, Kennedy established several advisory task 
forces to study problems confronting the nation, and included in these 
areas was one on education. The Task Force Report on Education, made 
public on January 6, 1961, recommended a program of over three billion 
dollars for education, none of which would be available to the parochial 
42 
schools. The report drew an immediate response from Cardinal Spellman 
40p . 3 rice, p. • 
41 New York Times (September 13, 1960), p. 22. 
42 For a summary of the Task Force Report see U. ~· News and World 
Report (January 23, 1961), p. 59. The report recommended three major 
l(;)gislative proposals regarding education. They were (1) federal 
support for the public schools of over 1.5 billion dollars per year; 
(2) federal support for colleges and universities of amounts close to 
one billion dollars; and (J) federal support to strengthen the National 
Defense Education Act of 1958. The report's proposals are similar in 
nature to those that are eventually debated in Congress and proposed by 
the President, except that the task force recommendations called for 
larger amounts. 
(who earlier had led a fight to defeat a similar proposal made by 
President Truman): 
I believe and I state that these recommendations are 
unfair to most parents of the nation's 6,800,000 parochial 
and private school children. Such legislation would dts-
criminate against a multitude of America's children because 
their parents choose to exercise their constitutional right 
to educate them in accordance with their religious beliefs. 
I cannot believe that Congress would enact a program 
of financial assistance to seconqary education unless all 
children were granted equal educational privileges, re-
gardless of t~e school they attend •••• 3 
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On February 20, 1961, despite knowledge of Catholic opposition 1 4:4: 
President Kennedy sent his proposal to Congress in a special message 
on education. On the issue of federal aid to the parochial schools, 
he stated: 
In accordance with the clear prohibition o:f the 
Constitution, no elementary or secondary school funds are 
allocated for constructing church schools or paying church 
school teachers' salaries, and thus non-public school 
children are rightfully not counted in determining thfl5 
funds each State will receive for its public schools. 
1,,,3 Quoted 1n Price, pp. 22-23. 
44within the Upited States, "parochial schools" refers in popular 
usage almost exclusively to the Catholic parochial system. It is a 
unique characteristic of the American school system. In Europe, and in 
a number of other countries of the Western World, substantial numbers 
of Protestant religious schools exist, and the Protestant churches 
have not relinquished to the State their claims to control the edu-
cational system. In the nineteenth century this was also true in the 
United States when school. systems were maintained at one time or 
another by Quakers, Presbyterians, Lutherans, and Episcopalianse But 
these systems failed to keep pace with increases in population and most 
were abandoned. The causes of this development are discussed in 
Francis X. Curran, The Churches and the Schools: American Protes-
tantism.and Popular""""in"ementary E~a~n (Chicago, 1954). 
45 Kennedy, Public Papers, 1961, p. 109. 
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Reaction from Catholic leaders was immediate and forceful. On 
March 1, 1961 Archbishop Karl J. Atter, chairman of the Administrative 
Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference stated in part: 
"In the event that a federal aid program is enacted which excludes 
children in private schools, these children will be victims of dis-
criminatory legislation. There will be no alternative but to oppose 
h . . . t. ,,46 sue d1scr1m1na ion. Other Roman Catholic individuals and groups 
echoed this criticism of the bill. The National Council of Catholic 
Men passed a resolution which said that exclusion of parochial school 
children from the aid bill placed 11 a price on the exercise of religious 
freedom. 1147 
On the other hand, most Protestant and Jewish groups adamantly 
opposed the principle of federal aid to nonpublic schools. Gerald 
Knoff, representing the National Council of the Churches of Christ, 
echoed an opinion prevalent among Protestants when he appeared before 
a Congressional committee to state in part that: "We do not ask for 
public funds for elementary or secondary education under church 
control," and "to encourage such a general development would be tragic 
in its results to the American people.1148 
For several weeks the question of federal aid to parochial schools 
was so heated that it almost superseded the problem of whether there 
would be aid for any schools: "Matters culminated on July 18. On that 
46 New York Times (March 3, 1961), p. 18. 
---
47 Ibid. 
48 House, Hearings, p. 1025~ 
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day the public school and NDEA bills were awaiting rules, as was the 
President's aid to higher education bill. 11 4:9 The powerful Rules Com-
mittee50 voted to table all three education bills by an eight to seven 
margin. A motion to reconsider the decision received the same fate, 
thus killing. education legislation for 1961. 51 
Thus, it can be seen that the religious issue was a major factor 
in the debates over the 1961 federal aid proposal. ;rn fact~ Newsweek 
assessed the Catholic effort against the bill as being the strongest 
since church groups had pushed through the Eighteenth Amendment in 
1919. 52 At any rate the 1961 debates "pointed out the absolute 
necessity of resolving the church-state issue if the proponents of 
federal aid for education were to realize their objective.1153 
Race Relations 
Ever since the Civil War and subsequent efforts to expand public 
schooling for Negroes which resulted from this conflict, the effect of 
federal aid to education upon relations between the races has been a 
major ingredient in congressional deQates: 
1±9 Meranto, pp. 65-66. 
501n the House of Representatives once a bill has.been granted 
a committee hearing it must. al.so obtain a rule from the Committee on 
Rules -which determines consideration of the bill on the House floor 
and establishes the condition of debate. Since World War II 9 the 
Rules Committee has been a very powerful body, especially in regard 
to federal aid to education. 
51 Meranto, p. 66. 
52Newsweek (August 21, 1961), pp. 58-59. 
53Meranto, p. 66 
One major change has occurred in the terms of the 
debate, howeyer. · In the 1870 1 s and 1880 1 s the Republican 
party posed as the champion of the Negro. Today the 
Negro spe~s for himself and through his own organi-
zations.5 
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Since the founding of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), the Negro has had a major organization which 
had not only provided leadership on the federal aid question, but one 
which has consistently supported federal aid which has purported to 
equalize educational opportunity. This is reflected as early as 1909 
at the 11First National Conference on the Negro Question," a conference 
which led to the founding of the NAACP, in an opening address by 
William E •. Walling, which reads in par:t: 11 That there be equal edu-
cational opportunities for all and in all states, and that public 
school expenditures be the same for the Negro and the white child.1155 
One of the major problems faced by Negro leaders in regard to edu-
cation has been whether or not to support federal aid which has no 
provision concerning racial segregation. As one writer ha:s put it, 
the conflict arises 11when the goal of federal aid to common school 
education comes into conflict with the goal of equal expenditures for 
white and Negro education, which should be given priority?1156 Since 
the historic 1951± Brown Supreme Court decision which prohibited racial 
discrimination in the public schools, the NAACP~ and most Negro spokes-
men, have taken a position of preferring no federal aid bill at all to 
54Munger and Fenno, p. 65. 
55rbid., p. 66. 
56rbid. 
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bi·11 'th t · · · · 1 d. · · t' 57 wi ou any provision concerning racia iscr1.mina 1.on. 
The NAACP has not been the only organization which has supported 
racial desegregation provisions in federal aid bills. For example, in 
1955, the American J"ewish Congress and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) supported the NAACP in its stand against the use of 
federal funds for segregated facilities. 58 
In addition to the opposition of the NAACP, federal aid proposals 
in the postwar years faced another imposing obstacle in the form of an 
amendment which had been often introduced, or threatened to be intro-
duced, by Representative Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat, New York) 
calling for desegration of schools in connection with the use of 
federal funds for aiding the common schools. The so-called Powell 
~mendment59 kept the racial issue connected with federal aid to edu-
cation throughout the 1950's and early 1960 1 s. 
As a result, the racial issue was still very much alive in 1961, 
as indicated by a representative of the NAACP testifying before the 
House Subcommittee on Education in 1961: 
We shall never cease to resist the dishonest and un-
democratic idea that the taxpayers of all the States should 
be called upon to build segregated schools in a few States; 
nor shall we be silent when such proposals are made.60 
57Munger and Fenno, p. 69. 
58Ibid., p. 71. 
59The Powell Amendment stipulated that funds for any federal aid 
program could not be used by states engaging in racially discriminatory 
practices in the administration and application of such a program. The 
amendment was offered recurrently to social legislation during the 
postwar years. Many times it was supported by those who opposed the 
original legislation as a method of killing the particular program 
in question. 
60 House, Hearings, p. 666. 
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However, much to the dismay of the NAACP, other supporters of federal 
aid have been more willing to concede the point in their enthusiasm to 
obtain Southern support for federal aid bills: 11Although condemning 
segregation in schools, many of the groups (such as the NEA and the 
AFL-CIO) have opposed, at one time or another, an anti-segregation 
amendment to pending bills.1161 
In 1961, despite the fact that Representative Powell withheld the 
introduction of the Powell Amendment, there were four amendments that 
dealt with segregation introduced into Congress.in connection with the 
federal aid proposal. All four were voted down~ but the damage in-
flicted by the racial issue was substantial. The racial problem pre-
vented any type of united front of organized groups :from operating 
effectively. Although opinion differs as to whether it was the racial 
issue, the religious issue, or some other problem that did the most to 
block federal aid to education in 1961, it is obvious that dissension 
resulting from the racial problem prevented total cohesion among the 
proponents of federal aid~ 
States' Rights and Fear of Federal Control 
One of the earliest issues causing the formation of political 
parties in the United States arose over differences of opinion con-
cerning the comparative roles of the Federal and State governments. 62 
It seems that it was inevitable that federal aid to education would 
become involved in this larger issue~ 
61 Meranto, P~ 33e 
62 Johns and Morphet, p. 409~ 
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The controversy arose over the Tenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution which reads in part: 11 The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively or to the people •• II Since 
the Constitution does not contain any specific reference to education, 
it would under this Amendment, be the legal responsibility of the 
States. This provision is usually cited by those favoring a local 
system of education. The major spokesman for this school of thought 
during the Kennedy years was Senator Barry Goldwater (Republican, 
Arizona). In a speech before Congress in 1961, he pointed out: 
"There can be no question but that federal intervention in our school 
system through aid programs is unconstitutional," and that YiNo con-
stitutional amendment to extend :federal powers or responsibilities 
into education has ever been considered 
Also, one of the largest interest groups which opposed the Kennedy 
bill in 1961, the Chamber of Commerce, testified against federal aid on 
the basis of its unconstitutionality. Dr. K. Brantely Watson, who 
testifying on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce before the Subcommittee 
on Education, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1961, stated in 
part that: n •• public education is and should continue to be a 
State and local responsibility. It is our belief that the intrusion 
of federal support and consequent control into the discharge of this 
responsibility is unwarranted."61± 
63Barry Goldwater, HHistoric and Current Federal Role in Edu-
cation," Congressional Record (September 23, 1961), p. 21010. 
6lt Senate, Hearings, p. 338. 
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On the other hand, those who have favored federal aid to education 
have used Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution as a basis for 
justifying action on the part of the federal government. This section 
reads in part: "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defense and general welfare of the United States •••• 11 
Commonly called the "General Welfare Clause," it has been used for a 
number o:f activities by the federal government to justify action on 
constitutional grounds. Basing their arguments on the theory of 
general welfare, proponents of federal aid have argued that education 
is connected with the general welfare o:f the United States as a whole~ 
and thus it is a legal and humanitarian area in which the federal 
government should be involved. This particular view is best illus-
trated by the late Senator Robert H. Taft (Republican 1 Ohio) in a 
speech during the Senate debate on federal aid in 194:6 when he said: 
Education is primarily a state function--but in the 
field of education, as in the fields of heal th, relief~ 
and medical care, the federal government has a secondary 
obligation to see that there is a basic floor under those 
essential services for all adults and children in the 
United States.65 
There is little doubt that the unsettled controversy over states' 
rights cost some votes for the proponents of federal aid in the 1961 
battle, especially when such an issue becomes mixed up in a number 
of other related questions. For example, the possibility of federal 
control also worked against the measure. Many l~cal officials feared 
65Quoted in Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress 
(New York 1 1969), p. lJ. 
centralized direction of the nation's schools. 66 They felt that: 
Control inevitably goes with the purse strings. With 
the advent of general aid to education must certainly come 
federal control. When the last strong bastion of states' 
rights, the school, falls to federal control, individual 
rights will soon diminish. Aid to education is simply the 
opening wedge for an all encompassing move on the part of 
the federal government to enslave the American people and 
to seize control in all areas of endeavor.67 
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These individuals were given strong support by a publicized letter 
from former President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Representative Charles A. 
Halleck of Indiana. 68 In the letter the President expressed fear of 
federal control and indicated that he felt that federal aid, if passed, 
would become permanent. 
Such pressures were partially counteracted by the educational 
journals which asserted that fear of federal control had to be overcome, 
and that it was an irrational fear. 69 Examples were cited regarding 
the history of federal aid to prove that federal control was, in cases 
where it did occur, beneficial. But the opponents were not convinced 
by this argument as witnessed by a spokesman for the Chamber of Com-
merce at the 1961 hearings: "While the present Congress may deny most 
66For an example of their position see Anthony Marinaccio, 
Superintendent of Schools, Davenport, Iowa, "We reject Federal Aid,11 
Nations Business (September, 1961) 9 pp. 34-35. 
67Ti"edt, 73 71· pp. - '*· 
6811Eisenhower Hits School Aid Plan," The New York Times (June 28 1 
1961), p. 18. 
69For examples of their positions see William G. Carr 1 "Federal 
Support: A Clinical Survey, 11 NF.A Journal,L (January, 1961), pp. 
19-21; George Hecht, "Federal Aid for School Construction is Now a 
Must, 11 Parents Magazine, XXXVI (February, 1961), p. 37; and "Masters 
of our Schools," editorial, New Republic, CXLIV (January 9, 1961),pp0 
3-4. 
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sincerely any intention of Federal 'takeover' in education, subsequent 
Congresses will find that both more Federal money and more Federal 
direction are necessary. "70 
Therefore this issuej similar to those already discussed, caused 
dissension among the ranks, and was damaging to hopes of federal aid 
in 1961. 
Interest Groups 
One of the characteristics of the movement for federal support 
of education in the post-war years has been the variety of interest 
groups and coalitions for and against federal aid proposals that have 
71 been presented to Congress. The presentation of clear-cut interest 
group alignments on the issue of federal aid is further complicated by 
the fact that the specific features of a bill, especially in regard 
to segregation and parochial schools, have often resulted in mixed 
groupings. However, despite the fact that variations exist, it is 
possible to identify some of the major groups that have been for or 
against federal aid with some consistency. 
The major organizations that have supported federal aid for 
education are: National Education Association, AFL-CIO and its 
affiliates, American Federation of Teachers, National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (to nonsegregated schools), and the 
National Farmers Union. 
7°senate, Hearings, p •. 31±0. 
71 For a more complete coverage of interest groups and federal aid 
see Meranto, pp. 52-81±. 
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Those that have been opposed included United States Chamber of 
Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, Investment Bankers 
Association of America, American Farm Bureau, American Legion, and the 
Daughters of the American Revolution. 
The religious organizations that have supported federal aid with-
out funds for parochial schools are: The American Jewish Congress, 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, National Council of Churches, 
. National Association of Evangelicals, National Lutheran Church, 
Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, and Unitarians for Social Justice. 
Those groups which have supported federal aid only for both public 
and nonpublic schools are the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 
National Council of Catholic Men, National Council of Catholic Women, 
and Citizens for Educational Freedoms 72 
By far the largest of the interest groups is the National Edu-
cation Association. It represents well over a million members, through-
out the United States and has a representative assembly of over six 
thousand delegatesg 
Ever since the end of World War I, NEA had pressed--
at least intermittently-~for Federal aid to schoolsQ In 
the post-World War II ye.a.rs, NEA 1 s philosophy on Federal 
aid to education was marked by two attitudes; first, Federal 
aid should be general rather than categorical--leaving 
decisions on specific resource allocations to State and 
local educational agencies; second, no Federal aid should 
be given to parochial schools.73 
It is the latter stance which prevented the NEA from forming a 
72 Meranto, pp. 5~-55. 
73 , Bailey and Mosher, pp. 15-16a 
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unified front for federal aid in 1961. The position of supporting 
federal aid for public schools only alienated the major Catholic 
groups immediately. In addition, the NAACP, which supported federal 
aid for integrated schools, accused the N:&A of being too lax on this 
particular issue. Thus, in view of the multiplicity of conflicts 
among the supporters of federal aid, it is not surprising that federal 
aid encountered difficulties in 1961. 71± 
Although the supporters of federal aid stressed such factors as 
the population explosion, fiscal strain, and classroom shortages of' 
the public schools, their efforts were offset by the opposing organi-
zations. 
One of the best organized and most vocal opponents of federal 
aid legislation has been the United States Chamber of Commerce: 
The Chamber is well financed, broadly based, and 
adept at exercising its constitutional right of petition. 
Its techniques of congressional influence range from 
direct lobbying and presenting testimony before con~ 
gressional committee to organizing letter writing cam-
paigns. 75 
Another major group which has joined the Chamber in nu,merous 
federal aid fights has been the National Association of Manufacturers. 76 
In 1961, they stated their ,reasons for opposing federal aid on several 
grounds: 
71±For further elaboration on these conflicts see Munger and Fenno, 
pp. 66-75, and Meranto, pp. 52-85~ 
75Eidenberg and Morey, p. 13. 
76 For more representative statements, both pro and con, see UQ S. 
Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Proposed Federal Aid~ 
Education: A Collection of Pro and Con Excerpts and a Bibliography 
(Washington,-1961 ). - -- - -- -- -
The National Association of Manufacturers, throughout 
its organizational history, has supported the expansion 
of both public and private educationo Why, then, are we 
opposed to federal aid? 
Because,~!: matter of governmental principle, education 
is not a federal function but a responsibility of state 
and local governments and voluntary bodies. 
Because, as a matter of fiscal principle, state and local 
governments ;re in a better position to finance tax-
supported education than is the federal government. Non-
public education, which is a matter of choice, should be 
voluntarily supported. 
Because,~!: matter of political principle, intellectual 
and political freedom are best nurtured by the education 
system which is least subject to conformity •••• 
Because, ~ !: matter of educational 12rinciple, federal 
aid is more likely to aggravate than to solve our 
educational problems.77 
The opposition of such major interest groups were substantial 
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eriough in 1961 to constitute another reason for the defeat of President 
Kennedy's proposal and to bring about a realization by proponents of 
federal aid that without a unified effort among the major interest 
groups, not much hope existed. for federal aid. 
In summary~ then, as a result of the education issue in 1961 
becoming involved in other problems, the passage of a federal aid 
measure was doomed to failure. Not only was the education proposal 
of 1961 doomed, but also observers predicted that passage of any type 
of legislative measure regarding the public schools in the near future 
was also unlikely. For example, Hugh Douglass Price, after an analysis 
of the 1961 confrontation, wrote: 
77Quoted · T" dt 85 1n 1e , p. • 
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The bitterness of the 1961 legislative struggle and 
the difficulties of reaching a consensus on the status 
of nonpublic schools will not soon be forgottene In 
private, many school-aid supporters admitted that federal 
aid of the sort proposed by President Kennedy was dead, 
not just for the 87th ~ongress, but probably for the 
decade of the 1960 1 s. 7 
Other writers shared this pessimistic view. 79 But in a period of 
four short years, federal aid to education did occur, and in massive 
proportions, in the form of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1965. 
Formation of the ESEA 
The formation of the Elementary and Sf~condary Education Act was not 
an overnight occurrence. Although it would be virtually impossible 
to indicate all of the significant ingredients that helped in the 
formation of the Act between the years 1961 and 1965, it is signifi-
cant to note that the experiences of the last two years of the Kennedy 
Administration were very important to the eventual passage of a federal 
aid bill. Out of the ashes of the 1961 defeat, President Kennedy tried 
in 1962, and again in 1963, to build a program of federal aid to the 
commonschoolse Even though he failed to do so, Kennedy's efforts to 
aid the schools provided valuable experiences for the Johnson Adminis-
tration, the very least of which was a knowledge of techniques that 
would not work. And, too, the United States Commissioner of Education, 
Francis Keppel, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Anthony Celebrezzel were members of both President Kennedy and President 
Pe 67. 
79see Munger and Fenno, p. 170, and Bendiner 9 p. 7. 
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Johnson's Administrations. The experiences of these two individuals, 
along with a number of others who served under both Presidents, were 
valuable assets to the Johnson Administration. 
An example which shows that the Johnson Administration was well 
aware of the problems that President Kennedy experienced in 1961 is 
to be found in a White House memorandum to Douglass Cater, Special 
Assistant to the President~ from a White House aide in 1964. The 
memo concerned an analysis of the book published by Robert Bendiner~ 
Obstacle Course~ Capitol Hill, which had analyzed the 1961 defeat: 
To Douglass Cater from Bob Hunter: 
I infer from Robert Bendiner•s analysis the follow-
ing propositions: 
1. Priority: An education bill must be either top 
priority, or so close to top priority as to be 
•must legislation;' beyond the first four bills, 
legislation is not a must. 
2. Commitment: The President must be fully and 
completely behind the bills. 
3. Attention: The attention of Congress must be 
focused upon the subject of education. 
this implies a galvanizing of very real con-
stituent opinion •••• 
4. Civil Rights: Beware of the trap of permitting 
civil rights and education aid to become bound 
up with one another. 
5. Parochial School Aid: The question of Consti-
tutionality is not an open and shut one-~it is 
to be played down, to be •accomodated' out of 
the spotlight. 
6. Crucial Points: The Catholic issue is not crucial 
to the passage of aid to education legislation--
control of the critical. points in the House/ 
Senate process are--principally the Rules 
Committee; the more the Catholic and other 
peripheral issues are kept out of the contro-
versy, the less the opponents of aid to edu-
cation (for whatever reason) have to seize 
upon as their raison d'etre.BO 
1.35 
In addition to the last two years of the Kennedy Administration, 
the first two years of the Johnson.Administration (1963-64) are also 
important years to be examined regarding the groundwork performed 
for the eventual passage of a federal aid bill. Those two years were 
used by President Johnson as a ti.me of careful study and planning for 
a federal aid proposal which would be well defined and well executed 
through the numerous pitfalls which traditionally killed such pro-
posals. As it will be seen, that time was not wasted. 
1962 and 1963 Proposals 
Following the defeat of his 1961 federal aid proposal, President 
Kennedy sent a similar proposal to Congress in 1962. On February 6, 
1962, he sent a special message to Congress on education which es-
sentially asked Congress to reconsider the program that he had offered 
h . 81 t e preceding year. And once again Catholic leaders indicated they 
would fight federal aid if their schools did not receive a share of 
82 
the funds. Basically the opposition to federai aid in 1962 was the 
same as in 1961. As a result, neither President Kennedy, nor the 
Democratic leadership in Congress, pushed very hard for aid in 1962. 
80\vhite House Memorandum, Bob Hunter to Douglass Cater, December 
24, 1964 (Ex/Le/Fa2) Papers£!_ Lyndon Baines Johnson, Johnson Library. 
81Kennedy, 11 Special Message to the Congress on Education," 
February 6, 1962, Public Papers, pp. 110-117. 
82 
11 Schoo1 Aid: Catholic Views," Time, LXXIX (March 2, 1962), 
p. 58. 
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Chances are, with the memory of the 1961 defeat still fresh on the 
mind, that even if federal aid had been pressed in 1962, there would 
not have been much hope of passage of such a proposal. 
A new technique was badly needed. Some approach had to be found 
to, either meet the individual arguments against federal aid, or get 
enough support behind aid legislation to pass it despite the opposition 
of individual interest groups. An indication of what was coming in 
regard to federal aid in 1963 was revealed late in 1962 by Anthony 
Celebrezze in a news conference. Celebrezze indicated that, even 
though at this point the Administration saw no constitutional way to 
provide aid to parochial schools and thus gain the support of the 
Catholics, the Administration was planning to make a real fight for aid 
83 to elementary and secondary schools in the next Congress. Since the 
odds of passing the old program were close to nil, it was apparent 
that the administration had something new in mind0 
This new approach was revealed in President Kennedy's special 
message to the Congress on January 29, 1963. 84 In this message 
President Kennedy proposed an omnibus bill with provisions to help 
educate all age groups. This approach was a throwback to the popu-
lar National Defense Education Act in that the President put all of 
his program regarding education into one bill. It was a sort of all-
or-nothing approach. 
83 
11 Celebrezze Ready to Battle for Aid to Public Schools," The New 
York Times tOctober 14, 1.962), p. 11.9. 
84Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Edtl.cation, 11 
January 29, 1963, Public Papers, 1963, pp. 105-116. 
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Title IV of the omnibus bill contained a four-year program to 
provide 1.5 billion dollars for the elementary and secondary schools. 
It was essentially the same type of measure Kennedy had promised 
during his presidential campaign of 1960 and the Congress had de-
feated in 1961. The President apparently thought that by including 
this and other controversial proposals in an omnibus bill he could 
get enough support from the different areas of education to overcome 
pressure groups which opposed federal aid. 
Reaction to the proposal was somewhat less than positive. For 
example, Time magazine, in its issue of February 8, 196~, called the 
move an attempt to get the education legislation passed at "one big 
gulp," and 11 The President's plan is apparently to try to get federal 
aid through Congress by wrapping it all up in a big package containing 
something for everyone. His omnibus bill has in it the kind of 
general aid to public schools that runs into constant trouble. 1185 The 
magazine further predicted that "Congress inevitably will try to untie 
the big package and pass the selective-help items it likes.n86 Other 
editorials from the press were similar in their attack on the bill on 
political grounds: 
If one were to criticize Mr. Kennedy's presen-
tation to Congress it would be primarily on political, 
not educational grounds. Congress is today convinced 
that education bills haven't a chance. When the Presi-
dent submits a group of proposals most of which died in 
committee only last year, Congressional apathy inevitably 
grows even greater.87 
85"0ne Big Gulp," Time (February 8, 1963), p. ~9. 
86Ibid. 
87christopher Jencks, "Education Stalemate," The New Republicj 
CXLVIII (February 9, 1963), p. 6. 
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Reaction in Congress was also negative to the ominbus approach. 
Representative Adam Clayton Powell, chairman of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, stated that he thought the omnibus approach was 
politically unrealistic. 88 The only hope for aid to the common 
schools, as Powell saw it, was to separate Title IV from the rest of 
the bill. Other members of the Hous~ agreed with Poweli. 89 
But Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Anthony 
Celebrezze, testifying before the House 9 said that the Administration 
was not willing to change its proposal, and that it was up to Congress 
to accept all of it, or reject all of it. 9° Francis Keppel, Ue S. 
Commissioner of Education, recalls the reaction of Congress to this 
approach: 
So what we did was to put up what we called an omnibus 
bill in 1963 that had everything in it® The Congress roared 
with laughter and had a lovely time chasing it around, saying 
'you don't really mean that there are no priorities--
between higher education in the schools and between books 
and whatever.' 
And we solemnly got up there and said, 1 yes, indeed 
we do, it's all in one piece, and we won't cut it up for 
a minute.' 
At any rate, most of the arguments used against the federal 
88u. S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, 
Hearings on the National Education Improvement Act (88th Cong., 1st 
Sesse, 1963)--Z-Washington, 1963), pp. 1-2. 
89see Ibid., pp. 86, 90, and 104 respectively. 
9°For Celebrezze's testimony, see Ibid., pp. 61-85. 
91 Francis Keppel Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library (Interviewed by David G. McComb 9 April 21, 1969) 1 
Pe 6. 
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aid proposal in 1961 were rehashed in 1963. As the session progressedi 
the omnibus proposal continued to lose ground. Congressional leaders 
agreed that prospects for some elements of the package bill were good, 
but that aid to elementary and secondary schools was unlikely. 92 At 
this point the Administration had a choice of either keeping the bill 
in one package and risk losing it all, or consenting to breaking up the 
proposal into separate categories. In late May, Adam Clayton Powell 
announced what The New York Times called a "surprise" move on the part 
of the White House. 93 The Administration had finally given in to split 
the omnibus bill. Francis Keppel recalls this decision: 
What happened,.praoticaJly, was that with Wayne Morse's 
help it was-kept. as a sing1e bill for quite awhile until 
finally it .looked as if there was a chance in the summer of 
1 63 to spring out a higher education version. And we 
sprung it out and got it passedi knowing we'd have to go 
back later on the elementary, secondary side.94 
But instead of President Kennedy, it was President Johnson who 
went back to aid the common schools. Kennedy's attempt to use the 
omnibus approach to aid the common schools had failed. Thus, Lyndon 
Johnson inherited the problem of federal aid to the common schools that 
was found to be unsolvable by President Kennedy. 
Johnson Lays the Groundwork 
President Johnson demonstrated during the early months of his 
Presidency that he was concerned about the elementary and secondary 
92The New York Times (May 3, 1963), p. 61±. 
93 rbid., (May 23, 1963); pp. 1, J4. 
91± Keppeli Johnson Papers 1 Johnson Library, p. 6. 
11±0 
schools. While signing the Higher Education Facilities Act in mid-
December of 1963, he stressed that Congress should try for "early, 
positive action on the unfinished portion of the National Education 
Imp~ovement Act, particularly those programs which will assist elemen-
tary and secondary schools. 1195 And in late December he suggested in a 
news conference curtailment of some military expenditures as a possible 
ff d "th h" ht f" th duet" 1 · 1 t• 9 6 source o un s wi w ic o inance · e e a ion egis a ion. 
And again, speaking in early 1964:, he stressed· the need for work on the 
common school problem: 
Bills enacted last year for Federal assistance to 
higher education make important milestones in efforts 
to improve our educational system on a national scale •• 
but much remains to be done. Important elements of the 
education program prepared last year have not yet been 
enacted. In·· particular, attention must be turned to the 
basic foundation of our educational system--the elementary 
and secondary schools.97 
There is no indication given in either Lyndon Baines Johnson's 
book, The Vantage Point, nor in testimony given by Johnson's former 
staff members, that anyone knew at this point just what type of legis-
98 lation regarding the common schools would be proposed. This is also 
testified to by the fact that Johnson told reporters at the New York 
95Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Remarks Upon Signing the HiQher Edu-
cation Facilities Act 9 11 December 16, 1963, Public Papers of the Presi-
dents of the United States, Containing the Public Passages, Speeches 1 
and St~e~ts of the President, 196J-64(Washington, 1965), p. 58. 
96The New York Times (December 28i 1963), pp. 1, 22. 
97Johnson 9 11Annual Budget Message to Congress," January 21, 1961± 1 
Public Papers, 1963-61±, pp. 189-1900 
98Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of ~ 
Presidency, 1963-1969 (New Yor~1971). For testimony of the staff 
members, see Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
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World's Fair in early 1964 that he was not limiting his thinking to any 
one type of measure, but instead was exploring any avenue which ap-
peared feasible. 99 
The Task Forces 
On May 22, 1964, at the University of Michigan, President Johnson 
called for help in his search for an avenue through which the common 
schools could be aided: " 
I intend to establish working groups to prepare 
a series of conferences and meetings-~on the cities, 
on natural beauty, on the quality of education, and on 
other emerging challenges. From these studies we1d""J11 
begin to set our course toward the Great Society. 
This is the first mention by the President of the eventual creation 
of the task forces. In addition to his remarks 3 the President told 
reporters afterwards: "I'm going to get the best minds in this 
country to work for me. ,/Ol 
There appears to have been no single point in time when the con-
102 
cept of forming task forces was born. But there were a number of 
99 Johnson, "The President I s News Conference at the New York 
World's Fair, 11 May 9, 1964, Public Papers, 1963-64, p. 666. 
100 Johnson, "Remarks at the University of Michigan, 11 May 22, 1964 9 
Ibid., 1963-64, p. 706. 
lOlQuoted in William Leuchtenberg 9 11 The Genesis of the Great 
Society," The Reporter, XXXIV (April 21, 1966), p. 36. 
102 For an excellent coverage of the formation of the task forces, 
see Ibid. For those reports pertaining to Higher Education see Philip 
W. Semas, "Release of Lynpon Johnson's Higher Education Papers Brings 
Long-Secret Task Force Reports to Light 9 " The Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation, VI (February 7 9 1972), pp. 1-7. For the contentsof all the 
reports,. see Task Force Files, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
people on the President's staff who were familiar with the task forces 
set up by President Kennedy in 1960. These people included White House 
assistant Hayes Redmon, a former history instructor at the Air Force 
Academy; Press Secretary Bill Moyers; Walter Heller, chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors; Kermit Gordon, Director of the Bureau of 
the 1?udget; and Special Assistant to the President, Richard Goodwin. 
These staff members, although in general impressed with the work of the 
Kennedy task forces, had several criticisms to offer~ such as: (1) the 
Kennedy study groups had been primarily composed of academicians 1 and 
their work had been too remote from the actual process of legislating; 
and (2.) the Kennedy proposals had been .published before the President 
had read them, and thus were exposed too soon. As Bill Moyers ex-
pressed it, "When an idea has surfaced too soon, before it has been ex-
. d f t . t . t . . t . t . t 11 103 amine rom every van age po1n, 1 can 1nv1 e 1 s assass1na or. 
President Johnson, taking these criticisms seriously, instructed 
the task force groups to leave questions of feasibility to the Presi-
dent and the Cabinet, and to devote their efforts to generating ideas 
of real merit. Also 1 the members were instructed to keep the reports 
secret to avoid the pitfalls of the Kennedy task forces: 
The task forces averaged about nine persons each, but 
they sometimes. dr<ew in temporary consultants as well, in 
all, more than 150 people were to become. engaged in some 
aspect of the ,work. Ti:l.sk force members -were told they would 
have to donat.e at least a full month. .Each group had an 
executive se.cretary from the government (mainly the Bureau 
of the Budget) as a 'leg man' • • • • In addition, a member 
of the White House staff served with each task force. l04: 
l03Quoted in Leuchtenberg, p. 37, 
l04:Ibid., the leg man for the Task Force on Education 
addition to Cannon, Francis Keppel :t;rom the White House. 
was, in 
The Task Force on Education was composed of thirteen members, most 
of them outside the government with the exception of William B. Cannon 
of the Bureau of the Budget serving as Executive Secretary. The group 
was chaired by John Gardner, then President of the Carnegie Corpo-
t . 105 ra ion. The Task Force on Education was probably the most signifi-
106 
cant of all the Johnson task forces, in that almost all of the 
recommendations made in the report were eventually accepted by Presi-
dent JohnsonolO? Some of these recommendations included: (1) base the 
formula for distributing federal funds on the number of children from 
poverty families in each independent school district; and (2) create 
lOSThe full membership of this distinguished body included the 
following: John W. Gardner, president, the Carnegie Corporation of 
New York (later Secretary of Beal th, E.ducation, and We.lfare), James 
E. Allen, Jr., Commissioner of Education, New York state {:J_ater U. S. 
Commissioner of Education "under President Nixon, now deceased); Hedley 
W. Donavan, editor-in-chief, Time, Inc.; Harold B. Gores, president, 
Educational Facilities Laboratories, Inc.; Clark Kerr, presidenti The 
University of' California (now chairman, The Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education); Edwin H. Land,. president, Polaroid Corporation; 
Sidney P. Marland, Jr., superintendent of schools, Pittsburgh (U.S. 
Commissioner of Education under President Nixon, succeeding James 
Allen); David Riesman, Henry Ford, II professor of social sciences, 
Harvard University; The Reverend Paul C. Reinart, president, St. Louis 
University, Raymond R. Tucker, mayor, St. Louis (later becomes pro-
fessor of urban af.fairs, Washington University); Ralph W. Tyler, 
director, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (later 
becomes director emeritus); Stephe11 J. Wright, president, Fisk Uni-
versity (later becomes vice-president, The College Entrance Exami-
nation Board); and Jerrold Ro · Zacharias 1 professor of physics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Te.chnology. 
1061 · · t' t t th . J 6 1· h tis interes 1ng o no e at in une, 19 '± 1 oft e fourteen 
task forces commissioned by the President, only one concerned foreign 
affairs, while seven o.f the Kennedy task forces were connected wi,th 
foreign affairs. See Leuchtenb,erg, p. 37. This fact reflects the 
attempt by the President to formulate his Great Society program by 
concentrating on domestic affairs in the early period of his Presi-
dency. 
107 In addition to the recommendations utilized in the ESEA, the 
Gardner Task Force report also contained most of the eventual pro-
visions of the Higher Education Act of 1965. 
supplementary centers to encourage innovation in education. As will be 
seen later, these recommendations become very important to the passage 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 
In the summary of their report, the Task Force also commented 
on federal aid to education in general: 
This is a fateful moment in the history of American 
education. For almost a decade 9 we have been engaged in 
a lively, argumentative reappraisal of our schools and 
colleges, and a search for new paths. The years of ap~ 
praisal and innovation are just beginning to pay off in a 
clearer understanding of where we have failed and a 
surer notion of what our goals must be. 
And now the President of the United States has said 
explicitly and repeatedly that education is at the top of 
the Nation's agenda • 
• • • it follows that education will be at the heart 
of the Great Society.108 
The task force also commented on·financing the elementary and secondary 
schools: 
Population curves continue upward. Costs are sky-
rocketing, and we demand more of our schools than ever 
before. How are we going to pay for it? Today local 
sources pay about 56.4% of the bill for elementary and 
secondary schools, the State pays 4001% and the Federal 
government pays J.5%. 
We favor general Federal aid to education. We 
particularly commend to the attention of the President 
an.d of Congress the pressing requirements in school 
construction. 
Though we favor general Federal ai?~ 
comment on its political feasibility. 10 
we cannot 
The political feasibility of promoting the task force proposals 
was left to the President and his staff to decide. Once completed, the 
task force report was circulated throughout the government agencies 
concerned with education, and then Presidential Assistant Bill Moyers 
108Task Force Files, 1964 Folder, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library, 
p. 10. 
109Ibid. 
14:5 
directed a review process with the White House staff. Results were 
then submitted to President Johnson for consolidation. 
Even though Bill Moyers was in charge of the whole process, it 
was Francis Keppel, the Commissioner of Education, who really tied the 
110 program together. 11 In short, Keppel performed a key role as an 
intermediary broker of ideas, moving among various arenas; the task 
force; HEW and USOE planning staffs; the White House; the Congress; the 
111 Press; professional associations, and interest groups. 11 
Yet even more important than the proposals that came out of the 
112 
task force report, was. the nature of the task force operation. 
According to Phillip S. Hughes, of the Bureau of the Budget under 
Johnson, the operations of the task forces were vitally important: 
"Johnson's use of the task forces was a major innovation whose signifi-
cance has been missed • The task force was the basic tool which 
113 
made much of the success of the Eighty-Ninth Congress. 11 In essence, 
the task force procedure circumvented the old routine way of going 
through departmental lines for proposals by working outside the re-
spective governmental agencies. Such a procedure allowed for a more 
llOKeppel served as an ex officio member of the task forceo His 
role in the Johnson Administration's educational program will be the 
subject of an analysis later on in this work. 
111 B . M h 1·1 ailey and os er, p. ~. 
112F . C . . or the proposals wh1.ch were eventually used, see • Phillip 
Kearney 1 "The 1964: Presidential Task Force on Education and the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 11 (unpub. Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967). 
llJQuoted in Leuchtenberg, p. 38. 
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innovative approach, especially in regard to old problems such as 
federal aid to education. 
The Campaign. of 1964 
According to Pre'sident Johnson it was during the late summer of 
1964 that he decided to make education a high priority for the presi-
d t . 1 . 114 en 1a campaign. A number of approaches were open to him at this 
point, and education was sure to be an issue in the campaign. The 
national party platforms of 1964 indicated that wide differences of 
opinion existed between the two parties in regard to federal aid. 115 
The Democratic party took a firm stand in favor of federal aid. The 
portion of the platform dealing with domestic issues began: 
There can be full freedom only when all of our people 
have opportunity for education to the full extent of their 
ability to learn, followed by the opportunity to employ 
their learning in the creation of something of value to 
themselves and the nation •••• 116 
On the other hand the Republican platform pledged to block 11 the 
Democratic efforts which endanger local control of schools. 11117 They 
took the position that federal aid was an encroachment upon the rights 
of local control of the educational system. 
The party platforms were widely separated on the federal aid 
issue, but the candidates from the respective parties were even wider 
114 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 203. 
115F or 
Porter and 
( Illinois 9 
the Democrat and Republican party platforms, see Kirk H. 
Donald B. Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1840-1964 
1966), p. 664, anq p. 684, respectively. 
116Ibid., p. 644. 
ll?Ibid., p. 684. 
apart on the issue. Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate, was 
strongly opposed to federal aid. In the 1961 debate over federal aid, 
Goldwater had joined the opposition in trying to kill the measure. At 
that time he stated: 11 I wish to make it clear that I do not believe 
that we have an educational problem which requires any form of federal 
' . t th St t n 118 grant-1n-a1d program o e a es0 This position was reiterated 
by the candidate in 1964. 119 
In contrast to Goldwater, President Johnson was a strong advocate 
of federal aid. The President believed that when the states cpuld not 
finance their own educational system, it was the duty of the federal 
government to step in to insure that every child received an equal 
120 
opportunity to be educated. During the campaign the President 
spoke over and over on the issue of federal aid. In Denver, Colorado 9 
in October, 1964, he spent the major part of his speech on education. 
He stated in part: 
But I make this pledge to you and to the people of 
America. I make it to the parents and I .make it to all of 
their children. I intend to put education at the top of 
America's agenda. And if you do not quite understand the 
details of what I mean by the top of America's agenda 9 I 
will say this: That regardless of family financial status, 
education should be open to every boy and girl born in 
America up to the highest level they can take.121 
118 Senate 1 Hearings, P0 539. 
119The New York Times iJuly 18, 1964), p. 1. For a detailed look 
at Goldwater's position, see Barry Goldwater 9 The Conscience of a 
Conservative (Shepherdsville, Ky., 1960). 
120Johnson, "Remarks in Boca Raton at the dedication of Florida 
Atlantic University," October 25 9 1964, Public Papers, 1964, p. 1429. 
121 Johnson, "Remarks at the Coliseum in Denver 9 11 October 12, 1964, 
Ibid., p. 1317. 
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With his landslide victory in November of 1964, Lyndon Johnson 
obtained popular support for his program of the Great Society. Edu-
cation was a very vital part of that program. The groundwork had been 
built for an education program; possible success of such a program 
depended upon the President's ability to build upon that framework® 
Related Events..:.-Civil Rights and Poverty 
Besides the fact that President Johnson's landslide victory in 
1964 gave him a safe majority in Congress with which to work with, 122 
there were two other important antecedents to the emergence of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act. These two developments were 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964~ and poverty legislation. 
Since tlj.e Civil Rights Act will be covered later 9 this section will 
examine briefly the effect of poverty legislation upon the federal aid 
issue. 
During the Kennedy administration, a number of laws were passed 
to upgrade the job skills of the poverty residents. The Area Re-
development Act of 1961; the Manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962; and the Vocational Educational Amendments of 1963 were all aimed 
at helping econqmically depressed segments of the population to become 
lf t o th h d t" d t O O 123 se -suppor ing roug e uca ion an raining® The success of 
122F t D . H 
'or example 1 here were 295 emocrats elected to the ouse as 
compared to only 140 Republicans" Of these 295 Democrats 1 69 were 
freshmen. For the effect of the President's victory in the Con-
gressional elections, .see Eidenberg and Morey 9 pp. 33-36 1 and Stephen 
K. Bailey 1 The New Congress (New York 1 1966). 
123 . , Bailey and Mosher, p. JL 
these programs, as well as their popularity, gave President Johnson 
something with ¥hich he could associate his educational program. 
President Johnson was aware of this opportunity as shown in his messages 
delivered to Congress in January, 1964. His Annual Message stressed 
the importance of improving education in the hardest· pit areas of the 
, . 124 
country. And his Annual Economic Report went eveh further and tied 
education specifically with an attempt to help "the children of the 
125 poor, so that they need not follow their parents into poverty.vi 
Also, the Economic Opportunity Act, passed in August, 1964 1 created a 
number of programs such as the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, 
and Adult· Basic Education Program. 
The Economic Opportunity Act presaged the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in at least. two respects: 
its stress upon the importance of variety and inn.ovation, 
and its acknowledgement of the special needs of educationally 
disadvantaged children. 
At this point the type of aid and the specifics of a proposal ~ere 
yet undetermined, but. the concept of relating education to the fight 
against poverty was to remain a part, of the President's strategy. Early 
response from church leaders and the press was favorable to the Presi-
dent's proposal of linking education to povertyy 127 so it became 
124 Johnson, 11Anm,!.al Message to the Congress on- .the State of the 
Union," -January 8, 1964, Public Papers, 1963-64, p. '112~ 
125 Johnson, "The Economic Report of the President, 11 January 20, 
1964, Ibid., p. 164. 
126Bailey and Mosher, p. 33. For a complete look at the President's 
poverty program, see John C,, Donovani The Politics~ Poverty (New.York, 
1967). 
127Marjorie Hunter, "President to Seek More School Aid, 11 
York Times (January 4, 19q4), p. 22. 
The New 
app&rent to the President that this development could be useful in 
obtaining support for an educational proposal later on. 
Douglass Cater, Special Assistant to the President, gives an 
account of the procedure followed by President Johnsoq. 
When we came to the preparation of the first messages 
to Congress, I was assigned the education one. I served as 
the White House coordinator in preparing the education 
message. This had grown out of the task force report which 
had been chaired by John Gardner. Then there had been a 
White House review that included people from H.E.W. and 
the Budget Bureau and others. So by late December the 
President had chosen his options on his education pro-
gram that was to go up. The1s it was my job to be the 
draftsman for the message. 12 
150 
The task of choosing the options regarding an education program 
by the President was a deliberate process, yet it shows that the 
President was determined to pass an educational bill. The testimony 
to the ability of the President is best given by one who worked 
closest to him, Special Assistant, Bill Moyers. The occasion was a 
briefing on strategy rebarding the elementary-secondary proposal with 
the President in the front yard of the LBJ Ranch: 
I thought I was .he.ing especially articulate, but when 
I looked over at the hammock, the President appeared to be 
asleep. So I stopped speaking, and for five minutes we 
sat in silence. Then bang, bang, bang, the President 
spoke--he had obviously heard everything that had been 
said--and he told us precisely why the recommendation 
would not work and how it should be packaged. All the 
mulling in silence had paid off. The President had been 
able to chart the ~olitical terrain on education better 
than anyone else. 1 9 . 
128 Douglass Cater Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. 12. 
129Quoted in Leuchtenberg, p. 39. 
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The option which the President chose was the proposal for the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which he presented to 
Congress in January, 1965~ 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICS OF AN ACT 
Introduction 
The normal., process for most major legislation that is enacted 
by the'United States Congress follows a distinct pattern®· f.irst, the 
proposed legislation is introduced to Congress in the form of a 
Presidential me~sage or proposal; second, it is introduced into the 
respective branches of the Congress in the form of a bill by .a member 
of the party of the President; third, through an elaborate process of 
committee hearings and floor debates 9 the bill is finally voted on 
by Congress. The President then signs the bill into lawo This is a 
time consuming process; and in most cases, the product that emerges 
from Congress has been altered somewhat from the original proposal 
that was made by the President. 
Most of the early decisions regarding what should, or should not 1 
be in a proposal, are made at the White House level. Once the par-
ticular proposal in question has reached Congress however 1 a whole new 
process usually begins0 Through committee hearings and floor debates, 
the two 1,or more sides to the proposal in question discuss the par-
ticular parts of the .bill that are questionable. This is a vital part 
of' the process and allows for differences of opinion to be aired 1 as 
well as compromises to be added to, or detracted from, the bill. Under 
normal Conditions, if would be impossible for the o·riginal draftees 
152 
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of the proposal to know, or anticipate, all of the problems that would 
occur in a bill's journey through Congress. 
However, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 dif-
fered somewhat from the normal process of legislation in that once it 
reached Congress, 11 ••• there was extraordinary little congressional 
consideration given the bill. 111 The act was proposed by the President 
in a special message on January 12, 1965, 2 and introduced into the 
House by Representative Carl Perkins (Democrat, Kentucky) on January 
22, 3 and introduced in the Senate by Senator Wayne Morse (Democrat 1 
4: Oregon) on January 26. It then sped through Congress with little 
opposition and was signed into law virtually unchanged less than 
three months later by the President on April 11, 1965. 5 
If Congressional compromise and debate is a vital phase in the 
decision m,aking process regarding legislation, why then was there so 
little congressional consideration given the Elementary and Secondary 
1Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York, 
1969), p. 76. 
2Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Toward Full Education Opportunity," 
January 12, 1965. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of 
the President, 1965-iwashington, 1966) 1 pp. 25-33.~-
3u. S. Congress, House, Suqcommittee on Education, Committee 
L':!bor, Hearings, Aid to Elementary and Secondary Education (89th 
Cong., 1st Sess.,°"r965) (Washington~965). 
on 
4u. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Education, Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings 1 The Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (89th Cong. 1st Sess., 1965} (Washington, 1965). 
5 Johnson, "Remarks in Johnson City, Texas, Upon Signing the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Bill, 11 April 11, 1965, Public 
Papers, 1965 1 pp. 412-414. 
Education Act, and virtually no changes made from the time the pro-
posal was introduced and the time it became law? The answer to these 
questions lies in the fact that the major problems and issues regarding 
this particular piece of legislation were worked out before the program 
ever went to Congress. Obviously 1 with most major legislation, the 
White Hbuse would attempt to anticpate most problems regarding a pro-
posal before going to Congress. But very few pieces of legislation 
reached the point of success with this procegs as did the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act~ 
The normal process of congressional debate was circumvented in 
this instance by allowing both the proponents and the opponents of the 
issue to feel that they had some input into the actual drafting of the 
bill. This was no simple task in that 'it took a considerable amount of 
coordination between the various interest groups and the White House 
staff. This coordination speaks of the organizational ability of 
President Johnson 9 as well as his ability to utilize the principles of 
political compromise at their utmost. President Johnson in 1965 was 
determined to pass a federal aid bill to aid the common schools; and 9 
in order to do so 1 he had to know the pitfalls of such a proposaL So 9 
beginning with the task force reports in November of 1964, the Presi-
dent carefully studied and planned his program in almost every detail 
to avoid any major conflicts within Congress over the legislation. 
Once the proposal was presented to Congress, the President pushed 
the program hard. The combination of early groundwork 1 a well-written 
bill 9 and relentless political pressure paid off in a bill that was 
almost unmarked from the President's original proposal~ a feat 
seldom performed in congressional history. As one observer put it 9 
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"The 1965 bill, in all candor 1 does not make much sense educationally; 
but it makes a hell of a lot of sense legally~ politically, and con-
stitutionally. n6 
The Preliminaries 
Following the landslide victory in the November election, pre-
paration for the 1965 legislative session began in earnest for the 
White House staff. The biggest problem facing the President and his 
staff was to transform the ideas of the task force reports (which the 
President received November 15) into a viable program for congressional 
consideration: 
When the reports were finally filed, it was Moyers who 
took charge of the second round of operations. On No-
vember 15 the reports we;re circulated to all the government 
agencies involved for their responses 1 including suggested 
revisions and additions. At this stage the Cabinet of-
ficers to whom the President had spoken in July were given 
their first opportunity to make their views knowno7 
Following this round of group con~erences and sessions, another 
series of meetings were ,s;et ,,lap: 
Moyers now set up a second group of task forces com-
posed of government officials with an occasional outsider 
that met at a series of sessions in his office. These men 
were to decide which of the propositions of the original 
task forces had merit, and also which stood a fair chance 
of winning Congressional approval.8 
To advise the group on what would be politically feasible, 
"Lawrence O•Brien 1 then the President's assistant for Congressional 
6Q . E' uoted 1n 1denberg and Morey, Pe 93. 
7william E0 Leuchtenberg, 11 The Genesis of the ~\'eat Society 9 " 
The Reporter, XXX:IV (April 21, 1966) 1 Po 38. 
8 rbid. 
156 
relations, and his staff were worked into the operations at an early 
stage. 119 This process was essentially the same one followed for all 
the task force proposals, and according to one source, nThe ultimate 
success of the ,Johnson program in Congress owed much to the fact that 
it was offered in such a way as to minimize political friction011 10 
The transforming of the Task Force Report on Education into a 
legislative program occurred at a faster rate than most of the other 
Great Society programs because of the spadework already performed by 
President Johnson in 1963 and 1964. 11 Immediately following the 
round of reviews of the Task Force Report on Education with White 
House Cabinet members, President Johnson assigned Francis Keppel, 
U. s. Commissioner of Education, and Douglass Cater, Special Assistant 
to the President, to work up a number of recommendations from the task 
force report. "Once the education task force filed its report and 
Keppel and Cater had developed their proposals, the actual legislation 
was 
12 drafted by the Office of Education and the Bureau of the Budget.n 
The process sounds rather simple, but in actuality it was a maze 
of activity directed at the top by the President, as illustrated by an 
account of the meetings between Kermit Gordon, Budget Director, and 
the President at the LBJ Ranch: 
9william E. Leuchtenberg, 11 The Genesis of the Great Society 9 " 
The Reporter 9 XXXIV (April 21, 1966) 9 p. 38. 
10Ibid. 
11 See Chapter IV.,. 
12 
· Leuchtenberg 9 p. 38. 
You just don't sit down and work out a program with the 
President at formal sessions. He gets restless if he sits 
for too long. He's always wanting to go out to look after 
the livestock or talk to the foreman. You've got to trail 
him around. We made a lot of budget decisions as the 
President drove a car around the neighboring Lewis Ranch. 
While I read, 1~e would give his response with his hands 
on the wheel. 
In recalling all of this preliminary activity, the President 
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indicated that during this process a number of people were working on 
various solutions to potential problems: 
In the meantime, other concerned people were working 
on similar solutions--Anthony Celebrezze, Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare; Wilbur Cohen 9 then As-
sistant Secretary of HEW; Senator Wayne Morse; Francis 
Keppel, Commissioner of Education; members of the White 
House staff; and staff men from the Bureau of the Budget. 
They i;net regularly euring this period--probing, searching 9 
and t~sting ideas.1 · , 
Out of all this preliminary activity came a tentative proposal which 
was submitted to the President in the form of a memorandum so that he 
could write his message to Congress. In this memorandum, the staff 
outlined a basic strategy to be followed by the President regarding 
the program: 
Basic Strategy: By proposing a package of legis-
lative programs, not including 1general aid I as usually 
defined, you will provide a middle way through the 
church-state conflict which has stalemated aid to lower 
education in the past. Commissioner Keppel believes this 
package could be more effe~tive educationally and larger 
fiscally than previous 'general aid' proposals. The 
Offi_c:~ of Education estimates that non-public schools 
co~ld receive as much as 10.1% to 13.5% of the dollars 
13 Leuchtenberg, p. J8® 
lltLyndon Baines Johns.on, The Vantage Point: 
Presidency, 1963-1969 (New Yor~1971), P0 208. 
Perspectives of the 
'contained in this package. (Parochial schools have 15% 
of total school enrollment). For most of the titles 
the Office of Education has submitted 1 high' and 'low' 
authorization requests. 15 
In addition to the basic strategy of the program, the report also 
outlined the specifics of the proposal made up of five separate 
titles, with expected opposition listed under each category. 16 
Between the forming of this tentative proposal and the actual 
drafting of the legislation there was a flurry of activity at the 
White House level. President Johnson and his staff knew what had 
traditionally hurt federal aid proposals, as well as the opposition 
they were facing with their proposal, so they set out to try to 
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eliminate those problems. President Johnson recalls how a coalition 
of support was built up: 
Various members of the administration met with 
Catholic groups. Education Commissioner Francis Keppel 
met with high ranking prelates of the church--Jack 
Valenti served as our liaison with the Vatican's 
Apostolic Delegate to the United States 9 Archbishop 
Egidio Vagnozzio •••• 
Similarly 9 Lee White of the White House staff 
dealt with the Jewish organizations; Henry Hall Wilson 
worked with the Southern leaders; Douglass Cater and 
Commissioner Keppel remained in close touch with the 
powerful education lobbies. 17 
All of this activity was aimed ati according to the President, 
"lining up all available support in advance so that the bill would 
15Memorandum to the President, HLegislative Program for Edu-
cation,n 1964, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Johnson Library 
(Cross-referenced in (Ex/Le/Fa2), p. 1. 
16Ibid., pp. 2-4. For the complete text of the memorandum, see 
Appendix F, pp. 314-317. 
17 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 209. 
move speedily through the deliberative process and not be killed or 
18 
crippled by amendments.n 
The overall design of these meetings with the opposition was to 
159 
give them an opportunity to feel that they were going to have some say 
in the actual drafting of the bill. Thus the problem became an ad-
ministrative tactic of trying to reach some sort of compromise with the 
issues that had traditionally killed aid to education bills. 
Compromising Old Problems 
Most of the major problems that led to the defeat of federal aid 
b . . th t t. 11 . . · 1 . 6 '· l 9 ills in e pas were s i in existence in 9 ~. The problem for 
President Johnson became one of attempting to eliminate those major 
obstacles by either resolving the issues by compromise in the actual 
contents of a proposal, or by gaining support from the opposition by 
political lobbying. In most cases the content of the proposed legis-
lation contained the compromises necessary to prevent major disputes. 
In some cases the issue was ignored or smoothed over by political 
bargaining. In this section each one of the major obstacles to 
federal aid to education will be examined to see how President Johnson 
handled the situation. 
Religion 
The recognition that the issue of religion was prominent in 1961± 
was made by the Task Force Report on Education when it warned that the 
18 Johnson, The Vantage Po:i.nt, p. 209. 
19The only exception being that the Civil Rights Act of 1961± had 
tempered the racial issue somewhat. 
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nation could not afford to go through another socalled Htug-of-war" 
over the church-state issue in regard to federal aid to education. 20 
The dispute over religion had always been a formidable issue facing 
federal aid bills, and the Johnson administration knew that some type 
of settlement would have to be reached regarding this thorny problem. 
Ironically, although the task force's job was not to solve po-
litical issues, the report did contain the basis for the solution to 
the religious problem. As President Johnson points out, the report: 
••• did not offer a specific solution for avoiding that 
issue, but it threw the spotlight of public attention on 
one of education's special needs, assistance to dis-
advantaged areas. It pointed out the possibility of 
sending federal funds to elementary and secondary schools 
not on a general aid basis, as earlier plans had speci-
fied, but on a selective formula related to the poverty 
of an area. 21 
Thus, the administration seized upon this task force idea and de-
veloped the concept which called for federal aid to be allocated to 
the student--and not to the school, based on the poverty level of the 
school district. This child benefit approach, used during the De-
pression years of the 19JO's, circumvented the question of separation 
of church and state: 
The compromise resulted primarily from the painstaking 
efforts of Johnson Administration officials who acted as 
political brokers. The task of HEW-OE personnel such as 
Wilbur Cohen, Francis Keppel, and Samuel Halperin was to 
identify educational provisions and legislative language 
with which spokesmen of previously antagonistic church-
state interest groups could agree. 22 
20Task Force on Education, Task Force Files, 1964, Folder, Johnson 
Papers, Johnson Library. 
21 J · T V . 8 ohnson, he antage Point, p. 20. 
22 James W. Guthrie, "A Political Case History: Passage of the 
ESEA,iv Phi Delta Kappan (February, 1968), p. 305. 
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The result of their efforts was several provisions within the 
contents of the proposed legislation which called for parochial stu-
dents to benefit from public funds under the child benefit approach. 
The biggest amount of money going to the schools would come under 
Title I. According to the tentative proposal which was worked up by 
the Johnson Administration late in 1964, funds under this provision 
would: 
Provide payments based on number of low income 
children in counties. This would be the largest single 
item in the education package •• ® • 
• • • Most school districts in the country would 
receive payments after submitting plans to state educational 
authorities to assure funds are spent for improving schools 
serving the poor. Special encouragement would be given to 
'shared services' for children in non-public schools. 
There would be no matching requirements.23 
President Johnson explains how the formula by which the funds 
were to be distributed worked: 
A 
We found it in a simple equation: 2 X B = P. In 
that formula A represented a state's average expenditure 
per pupil, B the number of poor schoolchildren in a 
local school district, and P the payment to that district. 
The formula was based on an old concept familiar to the 
Congress: aid to impacted areas.24 
However, the religious problem was still not solved as the aid 
provided in the proposed Title I did not go directly to the parochial 
schools but to the student: 
These compromise provisions were not as extensive or 
generous as Catholic interest groups spokesmen desired. 
They were, nevertheless, accepted as a necessary political 
compromise in hopes that later gains would be forthcoming. 
2311Legislative Program for Education," Johnson Papers, p. 10. 
24 8 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 20. 
These same church-state provisions engendered con-
siderable uneasiness for National Education Association 
and National Council of Churches spokesmen fearing that 
they encroached too far upon the ideological wall se-
parating church and state.25 
The administration was well aware of this tightrope position as 
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indicated in the same memorandum with the proposal by a statement re-
garding the expected opposition to Title I: 
Since no aid provided directly to parochial schools, 
Cardinal Spellman and others in Catholic hierarchy may 
attack this Title. (Other parts of the package provide 
more direct help to private schools). Office of Edu-
cation is exploring ways of m~ihg 'shared services' more 
attractive to Catholics, especially through supple6 
mentary education centers described in Title III. 2 
Title II of the proposed legislation also contained provisions 
which would benefit the parochial schools. As the memo outlined the 
program: 
Books and other materials, chosen under public 
auspices and held under public title, would be available 
to all students through a :state agency. Representative 
Hugh Carey, of New York, and other Catholics have shown 
q lively interest in s~7h a program. There will be no 
matching requirements. 
And in regards to the oppositiop to this Title, the memo indi-
cated that: 
The best estimate is that this would be the least con-
troversial part of the program so long as federal government 
is not involved in selection of instruction materials. Pro-
vides most direct form of aid to parochial students. Justice 
Department lawyers believe consitutional issue will depend 
on mechanism used by states.28 
25Guthrie, p. 305. 
2611 Legislative Program for Education 1 n Johnson Papers 1 p. 1. 
27Ibid., p. 2. 
28Ib, -1. d,, 
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Title III of the proposal was geared extensively toward com-
promising the church-state issue. 11 This was the major 'new' idea of 
29 the Task Force headed by John Gardner." Title III would set up 
Supplementary Education Centers throughout the country. 11 These cen-
ters, established by consortia of public and private schools in each 
community, would develop according to community needs~"JO This con-
cept utilized the "shared time" idea that both public and private 
schools could more effectively utilize educational equipment. Re-
garding the Catholic reception to this proposal, the memo stated: 
11 Keppel believes these centers will receive Catholic support and 
encourage greater cooperation between public and parochial school 
education. 1131 
However, the Johnson Administration had not resolved all of the 
conflicts yet. Now that Francis Keppel and others had identified 
areas in which the contents of the proposal could be used to gain 
Catholic support, the. problem turned to one of persuading the 
religious groups that the proposed bill was indeed a sound proposal. 
This concern was indicated in a memorandum to the President on 
December 19, 1964: 
As soon as you have made your decision on the education 
program, I recommend that we begin immediately behind-the-
scene work to convince Catholic leaders it represents the 
best and most logical start in federal aid to lower 
education.32 
2911 Legislative Program for Education," Johnson Papers, p. 1. 
JO Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Memorandum, Douglass Cater to the President, December 19, 1964, 
(Ex/Le/Fa2) Johnson Papers, Johnson Library® 
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The administration began working behind the scene immediately. 
Francis Keppel and Douglass Cater worked feverishly in a series of 
meetings with the two largest interest groups, the National Education 
Association and the National Catholic Welfare Conference, in order to 
try to establish a political alignment between these two groups so 
that a broad front of support for the program could be presented: 
The details of the legislation as introduced by the 
administration were never discussed in an organized fashion 
at these meetings. It was rather a matter of sensing moods, 
of feeling out how far the several groups would be willing 
to go. A central question, to put it bluntlyi was whether 
the Catholic group could afford to come out in public op-
position to an administration bill proposing an educational 
program for the children of the poor. The NEA, at the 
same time, would be in a difficult position to come out in 
opposition to a program that focused on poor children and 
that put the responsibility for the management of money 
in the hands of public bodies.33 
Although no agreements were reached during these meetings with 
the interest groups by the representatives of the White House staff, 
the Johnson Administration did learn the limits of what it could or 
could not do. 
It might be interesting to note that at this point no one con-
nected with the negotiations with the religious groups ever saw a draft 
bill during these meetings. Nor had anyone but the White House staff 
seen the task force reports: 
In part this was a deliberate tactic not to have anything 
in writing that could cause misinterpretations and ob-
jectionsi or to give any of the participants any reason to 
feel that prior decisions had been reached before the con-
sultations had taken place.34 
33Eidenberg and Morey, p. 84. 
Jiiibid., p. 88. 
The administration had simply tried to give the religious groups as-
surances that they would receive aid money under a formula based on 
the children from poverty areas. In return wished to have assurances 
that the religious conflict would not flare up again in Congress. 
This technique was successful to a certain extent as is reflected 
in a note to the President from Douglass Cater following a series of 
meetings with Catholic groups. In this note he reported that 11 The 
Catholic leaders were not at all eager for a direct aid message which 
would lead unavoidably to a court test.11 35 
Despite all of the precautions against having the issue of re-
ligion flare up again, events soon proved that the Administration used 
good judgement in concentrating so heavily on the religious issue 
because the problem was not totally solved. Following the President's 
message to Congress that presented the program to the public for the 
first time, Douglass Cater reported to the President that, HThe tele-
grams on the Message are running 3-1 in favor. The opposition is 
exclusively directed to aid to parochial schools. 1136 
The first indication that the efforts by the Johnson Administra-
tion were aimed at a compromise in the religious issue was quick in 
appearing. On 'the same day that the President delivered his education 
message 9 Monsignor Frederick G. Hochwalt, director of the Department 
of Education of the National Catholic Welfare Conference 9 indicated 
that the message had won support from the Catholic hierarchy: 
35cater Memo, December 19, 1964,, J,ohnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
36 Memorandum, Douglass Cater to the President, January 14,, 1965 
(Ex/Le/Fa2) Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
The major purpose of the President's message is to 
meet the educational needs of the children. This em-
phasis on the child, the student, I applaud. Priority 
is given to children in :Jfeas of economic distress. 
This is as it should be. 
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And the Monsignor also commented on the President's appeal for unity: 
Of great significance is the fact that the President 
calls for cooperation between the Nation's public and 
private schools. I have always considered the public and 
private school systems of thiJ8 country to be partners, 
not competitors in education. 
As a further public expression of compromise, on the same day 
!Robert E. McKay, chairman of the National Education Association's 
Legislative Commission, commented that the Association was pleased 
with the proposal and that he saw no proble~ with the traditional 
church-state issue in the President's proposai. 39 It was obvious that 
the timing of these statements was not coincidental. 
The work of the Johnson Administration was further revealed in 
the House hearings which began on January 22. Protestant groups who 
had in the past opposed aid to parochial schools now said that they 
supported federal aid to 11all schools which are recognized by the 
State as fulfilling its educational requirements and thus performing 
bl . · 40 th t · · · a pu ic service," and at he inclusion of parochial schools in 
receiving aid was 11 consistent with the American tradition of church-· 
state separation and interaction. /~I One of the reasons that these 
37The ~ York Times (January 13, 1965), p. 1. 
JSibid. 
J<)Ibid. 
40u_ S~ 8 
_ Congress, House, Hearingso, p. 73. 
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Protestant groups were supporting the bill was the shared-time pro-
42 posal. Dr. Bernard Donovan, Executive Superintendent of the Public 
Schools in New York City, and Monsignor Eduward T. Hughes, Superin-
tendent of Schools for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, both testified 
that they had used the "shared-time" concept and expresseq optimism 
that it would be a simple matter to expand this·cooperation to include 
programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 43 
However, not all religious groups supported the bill0 The Ameri-
can Jewish Congress, the Jewish War Veterans, and the National Council 
44 
of Jewish Women all expressed opposition to the proposal. Rabbi. 
Richard G. Hirsch, director of the ~eligious Action Center of the 
Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said that the bill was the 
same type of program which John F. Kbnnedy had rejected as unconsti-
tutional and that the bill merely evaded the church-state issue.45 
In response to this opposition, Douglass Cater sent a memorandum to 
the President which indicated that the Administration was concerned 
but not to a great extent: "Celebrezze and Keppel are keeping a 
plose eye on the opposition of certain Jewish groups. They are 
42For examples of the positions of these groups see the testimony 
of H.B. Sissel, secretary for national affairs of the United Presby-
terian Church; Arthur Fleming, £irst vice~president of the National 
Council of Churches of Christ; and C. Emanuel Carlson, executive 
director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, in U. So 
Congress, House, Hearings, pp. 785-89,. 736-44, 764-71, respectively., 
43For their testimony see Ibid., PPo 477-78, 555. 
44The ~~ Times (February 18, 1965), p. 200 
45u. S. Congress, House, Hearings, pp. 1501=1503. 
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convinced that it is only a small minority and that we should not over 
react in dealing with them. ,/.1:6 
Other problems regarding the church-state issue appeared during 
the debates over the proposal, but President Johnson and his staff 
kept close watch on the bill to prevent major problems. President 
Johnson recalls how one problem was settled regarding the religious 
issue: 
Objection was raised to a provision that would provide 
schoolbooks to students in parochial schools. I told 
Larry O'Brien, Cater, and Cohen to get together with Hugh 
Carey, a Catholic Congressman from New York who was on the 
committee and work out a solution. 
They met late into the night in Larry 0 1 Brien 1 s office, 
above mine, and the next morning O'Brien called me and said 
that he thought they had found the answer. The Supreme 
Court in 1947 had decided that busing of parochi~l school 
students was aid to the pupil and not to the Catholic 
schools. We sought a way to make this "child benefit" 
theory apply to this case. Why not, Carey asked, give 
ownership of the books to the public school boards and 
let them lend them to the pupils? The bill was amended 47 
to include thi!~ provisi'on and one more hurdle was cleared. 
Although there were several problems mentioned by the President, 
the major portion of them were solved due to the extensive planning 
that had been done prior to the bill's introduction in Congress0 The 
biggest success of the Presidential planning was in obtaining almost 
complete support of the Catholic hierarchy as indicated by a memo to 
President Johnson .from Jack Valenti~ White House Aide: 
I spent 45 minutes with the Apostolic Delegate 
Archbi.shop Egidio Vagnozzi • • • • 
• The Delegate is in favor of the bill and says 
that the great majority of the Catholic hier.archy shares 
46 Memorandum, Douglass Cater to the President, February 15, 1965 1 
Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
47Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 210e 
his opinion. Archbishop Mcintyre of Los Angeles may 
possibly be the only prelate who might oppose the bill. 
Spellman is for it and so is the Catholic Cardinal 
Shehan of Baltimore.48 
In fact, the Johnson approach was very successfully reflected in 
the final vote for passage of the bill: 
Race 
There were more Roman Catholic Congressmen in the 89th 
Congress than any of its 88 predecessors. In the House of 
Representatives, 93 Congressmen were present and voted in 
final passage of the ESEA. They voted overwhelmingly for 
the bill, 84 to 9. If this bloc had voted negatively with 
the same degree o! cohesion, it would have been sufficient 
to sink the ESEA. 9 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly prohibited racial discrimi-
nation in school districts receiving federal funds. This legislation 
stated that: 
••• no person in the United States shall, on the grounds 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from par-
ticipating in, and be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any programs or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance.SO 
Thus, President Johnson did not have to concentrate too heavily upon 
solving the racial issue in connection with his federal aid proposal. 
The Civil Rights Act did not eliminate hostile feelings about racial 
desegregation, but it did lessen the controversies over desegregation 
in most of the education proposals. 
4:8 Memorandum, Jack Valenti' •to the President, February 26, 1965, 
Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
49Guthrie, p. 305. 
SOQ t . G . 3 3 uo ed in uthr1e, p. 0. 
In addition Title IV of the Civil Rights Act authorized the 
United States Commissioner of Education to: 
••• conduct a survey concerning the lack of equal edu-
cational opportunities in public educational institutions 
because of race, color, religion or national origin • 
• • • render technical assistance to a school board, 
or other state or local governmental units, on request 
of the applicant, in order to assist in the desegregation 
of public schools •••• make grant to school boards, 
on request, to provide school personnel with inservice 
training and to permit the school boards to employ 51 
specialists in order to deal with desegregation problems. 
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As a result, Congress gave the United States Office of Education some 
eight million dollars in 1964 to begin this project, with more to be 
funded in 1965. 52 Thus racial desegregation:was already partially 
settled in a separate bill and would not become part of Johnson's 
proposed federal plan to aid the schools since his plan would auto-
matically be applied. Therefore, the threat of the divisive Powell 
Amendment was removed from consideration as an obstacle to education 
bills because it was no longer needed. 53 
President Johnson, however, did not ignore the potentiality of 
race becoming a problem. He anticipated the possibility of such an 
occurrence by lining up the early support of Representative Adam 
Clayton Powell (Democrat, New York). This move was both a political 
and psychological weapon against race becoming an issue. Powell, a 
recognized Negro leader from Harlem, gave the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act an early boost by indicating to news reporters in late 
51Quot~d in "Washington News," Education Digest (September, 1964), 
P. 56. 
52Ibid. 
53see Powell Amendment, Chapter IV, p. 124. 
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December of 1964 that he would do his utmost to enact federal aid 
legislation during the Eighty-Ninth Congress. He also pledged that he 
would not entangle school aid with segregation and stated that: 11 If 
we don't get federal aid to education in this Congress, we might as 
' 
t b t . h t" 54 well forge all a ou it for anot er genera ion. 11 
The use of the poverty formula in Title I of the proposed legis-
lation was also a psychological weapon in overcoming any racial 
problems. Theoretically, the money to be extended under this proposal 
would benefit most of the poverty-stricken school districts® Since a 
large number of predominantly black communities also contained a 
substantial number of poverty families, the weapon used to combat such 
areas was not racially stigmatized by the use of the poverty formula 
as a tool to eliminate such districts. 
This strategy by President Johnson was successful as is shown by 
the records of the debates in 1965. These records reveal that race was 
seldom mentioned in connection with federal aid programs. It is true 
that of the 57 Democratic votes cast against the Elementary anct Second-
ary Education Act in the House of Representatives 1 5iJ: were cast by 
Southerners from the Deep South; Southern Republicans voted 15 to 2 
against the measure .. 55 
Ordinarilyl a vote of this type would be a reflection of deep 
anti-desegregation sentiment from this section of the country. However, 
since the prevention of racial discrimination in the public schools 
54The New York Times (December 24, 1964), p. 10. 
55Guthrie, p. 303. 
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was already on the books, it would be difficult to attribute the 
negative votes to anti-desegregation feelings alone. Opposition to 
federal control and states• rights sentiments was also strong in the 
Deep South. 
It is difficult to analyze how many votes were gained by the fact 
that the racial question was not brought up in 1965, but there were 43 
affirmative Southern votes for the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act. 56 Almost all of the positive votes came from border states who 
might have voted negatively if the racial issue had flared upe A 
number of the border states could possibly have shifted to the 
affirmative side of the question because President Johnson's strategy 
did not equate federal aid with desegregation. 
States• Rights--Fear of Federal Control 
The fear that the passage of the Elementary and Second~ry Edu-
cation Act would establish the federal government as a center of power 
in educational matters and constitute an intrusion by the federal gov-
ernment upon state~' rights was combatted by President Johnson in two 
areas0 
First, the contents of the bill were written as an attempt to 
compromise this issue and alleviate the fear of federal control of the 
local school systems. Title IV of the Act included a provision 
(Section 604) which stated: 
56Guthrie, Pe 303. 
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to 
authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee 
of the United States to exercise any direction, super-
vision, or control over the curriculum, program of 
instruction, administration, or personnel of any edu-
cational institution or school system, or over the 
selection of library resources, textbooks, or other 
printed or published instructional materials by any 
educational institution or school system~57 
Also, Section .509 of the Act provided that any veto of a state 
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plan by the Commissioner of Education was subject to judicial review® 
And, to further assure protection against federal control, the money 
appropriated under the Act was to be funded as a supplement to State 
e~penditures and not as a substitute. 
In addition, Title V provided for 
• grants to stimulate and assist States in strengthening 
the leadership resources of their State educational agencies, 
and to assist those agencies in the establishment and im-
provement of programs to identify and meet the educational 
needs of States.58 · 
This provision assured the states of receiving funds by which they 
could strengthen their own role in the participation of the funding 
programs under other titles. Such a program called for more federal-
state-local cooperation than had heretofore been accomplished and 
' quieted some fear-,s regarding possible federal take-over in education. 
President Johnson recalls how one element in the proposal was aimed 
at lessening fears of federal control: 
57The most complete section-by-section analysis of the Act is 
found in U. So Congress, Senate, Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965. Background Material with Relatea"°Presidential Recom-
mendations (Washington, 1965), pp. 181-93., For a summary of the 
provisions of the Act, see Appendix A., pp. 287-290. 
58 rbid. 
Another element in our legislation suggested by the 
Gardner task force provided for a number of innovations 
to upgrade the quality of education in elementary and 
high schools. It called for the establishment of com-
munity-wide organizations to offer services that indi-
vidual schools could not provide--such as special courses 
in foreign languages, music, and art, science laboratories, 
and programs for the physically and mentally handicapped® 
Private as well as public school students would be able 
to take advantage of these programs. 
Making the educational grants directly to the states 
would, we hoped, reassure doubters that the federal 
government would not endeavor to take over local school 
boardsa59 
In addition to the compromises written into the bill, President 
Johnson sought through his formal proposal to Congress to assure 
everyone that his federal aid proposal did not constitute any more 
federal control. In this message the President said that he saw no 
possibility of federal usurpation of state power in the program and 
quoted an earlier champion of federal aid to education 9 Senator Robert 
Taft of Ohio, to substantiate his position: 
In all that we do, we mean to strengthen our state 
and community education systems. Federal assistance 
does not mean federal control--as past programs have 
proven. The late Senator Robert Taft declared: 
1 Education is primarily a state function--but in the 
field of education, as in the fields of health, relief 
and medical care, the Federal government has a secondary 
obligation to see that there is a basic floor under 
those essential services for all adults and children in 
the United St·ates. '60 
President Johnson went on to say that,he felt that the locally con-
trolled schools were the foundation of the educational system, and the 
federal government's role was to help the local systems revitalize 
59 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 209. 
60 Johnson, liToward Full Educational Opportunity, 11 January 12, 
1965, Public Papers, p. 26e 
61 
their programs. 
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But despite these assurances against federal control, the issue 
did appear in the Congressional hearings on the Act. Dr. Edgar Fuller, 
executive secretary of the American Council of Chief State School 
Officers, testified that he thought the evasion of the church-state 
issue in the proposed legislation 1buld result in a loss of power on 
the part of state and local officials. He felt that in most statesi 
it was clearly unconstitutional to use public monies for items which 
would become the property of sectarian schools. Thus~ many state 
educational agencies would not be legally qualified to administer 
funds for these schools. This would mean that the federal government 
would be compelled to distribute the funds directly to the school 
systems and thus the local authorities would lose their controi. 62 
However 1 since most of the religious groups were in favor of the 
proposal and testified that the bill did not violate the tradition of 
the separation of church and state, the argument concerning the un-
constitutionality of state actions was largely ignored. As a result 
the issue of federal control was not a substantial obstacle for the 
federal aid proposal. 
Interest Groups 
The Johnson Administration essentially solved two problems when 
the formula for appropriating federal aid to both public and private 
61. F E . . Johnson, 11 Toward ull ducat1onal Opportun1ty,n January 12, 
1965, Public Papers, p. 26. 
62. H . House, ear1ngs, p. 1125. 
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schools was devised in 1965. By including some form of assistance to 
the parochial schools in the proposal, the Administration gained the 
support of the Catholic organizations; and, at the same time managed 
to keep from alienating the Protestant groups and educatioh asso-
ciations. Thus, both the church-state issue and major interest group 
pressure was resolved in favor of the -Johnson proposal. This solution 
was complicated by the fact that the two largest interest groups, the 
National Education Association and the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, had traditionally been split over the church-state issue 
and had historically been on opposite sides of the federal aid con-
troversy. Any proposed legislation which attempted to solve the 
church-state problem would certainly require the support of these two 
powerful groups. 
In order to gain the support of the interest groups, President 
Johnson decided to include representatives from both sides of the 
federal aid question in working out a solution with the Administration 
in the fall of 1964. 63 Douglass Cater, who was in charge of these 
meetings, assessed the key tactical problem facing the Administration 
this way: 
The problem we faced was not ohe of having to mold 
public opinion. Public opinion had been generally in 
favor of such a bill for at least several years. The 
problem continually facing the bill was the opposition of 
the two major interest groups: the l\Jiationa.l Education 
Association and the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
(now the United States Catholic Conference). The over-
whelming victory of the President and the (Democratic) 
party in 1964 had the effect, beyond expanding Democratic 
majorities in the Congress, of forcing the pressure 
63see this chapter, pp. 163-164. 
groups to come to terms with each other0 Both had to 
know that a bill was going to be passed; and as a con-
sequence the legislative goal for both groups was to 
maximize their gains while minimizing the gains of the 
other side ••• with the major difference that now they 
both accepted the fact that the other side had to be 
given something.64 
The psychological effect of the Democratic victory in 1964 
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had a tremendous impact upon both major interest groups and made them 
more susceptible to bargaining as pointed out by one writer: 
The USCC was particularly afraid of the overwhelmingly 
urban Democratic House of Representatives which could, 
if it wanted, pass a bill identical to the Kennedy program. 
The changes in the rules and the new party ratios left the 
Catholics no procedural foothold from which to stop a bill 
that ignored their needs and interest •••• 
The NEA. on the other hand, had supported the Kennedy 
program all the way to its defeat in the Rules Committee. 
The NEA. 1 s influence in the Office of Education was waning, 
and they were afraid of losing access to the administrative 
machinery on education matters if they persisted i% op-
posing any aid for the private educational sector. 5 
Also, the heated debate over federal aid in 1961 had a lasting 
impact upon the interest groups, as one spokesman pointed out: 11 No 
one wanted another eyeball to eyeball episode like 1 61--a repeat of 
that would have meant the end of federal aid for a long time. 1166 
Thus, the Johnson forces took advantage of the willingness on the 
part of the pressure groups to compromise and launched the meetings 
in an attempt to reach a settlement prior to the President's message 
to Congress. The success of this strategy is reflected by the fact 
that the President received a simultaneous endorsement from both 
61± in Eiden berg 79-80. Quoted and Morey, pp. 
65 rbid., pp. 85-86. 
66 in Merantoi 82. Quoted p. 
pressure groups the day his proposal was publicized. 67 Such an 
announcement strengthened the President's hand even more by the 
psychological and political appearance of a strong united front in 
support of federal aid. 
Opposition from other interest groups was also virtually non-
existent. The sectarian opposition was led by the American Jewish 
Congress 9 but 
••• interestingly, the groups opposed to the legislation 
on church-state grounds received virtually no support 
from other non-religious organizations which traditionally 
have opposed federal school aid on the bag~s of fiscal 
consideration, federal controli and need. 
These organizations included the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the 
National Association of Manufacturersi the American Legioni and the 
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American Farm Bureau. None of these groups testified on the proposed 
legislation in 1965. "Consequently, the handful of religious groups, 
the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Council of Chief State 
School Officers were the only major organizations overtly opposed to 
the legislation. 1169 
However, despite the weakened opposition, the Johnson Adminis-
tration did not underestimate the Act's rivals as is revealed in a 
memorandum from Samuel Halperini a White House official, to Douglass 
Cater in March of 1965 concerning the opposition of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce. Although the Chamber did not testify against the bill, 
67 See this chapter, pp. 165-166. 
68The ~ York Times (February 18, 1965), p. 21. 
69 rbid. 
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it did, when the bill was before the Rules Committee of the House 
on March 17, indicate that it was opposed to the legislation. In 
answer to the Chamber, Halperin worked up a nine page response to the 
Chamber's statements in hopes of dashing any later efforts to hold up 
the bill by this interest group. 70 According to Halperin: 
. 
It is no news to any one that the United States 
Chamber of Commerce has opposed every general federal 
aid to education bill which has been proposed. It was 
certainly expected that their views would be no different 
than they have been in the past on this subject.71 
At any ratej the Chamber's opposition appeared to be only nominal. 
In the face of the President's strong mandate, the members of the 
Chamber apparently decided that opposing the bill was a lost cause. 
Despite the strong show of initial support, President Johnson 
did not diminish the pressure on the interest groups to support his 
legislative proposal once it was presented to Congress. Almost 
immediately after the Senate began hearings on the proposal, Senator 
Wayne Morse requested that the President meet with the leaders of the 
72 National Education Association to further explain his proposal. The 
President acknowledged the request and met soon after with the edu-
cation leaders. The meeting was a success, as testified in a memo-
randum to the President from Douglass Cater: 
~ . Samuel Halperin to Douglass Cater 1 HA Response to the Chamber 
of Commerce's Commentary on Elementary and Secondary Education Legis-
lation," March 22, 1965, Johnson Papers, pp. 1-9. See Appendix D. 
71 Ibid. 1 p. 1. 
72Letter to Mro Jack Valentil Special Assistant to the President, 
from Senator Wayne Morse, February 3, 1965l Johnson Papers~ 
Secretary Celebrezze and Frank Keppel called in 
to report that your visit with NEA leaders was enor-
mously effective. The NEA Board of Directors voted 
support of the program yesterday without a hitch •• 73 
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President Johnson's effort to align the major interest groups into 
a coalition of support for his program was indeed a successful opera-
tion. Consequently, the new group coalition formed in 1965 could be 
termed as a major factor in the eventual success of the President's 
program. This success was due primarily to President Johnson's ability 
to develop a favorable situation into a victory. 
Rural-Urban Quarrel 
The poverty formula devised by the Johnson Administration was 
also a successful device by which another problem area was removed 
from the path of the President's program--that of the argument between 
rural and urban constituents over the distribution of federal funds. 
The basis on which federal funds should be distributed, although some-
times a minor argument in comparison to the religious issue, had caused 
some doubts among Congressmen over federal aid proposals in the past: 
The distribution controve;rsy contains at its core 
a conflict between educational desirability and political 
feasibility. It is generally conceded among educators 
that federal school finance formulas should contain the 
principle of •equalization'; that is federal revenues 
generated in wealthy states would be distributed in a 
compensating fashion to less wealthy states. However, 
congressional spokesmen for wealthy states have tended 
to oppose school aid bills which returned proportionately 
less to their constituents than the latter had contributed 
in taxes to the federal treasury. Conversely, congressmen 
73Memorandum, Douglass Cater to the President, February 15, 1965 1 
Johnson Papers. 
from poor states have seldom been favorably disposed 
to school aid bills which did not allow their states 
proporti4nately more than their federal tax contri-
bution.? 
For years prior to 1965 this argument over equalization had 
continued without a politically acceptable solution. The poverty 
formula broke this long standing deadlock by compromising the issue 
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and essentially "giving something to everyone." By basing the federal 
fund allocation on the basis of one-half of the states' average ex-
penditure per child, multiplied by the number of poverty students in 
the area, the proposal gave proportionate amounts to a state based on 
~ its expenditure and taxation level, as well as its poverty level. 
Thus, the formula was a mixture of both the rich and the poor states' 
arguments. At the same time the particularly heavy needs of poverty 
children in large city and rural schools was served. 
This fact was publicized when the.!::_.~· News and World Report ran 
an analysis of the legislation to determine exactly where the funds 
would go. The data used was based upon estimates obtained from the 
U.S. Office of Education. 75 The article pointed out that big city 
slums and depressed rural areas in the South would receive the 
greatest benefit, but eighty-five to ninety per cent of all school 
districts in the country would qualify for some aid. The article 
also noted that the larger richer states, such as New York, California, 
and Texas received twice the national average on a per capita basis. 
?1±G th. u r1e, p. 101±. 
75,vWho Gets the Billions in 
World Report (January 25, 1965), 
distribution in Appendix E. 
LBJ 1 s School Plan. 11 U. S. News and 
----pp. 66-67. Also note the proposed 
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Thus, "the end result is an educationally sound and politically ac-
ceptable federal aid distribution formula, the first of its kind with 
both flat grant and equalization features. 11 76 
However, one problem regarding the equalization formula did arise 
during the Hou.se debate on the P;oposal. During the subcommittee 
hearings, emphasis was placed on the fact that the formula set the 
poverty line at such a low level ($2,000) that it fell below what some 
states were providing families on welfare. Thus, families on welfare 
would not be counted under the Title I formula. 77 When this was re-
vealed, President Johnson authorized the chairman of the Subcommittee, 
Adam Clayton Powell, White House Aide, Douglass Cater, and Congressman 
78 Roman Pucinski (Democrat, Illinois) to meet and work out the problem. 
The bill was changed to allow welfare recipients to be accounted for in 
the poverty formula, and another hurdle was cleared by the persistent 
initiative of the Johnson Administration. 79 
The Presentation 
The multiplicity of compromises written into the proposal for the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act were indeed the result of 
master planning on the part of President Johnson and his staff. But 
the planning for the proposal did not stop with the alignment of a 
76G h. ut r1e, p. 104. 
77Eidenberg and Morey, p. 102. 
78 rbid. 
79 See Appendix A. 
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coalition of support, nor with the careful handling of traditional 
problematic areas concerning federal aid. The President turned, in 
January of 1965, to two other areas of planning for his program, that 
of shaping public opinion and obtaining congressional support. 
Public Opinion 
President Johnson's landslide victory in November of 1964 pro-
vided him with a public image of being a consensus President. This 
advantage was pressed to the fullest extent by the President in the 
preparation of his proposal to be submitted to Congress. For example, 
the presentation of the President's Great Society program was planned 
so that it would receive maximum exposure and impact. For the first 
time, the State of the Union address was delivered to Congress at a 
. t l . . . . h Bo Th G t S . prime e evision viewing our. e rea ociety program was out-
lined by the President in a series of one sentence proposals, and 
then supported in following weeks by special messages concerning each 
of the topics. 11 The education message was the second in this series of 
messages delivered in such rapid succession that they were called 
'a drumbeat summons' to congressional action.11 81 
In addition, a memorandum to the President on January 10, 1965, 
two days before the special message was to be presented to Congress, 
reveals that the White House staff was very conscious of the public 
impact of the President's program. In this memo the staff proposed 
that a television program be produced regarding the President's 
BOB . M . I. ailey and osher, p. ~2. 
81Ibid. 
184 
proposals on education. The television program would be outlined so 
that, according to the memo, it would: 
take cameras into carefully selected schools 
around the country to show just what the problems are. It 
would then drop back to review the history of federal 
legislation and its successes. It would climax with an 
exposition of the/resent proposed legislation, including 
some criticisms. 8 
Evidently the President thought better of not producing the 
program because nothing came of the proposal. But the President did 
pre-set the stage for his address on education, as the announcement 
of the special message was managed with the public in mind. This was 
done by briefing the Cabinet on the legislative program for education 
on January 11 in a two-hour closed session. This was sure to attract 
news reporters, and it did, as they reported that Cabinet members came 
from the session using expressions like 11 revolutionary, 11 and "ex-
citing," to describe what they heard. 83 Following the session with 
the Cabinet, a special press conference was held at the White House 
the next morning on January 12. Reporters were told at this confer-
ence that President Johnson hoped to be known as "the education 
President. 11 84 
Immediately after the press briefing at the White 
House~ reporters were invited to an NEA press conference. 
NEA spokesm~n, fresh from a January 9 and 10 meeting of 
their Legislative Commission concerning ESEA, expressed 
support of the President's bill.85 
82 Memorandum to the President, January 19, 1965, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library. 
83The New York Times (January 12, 1965), p. 20 
84Eaucation Digest (February, 1965), p. 53. 
85B . M I. a1ley and asher, p. ~5. 
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Thus, with a maximum exposure of support for the bill, as well 
as presenting the image of a President who was following the mandate 
of the people in his Great Society program, the Johnson Administration 
was prepared for congressional action. 
Congressional Support 
The Democratic victory in 196~ presented the Johnson Adminis-
tration with a substantial majority in Congress, and, therefore an 
opportunity, theoretically, to enact any type of legislative programs 
as long as they did not split the party. However, 
Although a large numerical majority in the legis-
lature may present a President with the opportunity for 
fulf'illing his agenda, it is not axiomatic that large 
majorities equal great legislative records. Members 
of the party with a considerable edge are apt to decide 
that their votes on a particular seg~itive question, 
such as federal aid, are not vital. 
Therefore, President Johnson certainly was not going to be able 
to depend entirely on his margin of victory in the election to pass 
his legislative program. Keeping the party votes in line was going 
to require a great amount of pressure from the President. Also 1 there 
were a large number of new faces in Congress, and the President had 
to make sure they responded to his proposals. 
Results from the voting on President Johnson's bills in the 
Eighty-Ninth Congress show that the President was successful in both 
problem areas. For example, of the ~69 proposals he submitted to 
Congress, 321, or 68.~ per cent were approved--an all time high for 
86 Meranto, p. 107. 
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Presidents. 87 Also, according to one source, of those proposals which 
called for roll call votes which presented "clear cut tests of sup-
port," President Johnson scored the highest rate of approval of any 
President since 1953. 88 The President was equally successful with the 
newcomers to Congress. The 71 Democratic freshmen in Congress sup-
ported the President on 89 per cent of 12 key roll call votes, and 
of a total of 66 roll call votes held by August, 1965, 83 per cent of 
the new Democrats supported the President. 8 9 
One of the reasons for the President's success with the Eighty-
Ninth Congress was the constant pressure and vigilance he supplied 
over the activities of the members of Congress. As one observer put 
it: 11 He supported it to the hilt. I.f a Congressman was not going to 
vote for the bill, Johnson wanted to know personally who he was and 
why he wasn't going to vote for it.11 90 
Another reason for the President's success with congressional 
support in rega~d to the Elementary and Secondary Act was that he 
lined up the support of the leadership in Congress for his proposal 
beforehand. As President Johnson recalls: 
As we were hammering out the program, we were also 
developing a strategy to overcome congressional obstacles. 
The bill was placed in the highest-priority category. I 
resolved to put the entire power and prestige of the 
87see Appendix H. 
88congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (November 19, 1965) 
p. 23lic1. 
89Ibid., (August 27, 1965), p. 174,8. 
90Quoted in Meranto, p. 105. 
Presidency behind it. All the centers of power and 
control within the Congress were consulted.91 
In the House of Representatives, these key leaders were Chairman 
of the Education and Labor Committee, Adam Clayton Powell; Sub-
committee Chairman, Carl D. Perkins; and the Chairman of the House 
Rules Committee, Judge Howard W. Smith (Democrat, Virginia). 92 The 
support of Judge Smith was very important because, as the President 
puts it, he had: "blocked the passage of so many previous education 
bills that a slogan had been coined for him: 
schools. 11193 
'no rules for 
The President was successful in this attempt to obtain early 
91± 
support as exemplified by Powell's early endorsement of the proposal, 
and Perkins calling the bill "the most outstanding proposal ever to 
come before this Congress.n95 The power of Judge Smith and his 
Rules Committee had been reduced somewhat by new rules adopted by 
the Eighty-Ninth Congress, so his eventual opposition to President 
91 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 209. For an account of the 
relationship between the President and House leadership, see Vernon 
Montgomery Goetcheus, Ph.D., "Presidential Party Leadership: Re-
lations Between President Johnson and House Democrats in the 89th 
Congress." (Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, 
1967). 
920i1ly the key committee leadership in reference to education 
are listed here. The traditional party leadership, such as the 
Speaker and Majority Whip were, as usual, important. 
9JJ. h o nson, The Vantage Point, p. 209. 
91±See this chapter, p. 170. 
95~ New York Times (January 23, 1965), p. 1. 
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Johnson's program was not as damaging as it might have been. 96 Also, 
Representatave James Delaney (Republican, New York), who had cast the 
critical vote aga~nst Kennedy's education measure in the Rules Com-
mittee in 1961, gave President Johnson's program a boost when he 
indicated he thought the bill would make it through Congress with no 
problem. 97 
Thus, the President was well prepared when the education message 
was finally delivered. All the legwork had been completed, and the 
President turned to another task, that of pushing the program through 
Congress. 
Presidential Pressure 
President Johnson's preliminary planning in regard to the Ele-
mentary .and Secondary Education Act was a major factor in the 
96 The rules change that the Eighty-Ninth Congress adopted which 
affected the Rules Committee was the so-called twenty-one day rule. 
This rule gave the Speaker the power to bring a piece of legislation 
to the floor after twenty-one calendar days passed from the date a 
standing committee had requested a rule from the Rules Committee. 
Thus, it was possible to bypass the Rules Committee in regard to the 
school aid bill if opposition developed$ In addition, the vote 
to do so was changed from a two-thirds vote to a simple majority. 
Judge Smith's reaction to the changes was that he could see "the 
legislative skids were greased," and there was little point in his 
trying to stop the prooe-ss, other than to protest the action. For 
an account of the ruLe change, see Eidenberg and Morey, pp. 42-44. 
For Judge Smith's spee,ch a.gainst .the .. ,education bill on the floor of 
the House, see the Congressional Record (March 24, 1965), p. 5553. 
97The New York Times (January 23, 1965), p. 1. 
. 98 
prop6sal's passage through Congress. But an important part of the 
credit for steering the proposal through Congress must also go to 
the President for his relentless pressure on Congressmen to pass the 
bill once it was presented: 
Minority blocs in Congress have a variety of 
opportunities to delay and amend bill.s which they 
oppose, and there are innumerable potential combi-
nations of personal, partisan, and constituent con-
cerns among lawmakers that can be mobilized by 
determined efforts of a few strategically placed 
leaders in committees or subcommittees. 99 
To offset this possibility, President Johnson followed a basic 
strategy of pushing the bill through Congress as rapidly as possible 
without any amendments to delay or cripple the legislation. To 
preclude any such changes, Representatives Perkins and Powell, and 
Senator Morse, along with the White House, decided to try to rush 
the bill through each stage of the legislative process in the hopes 
of avoiding the flare-up of any major issues over federal aid. 
Francis Keppel gives an observation as to why the President wanted 
the legislation through Congress in a hurry: 
he came in, looking cheerful as can be, and 
said to the half-dozen or dozen people in the room who 
were responsible for various legislation, President 
,Johnson said 'Look, we've got to do this in a hurry. We 
got in with this majority in Congress' (by however many 
million votes, he had as a majority)® He said, 1 It 
98A summary of the legislative progress of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act is included in Congressional Quarterly 
Service, The Federal Role in Education (Washington, 1965), pp. 3~-
38. For a full length study of the legislative politics surrounding 
the Act, see Meranto; and Eidenberg and Morey. 
I 
99Bailey an1 Mosher, p. 60. 
doesn't make any difference what we do we're going to 
lose them at the rate of about a million a month, 
and under those circumstances, get your subcommittee 
hearings going.' 100 
House Action 
With the active support of President Johnson the bill moved 
rather quickly through the House hearings on the proposal. Carl 
Perkins, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Education, opened hearings 
on the proposal January 22. 101 Representative Charles Goodell'(Re-
publican, New York) was the principal spokesman for the minority 
throughout the subcommittee hearings. 102 Goodell's biggest charge 
against the bill was that "the Administration and its committee 
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leadership had conspired to push the bill through Congress with barely 
103 
enough time for the legislative amenities to be observed." 
Goodell also stated: "This isn't going to be an education act; its 
going to be the Railroad Act of 1965.11104 
The Administration's answer to the charge of too much speed was 
that elementary and secondary education legislation needed to pass 
Congress even if it meant that the bill would have some imperfections. 
lOOF ' K F H, , . ranc1.s eppel older, Oral 1.stor,1.es File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. 6. 
101 House, Hearings. 
102 For a full account of Goodell's actions in connection with the 
bill~ see Meranto, pp. 71-84. 
lOJE. b M 1.den erg and orey, p. 105. 
l01±The World in 1965, History As We Lived_!!., quoted in The 
Associated Press (New York, 1966), p. 77. 
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Andrew Biemiller, the chief lobbyist for the AFL-CIO, reflected this 
thought publicly before the subcommittee on January 29: 
I repeat ••• let's get started ••• and get a bill 
through here, and begin to get some mqney into our school 
systems where we now know it is badly needed, and then we 
can take another good look and get closer to the goal 
that both you and I want; and we make no bones about it, 
that we want a general education bill.105 
At any rate, on February 2, 1965, twelve days after the hearings 
began, Perkins closed them. Representative Goodell reacted angrily 
against the closing because he said that he still had several wit-
nesses to call, and they had to be all crammed into the last day. 
"Interestingly, Goodell does not blame Perkins personally for this 
state of affairs so much as he does the White House who, he maintains 
106 
was issuing the marching orders." On February 5, with the Re-
publicans boycotting the meeting because they were protesting the 
handling of the subcommittee hearings, the bill was reported to the 
full committee where Adam Clayton Powell took charge. 
The Powell Caper 
The power of President Johnson to put pressure on Congress to act 
is best seen in the events surrounding the conducting of the business 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor by Representative Adam 
Clayton Powell in regard to the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act. Powell had said that he would take up the bill in full com-
mittee immediately following the subcommittee mark up. But, instead 
105H H . 7 ouse, ear1ngs, p. 9 7. 
l06E·d b d M 1 6 1 en erg an orey, p. O. 
he used the opportunity to demand that the expense account be raised 
for his staff or he would delay action on the bill. 107 President 
Johnson recalls what happened next: 11 He cancelled the February 8 
meeting and rescheduled it for February 17, the day after the House 
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was slated to consider his expenses. Then he left for Puerto Rico.11 108 
The device worked for the Chairman because the House voted to increase 
the expense level for him and his staff. In a memorandum to the 
President from White House aide Jack Valenti, the next action by Powell 
is related to the President: 
Adam Clayton Powell called ••• asked to pass along 
his apologies to the President for delaying the full com-
mittee meeting, but he had to turn the screws on the 
House leadership to get his full appropriations. He has 
that now. He pledges the President that he will meet 
beginning tomorrow morning--both mornipa and afternoon and 
hopes to report the bill on Saturday. 9 
Powell did meet with the Committee, and on March 2 the House 
Committee on Education completed its work, only seven days following 
the bill's entrance. Powell really rushed the bill through once he 
began to work. 
The handling of the House hearings on the bill, and the Adminis-
tration's response to Pdwell's caper, is best reflected in the memo-
randum from Larry O•Brien, legislative liaison, to the President of 
March 8, 1965. The memorandum reflects the close watch over the bill 
110 
conducted by the White House. 
l07The New York Times (February 25, 1965), p. 16. 
108J. v O ohnson, The antage Point, p. 211. 
109 Memorandum, Jack Valenti to the President, February 2~, 1965, 
Johnson Papers, ,Johnson Library. 
llOS A d" E 305 
.ee ppen ix ., p. • 
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Edith Green--A Surprise 
Another surprise headache for the Administration was the sudden 
opposition of Congresswoman Edith Green (Democrat, Oregon). Green had 
generally been identified with those who supported the concept of 
federal aid to education and had not been counted on as an opposing 
force in the House. However: 
Mrs. Green quickly came to support the position that 
a judicial review amendment was required to maintain the 
equity of the allocation process, and that the formula 
needed to be amended to distribute the funds more directly 
to the poor districts. She began to assert herself at 
the full committee sessions and.q~ickly found he~self111 
articulating the Republican pos1t1on on these points. 
The Democratic leadership and the White House assumed that she 
was organizing an effort with the Republicans to sabotage the legis-
lation and, as reflected in the O'Brien memorandum, they were 
112 keeping a close watch on her •. 
The Administration's concern over Mrs. Green mainly revolved 
around the fear that her stand would attract other liberal Democrats 
to her side in opposing the bill. As a result, 11When the bill got 
to the full committee, the Office of Education asked only one thing 
of Chairman Powell: that he keep the subcommittee. bill intact and 
not let Mrs. Green's efforts get lengthy consideration. 11113 And 
Chairman Powell did just that, as, according to one spokesman, "by and 
large he did a beautiful job of this.11 114 
111 Eidenberg and Morey, p. 107. 
112s A d. E ee ppen 1x • , pp. 308-309. 
llJE.d .b d M 1 en erg an orey, p. 109. 
114Ibid. 
The continuing concern of the Administration with Mrs. Green is 
also indicated in a. memorandum to Douglass Cater following the bill's 
passage out of the Committee on to the floor of the House. The memo-
randum outlined several arguments which could he used against Mrs. 
Green if she caused any problems during the House debate. 115 
At the same time, according to the. memorandum, a caucus was held 
in which 11 a rough division of labor on the defense of the Adminis-
tration's bill on the floor was de~ided. 11116 Once the bill reached 
the floor of the House, Presidential pressure for p~ssage continued at 
an ever increasing pace as reflected in a memorandum to the President 
from Jack Valenti, in which he indicated that Anthony Celebrezze, 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was "working hard on the 
bil1.11117 President Johnson also recalls tHe tactics of the Adminis-
tration those last few days: 
On March 24 Secretary Celebrezze's head count showed 
248 votes for the bi.11 and Valenti told me that 1 Celebrezze 1 s 
people were working feverishly.' The White Hous~ estimate 
that day was 229 votes in favor, but twenty memb~rs of the 
House had not expressed themselves one way or another. 
Our special task force was busy on the Hill, concen-
trating on 148 wavering Democrats. Valenti reported that 
a frantic struggle was in progress: 'Carl Albert is 
staying on the floor supporting Carl Perkins. Its been 
hell today. • Finally, on March 26, by a roll call 
vote of 263 to 153, the House passed the education bill 
and sent it to the Senate.118 
115Memorandum, Samuel Halperin to Douglass Cater,-.March 22,,. 1965, 
Johnson Papers, ,Johnson Library. See Appendix G., pp. 319-320. 
116Ibid. 
117 Memorandum, Jack Valenti to the President, March 23, 1965, 
Ibid~ 
118 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 211. 
195 
Senate Action 
The Senate Subcommittee on Education began its hearings on its 
version of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act January 26. To 
prevent the possibility of the Senate and the House from passing 
two versions of the President's proposal, and thus forcing a joint 
conference between the two chambers which would delay the proceedings, 
Senator Morse and Representative Perkins, had introduced identical 
. . h . . h b 119 bills into t eir respective cam ers. 
In the Senate, the bill received a great amount of immediate 
. t h" t . S t t' 120 support in that here were t ir y-six ,ena ors acing as sponsors. 
Senator Morse had done his groundwork well. In addition, Senator 
Jacob K. Javits (Republican, New York) indicated he thought the bill 
ought to be a bi-partisan measure in a message to the subcommittee. 121 
As a result the Administration had very little trouble in passing 
the Elementary and Secondary Act through the Senate. One of the 
reasons for this is that the Senate has traditionally demonstrated 
a greater degree of bi-partisan support for federal aid than has the 
H R . . 122 ouse of epresentatives. 
119 When the two chambers in Congress pass two versions of the same 
bil.l, a joint conference is held to work out differences. The 
con:ference results is then re-submitted in both chambers for voting@ 
If the conference bill is d~feated, the bill is dead. 
120 Hearings, 1±. Senate, p. 
121 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
122B . 1 ai ey and Mosher, p. 66. 
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The opposition to the education bill was basically aimed at the 
speed with which deliberations were being pushed, as pointed out by 
Senator Winston L. Prouty (Republican, Vermont): 
The intent of the sponsor of this legislation--the 
President of the United States--is that the Senate 
passively accept his decree and pass this bill in exactly 
the form voted upon by the other body •••• 
Today may be the day when the Senate of the United 
States, after 176 years of greatness, yields to the 
insistent demand of a Chief Executive, its right and 
duty to perform its true legislative function. 123 
Before the Eighty-Ninth Congress convened Senator Wayne Morse 
had decided, with the concurrence of President Johnson, that the 
Senate would postpone action on floor debat,es regarding the education 
bill until final passage in the House and that no amendments should be 
accepted at any stage. President Johnson recalls why he especially 
did not want any changes to occur in the Senate on the bill: 
The danger lay now with the Senate amendments, 
which could upset the delicate balance of the bill's 
various provisions. I talked with Wayne Morse, the 
floor manager, and with other Senate leaders of both 
parties. They agreed that no matter how much they might 
like to change some aspects of the House bill, the dangers 
of scuttling it in conference were too great to risk. As 
Morse said on the Senate floor: 'The stakes are too high 
for the children of America for us to run the risk of 
jeopardizing this legislation in conference.' After eleven 
amendments were beaten down, the measure moved'±through the 
Senate with no changes. The vote was 73-18. 12 
The President also took an interest in the speed and timing of 
the passage of the bill in the Senate: 
123congressional Record (April 7, 1965), pp. 7061±-65. Also see 
Roger A. Freeman, 11 How to Railroad a School Bill, 11 National Review 
(May 18, 1965), pp. 1±19-22, and "Through the Back Door, 11 The Nation 
(April 26, 1965), p. 1±31±. 
12'± Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 211. 
He let the Senate leaders know that he hoped to sign 
the bill at his Texas ranch during Easter vacation. The 
fact that the entire process of floor consideration in 
the House and Senate required only 16 days (March 24 to 
April 9) was testament, in part to White House and HEW 
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aggressiveness. 
Victory 
On the same day that the Senate 1acted, Johnson spoke in the 
White House Theater concerning the importance of the bill~ Calling 
it 11 the most significant step of this century to provide widespread 
help to all of America's schoolchildren," he saluted Congress for 
th . . t 1 . t. 126 eir actions on he egisla ion. Then, on April 11, 1965~ he 
signed the bill into law at the President's first school in Johnson 
C·t T 127 i ·y, exas. 
President J"ohnson I s part in the passage of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act must,be viewed as a key thread in the bill's 
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success. In reflecting on the role of President Johnson~ one official 
who worked in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, commented 
on ,Johnson the fol lowing way: 
I don't know what other Presidents think and care 
about but this one really. cares about education. With all 
due respect to·Kennedy we never had the cooperation or 
pressure from the White House like we've had with Johnson. 
He simply was det1r~ined to get this thing through and 
everyone knew it. 2 
125Bailey and Mosher, pp. 64-65. 
126Johnson, "Remarks Following Enactment of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Bill, 11 April 9, 1965, Public Papers, pp. 407-08. 
127Johnson, "Remarks in Johnson City, Texas, Upon Signing the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Bill," April 11, 1965, Ibid., pp.412-14. 
128Q t . M. 
uo ed in eranto, p. 105~ 
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On the other hand, opponents of the measure claimed that the 
President railroaded the bill through the legislative process. In 
reaction to this accusation, Douglass Cater had this to say: 
He had the notion that we wanted the elementary-
secondary to be a fast moving piece of legislation. I 
think a great deal of exaggeration has been written about 
the fact that the President demanded that it be steam 
rollered through. If he did, he didn't do it in my 
presence. I know, for exampl.e, that Wayne Morse, when 
it got to the Senate, presented it as his own idea that 
the bill from the House should be passed without amend-
ment. And Wayne Morse was not the kind of guy that you 129 
could just lay down the law to and say, 'do it this way.' 
Regaxdless of whether the President did or did not railroad the 
bill through Congress, his political skill in utilizing compromise 
and gageing the political winds was extraordinary, as testified by 
Francis Keppel: " e he knew the machinery of Congress. He knew 
how to play it. Boy, he was good at that1 11130 Presidential Press 
Secretary Bill Moyers echoed this claim as he stated the President 
had "a great naturB;l gift for knowing, feeling, and sensing the mood 
of the American people •••• I think he has antennae that give or 
take one or two degrees, keeping him pretty closely attuned to the 
problems, moods, and attitudes of the people."lJl 
129 Douglass Cater Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. 16. 
lJOFrancis Keppel Folder, Ibid., p. 27Q 
131 Quoted in The~ York Times (November 1, 1965), p. Jo 
CHAPTER VI 
BOOKS, BULLETS, BUSSES, AND BUREAUCRACY 
Introduction 
An act of Congress is rarely permanent. Normally, it is not a 
resolution of an issue. In most cases Congress reserves the right to 
change its mind and review, or alter, previous legislation. In some 
cases this is accomplished by simply authorizing an act for only a 
certain length of time. This forces the problem, or act, to be re-
evaluated. As one writer has put it: 
In one sense the task of guiding public policy is much like 
that of catapulting a space vehicle to the moon. In both 
cases .one is not apt to hit a predetermined target without 
correcting the course after the launching phase. 1 
Parts of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act were authorized for 
2 
one year only. That meant that Congress would be taking up the issue 
of federal aid again. And, just as environmental changes prior to 
1965 had formed a favorable atmosphere in which President Johnson 
could maneuver the school aid bill through Congress, changes in the 
environment occurred after 1965 which affected the relationship be-
tween President Johnson and subsequent Congresses. 
1Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York, 
1969), p. 177; also note Malcolm E. Jewel-i-and Samuel c. Patterson, 
The Legislative Process in the United State (New York, 1966). 
2 For the length of authorization for each section, see Appendix A, 
pp. 287-290. 
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In addition to the fact that the political atmosphere was 
changed following the passage of the 1965 school bill, was the fact 
that the bill itself created an impact upon other sectors of society. 
The nature of American society is so complex that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to disentangle the various components. As a result, 
action taken in one sector of society is usually accompanied by a 
reaction in other parts of society. For example, in 1965 the passage 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act constituted an action 
on the part of the political sector--and it had a tremendous impact 
upon the education phase of American society. The reaction in the 
educational area to the political action taken by Congress went through 
a feedback process to reinforce, and in some cases alter, the political 
arena. Thus, before the efforts of President Johnson to promote 
federal aid between 1966 and 1969 can be adequately examined, one must 
look at the impact of the Elementary and Secondary Act upon the 
American education scene. 
Financial Impact 
The year 1965 was an unusual one in financing elementary and 
secondary schools. Local school districts found that money for badly 
.needed projects was available for the first time in many years. The 
mass infusion of federal money turned out to be a windfall for some 
districts, while others struggled with the multiplicity of forms, 
statistical data, and application procedures, in order to qualify for 
those funds© Therefore, any type of evaluation of the impact of the 
Elementary and Secondary Act upon the common schools is fraught with 
the dangers of over generalization. Therefore, this section will 
201 
first examine the total impact of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act, then look at some of the specific applications of the 
various titles of the Acte 
Appropriations for the Elementary-Secondary Act were signed into 
effect by President Johnson on September 23, 1965:3 11Act now. Get 
your plans made. Open your schools to the promise of these new 
programs. I hope that not a single day will be lost. For in edu-
cation, the time we waste today can mean a life tomorrow." 4 Author-
ized expenditures under the Appropriations Bill amounted to 1.2 
·billion dollars for the fiscal year 1965-66. 
Table I shows the financial impact the school aid bill had upon 
the relationship of federal expenditures by level. And as shown, 
expenditures on elementary-secondary schools in relation to other 
3The official numbering system for the Elementary-Secondary Act 
lists the law as PL89-10. The system used by Congress in numbering 
laws it passes is relatively simple. The first two numbers represent 
the Congressional number, and the second series of numbers represents 
the order in which laws were passed. Thus, PL89-10 was enacted by 
the Eighty-Ninth Congress, and it was the tenth law passed by that 
Congress. 
4Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Remarks After Signing Bill Providing 
Funds for Programs Under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act," 
September 23, 1965, Public Papers of Presidents of~ United States, 
Containing the Public Messages,. Speeches, and Statements of the 
President, 1965 (Washington, 1966), p. 101~ ~~-
The Congressional phase of obtaining federal funds in 1965 was 
actually two-fold; first, Public Law 89-10 ·s-igned by· ,the· .Pre·sident 
in April of 1965 only authorize,d an. a~ount. to· be, appropriated; second, 
President Johnson then sent an· authorization request to Congress to 
appropriate the full amount authorized under Public Law 89-10 in the 
form of two laws--Public Law 89-156, and Public Law 89-199. This 
procedure allows for the President, or Congress, to vary the amount 
actually funded in the original proposal. 
levels showed the greatest increase. 5 
TABLE I 
FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR EDUCATION BY LEVEL 
( in mil lions) 
Secondary and Elementary Education 
Higher Education 
Adult and Continued Education 
Training and Public Employees 
Foreign 
Other 
Total 
1964 (act.) 
546 
1,742 
108 
309 
169 
247 
3,121 
1968 (act.) 
3,228 
4,363 
306 
402 
242 
223 
8,764 
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Table II shows the overall federal outlays for education between 
1960 and 1970. Note the dramatic increase starting with the year 
1965, when aid to education jumped from 1.6 billion dollars to 2.9 
billion dollars. 6 
Table III indicates the impact the school bill had upon the re-
lationship between federal, state, and local expenditures. Again, note 
the dramatic increase in federal expenditures starting with 1965.7 
5Bureau of the Budget, "Federal Education Programs Special Analy-
sis,11 Califano Folder, Aides Files, The Public Papers of Lyndon Baines 
Johnson, Johnson Library (January, 1969), p. 115. Reprints of pp. 
113-133. 
6Ibid., p. 113. 
7National Education Association, Financial Status of~ Public 
Schools (Washington 9 1966) 9 p. 53. 
TABLE II 
FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR EDUCATION--1960-1970 
(in billions) 
Category 1 60 1 61 1 62 1 63 1 64 1 65 1 66 1 67 1 68 
Aid to 
Education .9 .9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 2.9 4.4 5.0 
*Other Edu-
cation 
Activities 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.8 
Total 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.7 5o7 7.5 8.8 
*Health, Veterans', National Defense, etc. 40 per cent of 
since 1964. 
TABLE III 
PER CENT OF REVENUE RECEIVED FROM FEDERAL, 
STATE, AND LOCAL SOURCES FOR PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
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•69 '70 
4.8 5.3 
4.2 4.5 
9.0 9.8 
growth 
School Year 
l 
Federal Sources State Sources Local Sources 
19.55-56 
1957-58 
1959~60 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-6.5 
1965-66 
1970-71 
2 
4.6% 
4.o 
4.4 
4.3 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
7.8 
7.0 
3 4 
39.5% 55.9% 
39.4 56.6 
39.1 .56.5 
38.7 56.9 
39.3 57.1 
4o.o 56.3 
39.7 56.5 
39.1 5.3.1 
41.0 52.0** 
**Since about 1968, the percentage of federal aid to education 1n 
relation to state and local sources has been on the decline. 
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In an attempt to study the impact of federal funds upon education, 
Representative Edith Green conducted a study in 1967 of the U.S. 
Office of Education and its activities. 8 The results of her study 
showed that in the fiscal year of 1967, the Office of Education han-
dled twice as much money as the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, four times as much as the Department of Commerce, and ten 
times as much as the Department of State. But even though it was the 
largest federal contributor to education, it hand.led only one-third 
of all federal aid. 9 
Perhaps as an addition to the overall look at the impact of the 
Elementary-Secondary Act, it would be helpful to briefly examine the 
specifics of each title of the bill. Since each title is essentially 
a separate program, most evaluations of the school bill concentrate 
only on one title at a time. 
Appropriated funds for Title I (959 million dollars) constituted 
by far the largest amount to be spent under the Elementary-Secondary 
Act. The monies appropriated under this title were to be spent for 
financial assistance to local educational agencies for the education 
of children of low-income families. Table IV shows the activity of 
school districts in regard to Title I. 10 
8The Honorable Edith Green, Study of the United States Office of 
Education, U.S. Congress, House (89th Cong~2nd Sess., 1966) 
(Washington, 1967). 
9Quoted in Education Digest (February, 1968), p. 55. 
10u. s. Office of Education, First Annual Report, Title I, Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 19654 in U.S. Congress,S-;nate, 
Subcommittee on Education, Notes and Working Papers ••• Title I of 
Public Law 89-10 (9oth Cong.,lst ·sess., 1967) (Washington, 1967), 
p. 914:. 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY OF FIRST-YEAR PARTICIPANTS IN TITLE I 
Total LEA 1 s (School Districts), Fall, 1965 
Total LEA 1 s eligible for Title I 
Total LEA 1 s participating in Title I 
Total LEA's eligible, but not participating in Title I 
26,983 
24,926 
17,481 
7,445 
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Of the 7,445 local school districts not participating in Title I, 
104 had not complied with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The remainder had either failed to apply, or had been turned down 
11 because of failure to meet federal or state application standards. 
The total program results are summarized below: 
In all, during the first year of operation, 813 
million children were served by Title I and some $987.6 
million was expended, including almost $11 million for 
handicapped children under Public Law 89-313. Ex-
penditures totalled 84 per cent of the allocations. 
The average Title I expenditure per pupil was $119, 
but the expenditures ranged from about $25 to $227. For 
many states, this represented a substantial increase over 
average current per pupil expenditures, the national 
average being about $532 for 1965-66. 
Nearly 52 per cent of the $987.6 million in Title I 
f'unds the first year was spent on instruction; about two-
thirds of that amount was spent for language arts and 
remedial reading, which were identified as the top 
priority by the majority of local educational agencies. 
Some 20 per cent of the total was spent on edu-
cational equipment, and about 10 per cent was spent for 
construction. Food and health services accounted for 
4©5 per cent of the total expenditures. 11 
11u. S. Office of Education, First Annual Report, Title I, Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in U. s. Congres;, Senate, 
Subcommittee on Education, Notes and Working Papers ••• Title I of 
Public Law 89-10 (9oth Cong.,lst.~ss., 1967) (Washington, 1967) 
p. 914. 
Nearly 65 per cent of the participants in Title I 
programs were in pre-school through grade six. Ninety-
two per cent of the students were enrolled in public 
schools and six per cent in non-public schools. About. 12 
two per cent of the students were not enrolled in school. 
It is obvious from the foregoing statement that by the end of the 
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first year, Title I was having a great amount of impact upon thousands 
of school districts and millions of children. 
Appropriated funds under Title II (100 million dollars) were to 
be spent on school library resources, textbooks, and other instruc-
tional materials. In 1965, one-half of the schools in the nation 
lacked a centralized library. At the elementary level, the figure 
h . 13 was much 1gher. As U. S. Commissioner of Education 1 Gordon Howe, II 
reported in April, 
In the 56,000 schools with central libraries, there 
are approximately 192 million books. If those libraries 
were to meet minimum standards, they would have to acquire 
233 million more volumes. Schools which have made valiant 
efforts to maintain adequate libraries are falling behind 
because of rapidly growing enrollments and the increased 
costs of construction and library materials. 
12u. S. Office of Education, Firist Annual Report, Title I, 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in U.S. Cong'i='ess, 
Senate, Subcommittee on Education, Notes and Working Papers 
Title I of Public Law 89-10 (90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967) 
(Washington, 1967), p. 914. 
13stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of 
Education Administers ~ Law (New York 1 1968), j;:"""T67 .--
14 . 
Howe replaced Keppel as U.S. Commissioner of Education in 
September, 1965. 
U. s. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Education, Hearings 
on the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966 
(89th Cong., 2nd Sess., April, 1966) (Washington, 1966),~477. 
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The condition of textbooks was equally bad, as Howe states: 
A survey of the needs of our schools for modern 
textbooks reveals that many children must use textbooks 
which are out of date and grossly inadequate for this 
era of expanding educational horizon~. It is a sad 
fact that 'modern history' books often have nothing 
to teach our children after WWI, and that physics texts 
frequently deal with the state of our knowledge in the 
forties and fifiies~-ignoring the atomic revolution and 
the space age. 
However, as a res4lt of Title II, by July, 1967, 3,600 new public 
libraries had been opened; 1,545,000 students were being served by 
these libraries; 89 per cent, or 43 million school children were 
enrolled in 91,000 schools participating in Title Ir. 17 
Title III authorized 75 million dollars to be used for making 
grants to establish supplementary educational centers and establishing 
innovative projects in education. Measurement of the impact of these 
funds, like the measurement of a number of the other titles, is made 
more difficult by the fact that it takes a considerable amount of time 
to get a program started, and once started cannot be measured in sta-
tistics alone. The first report of projects approved under Title III 
. 66 18 appeared in 19 • At the end of the fiscal year 1966, 2706 project 
applications had been received, requesting a total of over 250 million 
dollars. As of September 30, 1966, 1,030 of these requests had been 
16u. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Education, Hearings 
The Elementary and Secondary Amendments of 1966 (89th Congo, 2nd 
Sess., April, 1966) (Washington, 1966), ~ 477. 
on 
17u. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Education, Committee 
Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings on Education Legislation, 1967 
(9oth Cong., 1st Sess., 1967) (Washington, 1967), p. 971. 
18u. S. Office of Education, Projects Approved Under Title III, 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Washington, 1966). 
on 
208 
. . . . 19 
approved for a total expenditure of 75 million dollars. 
Title IV authorized 70 million dollars to be spent on developing 
cooperative research centers in education. Like Title III, measurement 
here proved to be difficult because only projects started 1 not their 
total effect, could be evaluated. By the end of the first fiscal year, 
12 regional educational laboratories had been approved, and eight 
university-based research and development centers created, or their 
20 
support increased and extended. 
Title V authorized 17 billion dollars to be spent on strengthening 
state departments of education. Actually, this title was more im-
portant than most people realized because the use of funds under the 
other titles depended upon how well the state departments of education 
functioned in distributing funds and aiding the local school districts 
. . . t 1 · t. 21 in preparing proJec app ica ions. 
The major portion of Title V funds were spent on adding personnel. 
For example, over 1800 new positions were created in the States under 
Title V. Over 1,000 of these positions were professional. 22 As one 
writer put it: 
19u. S. Office of Educationi Projects Approved Under Title III, 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Washington, 1966). 
20 Bailey and Mosher, p. 170. 
21 stephen K. Bailey, 11 BSSR Survey of 937 School Administrators on 
ESEA 9 11 in Ibid., p. 332. For example, a survey of school administra-
tors conducted in 1968 revealed that 72.1 per cent of the local school 
districts depended upon the state education agency for help in applying 
.for Title III funds. 
22 Ibid., p. 172. 
Progress has been made under Title V ••• the progress 
is already being felt in classrooms across the nation, as 
for instance, more and new curricula specialists move out 
from State agencies to assist teachers in improving what 
they teach and how they teach it. Such progress, however, 
will remain difficult to measure in concrete terms.23 
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Evaluations of each title of the Elementary and Secondary Act will 
probably continue for many years to come, and each new evaluation will 
initiate a new search ,for more and better techniques to evaluate the 
financial impact of the Act. 24 At this point, however, the overall 
effect of the Elementary-Secondary Act is best summed up by Francis 
Keppel: 
Whether the obvious fact that these various bills 
scarcely reformed American education in three years is 
to be regarded as a failure of the act is a question in 
part of what you think eight per cent leverage means on 
a huge enterprise, and that's about the leverage. About 
eight per cent federal money was going into primary and 
secondary schools. Well, that's not an awfully long 
crowbar, and there are an awfully lot of big boulders 
around. So I don't know how you measure it •••• 25 
Administrative--Educational Impact 
Most laws that are passed by Congress normally go through some 
sort of evaluation procedure following their enactment. Sometimes 
this evaluation is purely political in nature, and informal, while on 
other occasions both informal and formal evaluations are conducted. 
23 
· Robert L. Hopper, "Strength Where It Counts," American Edu-
cation, II (June, 1966), p. 20. 
24For the purposes of this chapter, only the immediate financial 
impact of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was given. For 
a total look at the spending under each title through the years 
1966-70, see Appendix C., p. 294. 
25Francis Keppel Folder, Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library, p. 16. 
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On some occasions the requirement for an evaluative study of the law 
is written into the bill, while other laws are given no specific 
requirement in regard to evaluation and, if conducted, are purely 
speculative. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act was unique 
in regard to evaluation. As one writer has put it: 
·Perhaps no piece of social legislation in American 
history has placed a greater pr'emium upon the reporting 
and evaluating of results than ESEA e ••• 
• • • the legislative mandate for formal reports and 
evaluations of programs was loud and clear 1 and un-
precedented in scope. Each of the operating titles of 
the act ·provided either for the establishment of pro~ 
cedures ·for making continuing and periodic evaluations 
of the effectiveness of the programs; or for annual and 
other reports; or for both, including repo2~s among 
various levels and branches of government. 
The fear that the federal money going to the local school dis-
tricts would be wasted had been a major topic during the hearings on 
the original proposal, and a number of congressmen had voiced fears 
that without some sort of evaluation of the program, efforts would be 
t db . ff" . t d. · t t• 27 was e y ine icien a minis ra ion. As a result, Congress es-
tablished a formal structure in the bill for evaluation. 28 
26Bailey and Mosher, pp. 162-63. 
27Most notable of these was Senator Robert Kennedy (Democrat, New 
York). During the Senate Subcommittee hearings on the school bill, he 
advocated that evaluation was necessary to upgrade local school dis-
trict administration. He felt that especially Title I funds would be 
wasted unless school operations were upgraded •. U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Subcommittee on Educatioµ, Hearings on the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1-.2.£2. (89th Cong., 1st Sess., February~965) 
(Washington, 1965) i pp. 511-16. 
28Th" t . d . . f . 
· is s ructure consiste of requiring the ollowing~ one, 
local school districts to report to the state education agency (Sec-
tion 205a); two, the state education agency to report to the U. Sa 
Office of Education (Section 206a); and three, the creation of the 
National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children to 
report to the President and Congress (Section 212c). 
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In addition to the fact that the Congress required formal reports 
on the progress of the Act, the bill itself was a complicated piece of 
legislation which required a great deal of study in attempting to im-
plement the programs authorized. All of this placed a tremendous 
burden upon the Office of Education, whose responsibility was to 
implement the Act. As a result, passage of the bill changed a rela-
tively small 0:f:fice of Education to one of the busiest and most con-
troversial agencies of the federal government. 29 A glance at the 
voluminous amount of literature which was published in 1966 and 1967 
in regard to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act by various 
agencies concerned is testament enough to the complexity of the 
30 program. 
In an effort to make implementation of the program much more 
efficient, Commissioner Keppel in March of 1965 appointed to the 
position of Deputy Commissioner of Education Henry Loomis, Director of 
the Voice of America, for the purpose of helping to re-organize the 
Office of Education: 
29 The complexity of the impact of the Elementary-Secondary Act is 
demonstrated by the fact that Bailey and Mosher have written an entire 
volume on the impact and reorganization of the Office of Education. 
Check their work on details of the reorganizationo 
30Among the dozens or so of the largest publications of the 
Office of Education are the following: U.S. Office of Education, A 
Chance for a Change (Washington, 1966); Education, 65: A Report to 
the Pro"te;sion (Washington, 1966); Fact Book: Offi~ of-Educatio;;-
~grams (Washington, 1966). In addition to these publications, the 
National Education Association, American Association of School Ad-
ministrators, and the Department of Education of the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference published numerous magazine articles regarding the 
Acts For their publications, see the respective regular publication 
journals for those years. 
With a rich background in the administration of 
science, defense, and foreign policy, and with national 
recognition for his public service accomplishments, 
Loomis seemed ideally prepared for his new role. Upon 
joining the Office of Education, however, he began 
what was probably one of the most extraordinary, bruising, 
controversial, if in some ways effective administrative 
operations in the recent annals of the Federal govern-
ment. 
Loomis took office on March 8, 1965. He began immediately to 
re-organize the Office of Educationm .Several personnel changes were 
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32 
made and new faces appeared. In addition, with President Johnson's 
support, Loomis and Keppel reached an agreement with Douglass Cater 
in the White House that the President, following the signing of the 
Elementary-Secondary Education Act, would appoint a special task 
force to conduct a full scale review of the administrative re-organi-
zation of the Office of Education. As a result, a task force was 
formed to study the Office on April 15. 33 Dwight Ink, then 
assistant general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, was chairman 
of the new task force. A report called "Recommendations of the White 
House Task Force on Education," was completed on June 14, 1965. 
Loomis and Keppel, after receiving the report, began immediately to 
3lB~iley and Mosher, P• 77. 
32For example, Loomis brought Walter Mylecraine with him from 
the Voice of America. Mylecraine was, according to Bailey, unpopular 
because he was the hatchet man for Loomis' re-organization activities. 
This situation is typical of the attitude toward any type of new 
program in which old established methods are seemingly threatened by 
the new. Under such circumstances it is often difficult to administer 
a change without becoming a culprit. 
33The full report of this task force is located in Task Force 
Files, 1965 Folder, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
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implement the recommendations. 34: 
To illustrate the political implications of all of this personnel 
shifting, a brief closer look at the trials of Loomis' appointment to 
office can be examined. Loomis I appointment to of'fice was not viewed 
with favor by President Johnson. According to one writer, Loomis was 
an Eisenhower Republican, and continued all during his work to hang 
Eisenhower's photograph on office walls, and in addition 
Loomis' farewell address to his colleagues in VOA 
had been read as an insinuation that White House pressure 
to make VOA newscasts conform to U. s. Senate Depart-
ment policies and interests had markedly increased under 
Johnson. Word of this farewell address, reported in one 
of the Washington newspapers, allegedly infuriated the 
President.35 
As a result of this pressure, the relationship between the 
President, Commissioner Keppel, and Loomis was somewhat strained: 
It came down to the question of whether the White 
House was going to permit the Commissioner of Education 
to have a deputy of his own choice. Although the Presi-
dent finally gave in, Loomis' relationship with the White 
House was cool from then on. Keppel's adamant defense of 
Loomis, whom he admired for his demonstrated adminis-
trative abilities, temporarily weakened Keppel's own 
rapport with the President.36 
In addition to the political problem over Loomis' initial 
Jl.i:Basically, the report recommended the division of the Office of 
Education into four bureaus, each dealing with a level of education. 
Those sections were: the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation; the Bureau of Higher Education; the Bureau of Adult and Vo-
cational Education; and the Bureau of Research. The report stressed 
research more, as seen by the creation of the Research Bureau. For 
personal experiences of the first operations under this new program, 
see the testimonies of Dr. Arthur Harris and Peter P. Muirhead, who 
headed the Bureaus of Elementary-Secondary and Higher Education, 
respectively, in Oral Histories File, Johnson Papers 9 Johnson Library. 
35Bailey and Mosher, p. 77. 
J6Ibid. 
appointment, was the added problem that he replaced Wayne Reed, a 
career civ~l servant, as Deputy Commissioner. Reed was appointed 
Associate Commissioner for Federal Relations and did not object too 
forcefully to the change. 37 But others did. "Empathy for Reed was 
reinforced b~· fear. If Reed would be pushed aside, who could be 
· 38 
next?" 
214 
There ~ere a number of other personnel changes within the Office 
\ 
of Education! and the Department of Heal th, Education, and Welfare 
during 1965. In July, Anthony J. Celebrezze was replaced by John Wm 
Gardner as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. 39 In Septem-
ber, Francis Keppel shifted his position within HEW from Commissioner 
of Education to Assistant Secretary of HEW. Harold Howe, II replaced 
Keppel as Commissioner of Education. 40 
Another result of the changes within the administrative area in 
regard to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which had politi-
cal implications was the forming of a committee in 1965 by Francis 
Keppel to study the possibility of a national assessment program. 
Called the Tyler Committee project, it immediately ran into heavy oppo-
41 
siti.on from educators. The Committee's main study was concentrated 
37For Reed's view of the change, see Wayne Reed Folder, Oral 
Histories Fi.le, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
38Bailey and Mosher, p. 78. 
39see Chapter III, pp. 70-71. 
4°Further implications of this change will be discussed in 
relation to the politics of racial desegregation later on. 
41Th.e project was headed by Ralph W. Tyler. A description of 
their work is located in Phi Delta Kappan (September, 1965), pp. 8-18, 
and (April, 1967), pp. J78-8o. 
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on looking at the feasibility of using standard assessment tests 
across the nation. The report was heavily attacked at the White House 
Conference on Education, called in July, 1965.42 The main argument 
used against the Committee was that such a national testing program 
would lead to federal control of the school curriculum. 
The White House Conference on Education was originally called to 
"tap the educational leadership" of the country on current issues in 
education. But the conference on many occasions turned into, in 
John Gardner's words, "nibbling" at great issues which required "bar-
racuda bites.n43 
What did come out of the conference was affirmation 
of the need both to speed up and to expand the national 
effort to bring about innovation and end discrimination 
in education. Among the themes running strongly through 
conference discussion were emphases on pre-school edu-
cation, federal-state coo~eration in curriculum inno-
vation and modernization. 4 
To illustrate political feedback, as a result of the Conference's 
attack on the Tyler Committee, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee 
exacted a promise from Keppel that no funds for fiscal year 1966 would 
be spent for any national testing .program until further study was 
45 
completed. 
42see U. s. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 11 Con-
sultants1 Papers Prepared for use at the White House Conference on 
Education, July 20-21, 1965," Executive Files, Johnson Papers, 
Johnson Library. 
43Quoted in Education Digest (September, 1965), p. 55. 
Li4Ibid. 
45Bailey and Mosher, p. 179. 
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Another related development in regard to implementing the Act was 
the involvement of the Office of Education in school desegregation. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had prohibited racial dis-
crimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance. In 
addition, the responsibility for ending this discrimination was also 
,, 
given: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered 
to extend federal financial assistance to any program or 
activity ••• is authorized and directed to effectuate 
the provisions of this section ••• by issuing LfG1les, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability. 
Thus, the Office of Education was responsible for making sure 
that segregation in schools did not occur, and if it did, to cut off 
federal funds. An incident which illustrates the political im-
plications of this section occurred in the Chicago school system in-
valving the Office of Education. In the summer of 1965, a Chicago 
civil rights group, The Chicago Coordinating Council of Community 
Organizations, took to the Office of Education a plea to cut off funds 
to Chicago schools because of alleged segregation. As a result, 
, 
Commissioner Keppel sent an investigator to Chicago to study the situ-
ation. In September, as a result of the investigation, Keppel wrote 
Superintendent of Schools, Benjamin Willis, that thirty million dollars 
in federal funds were being deferred until compliance with Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act was completed: 
Keppel's letter was delivered on Friday, October 1. 
On the foll.owing Monday, Mayor Richard Daley, a power in 
national. Democratic politics and a long time defender of 
Federal aid to education, was in New York on the occasion 
46PL88-J52, Title VI, Section 601, pp. 2-J. 
of the Papal visit to the United Nations. So was President 
Johnson. A discussion ensued in which the Mayor set forth 
his strong feelings on the fund delay. The next day, 
Keppel and top HEW officials were summoned to the White 
House, and after a meeting with the President, Under 
Secretary Wilbur Cohen flew to Chicago to work out an 
agreement that freed the ESEA funds. 47 
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Commissioner Howe, who later replaced Keppel, was also attacked 
for his attempts to force compliance with Title VI. All of this had 
policital implications in Congress later when the issue of racial 
segregation was brought up in connection with the discussion of the 
amendments to the Elementary-Secondary Act in 1966 and 1967. 
The Civil Rights Act also assigned another activity to the Office 
of Education. Section 4:02 of Title VI read: 
The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a 
report to the President and the Congress, within two years 
of the enactment of this Title, concerning the lack of 
availability of equal educational opportunities for indi-
viduals by reason of race, color, religion, or national 
origin in public educational institutions at all levels 
in the United States, its territories and possessions, 
and in the District of Columbiao 
The investigation was conducted under the direction of Professor 
James Coleman of John Hopkins University. A nationwide survey was 
conducted involving 64:5,000 students, 60,000 teachers, and 4:,000 
schools. Among the most significant findings of the Coleman report 
were the following: 
1. Segregation. The great majority of American students 
throughout the nation attend schools where almost all 
of their fellow students are of the same racial back-
ground. 
47PL88-3.52, Title VI, Section 601, p. 152. For Keppel's view of 
this incident, see Keppel Folder, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library, 
pp. 19-28. 
218 
2. School facilities and curriculum. Minority group students 
on the whole have larger classes; less access to labora-
tories; fewer books in school libraries and fewer text-
books available; less access to college preparatory or 
accelerated curricula, and fewer extracurricular activities. 
J. Teachers. Teachers of Negro students are more apt to have 
spent all their lives in a single community than are those 
of white students. In terms of types of colleges attended, 
scoring on a vocatulary test, educational background of 
mother, professional experience, and salary, teachers of 
Negro students are consistently of lower quality than 
those of white students. 
4. Achievement. Achievement tests, administered as part of 
the survey in grades 1, J, 6, 9, and 12, revealed that, 
with the exception of Oriental-Americans, minority group 
students scored lower at every level than the majority 
group and the gap increased with the number of years of 
schooi.48 
One of the most controversial of Coleman's findings was that he 
said in comparison with family background and socio-economic factors, 
"school factors" accounted for only a small fraction of the differences 
in student achievement: 
Thus, if a white pupil from a home that is strongly 
and effectively supportive of education is put in a school 
where most pupils do not come from such homes, his achieve-
ment will be little different than if he were in a school 
composed of others like himself. But if a minority pupil 
from a home without much educational strength is put with 
schoolmates with Jtrong educationa4 backgrounds, his 
achievement is likely to increase. 9 
The Coleman report had a tremendous impact upon American edu-
cation both educationally and politically. Since its publication, it 
48 James So Coleman, et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity 
(Washington, 1966), pp. 1-23 9 and summarized in Bailey and Mosher, 
p. 158. 
49c 1 22 o eman, p. • 
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has been the subject of numerous attacks. 50 Although the purpose of 
this work is not to examine the validity of the Coleman report, nor to 
weigh its findings, it did have implications for the Elementary and 
Secondary Act. It raised serious questions regarding low-achievers in 
our society and programs like the Elementary-Sec.ondary Act which were 
aimed at remedying the plight of under-privileged school children. 
More pressurewasbrought on Congress and the Office of Education 
following the publication of the Coleman report to re-evaluate the 
concept that mass infusion of federal money would solve the problems of 
the undereducated, poverty student. As a result, educational research, 
program evaluation, and more money for experimentation was pushed in 
Congress. Also, the requirement Keppel had promised in regard to 
national assessment for 1966 was removed in 1967.51 
In summary, as a result of the experiences of the Office of 
Education in trying to implement the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, Congress, as well as the President, was in a much better position 
to evaluate the program in 1966,. 1967, and 1968, than they were in 
1965. They could now base their arguments, or suggestions, upon per-
formance and impact, rather than suggested possibilities. 
5°For a sampling, see Charles S. Benson, "Coleman Report~ Why 
the Schools Flunk Out, 11 The Nation, CCIV (April 10, 1967), pp. 463-
466; Christopher Jen~ks,""rijj;ducation: The Racial Gap, 11 The New Re-
public,J..., CLY (October 1, 1966), pp. 21-26,;, and· Joseph Alsop,""li'No---;ore 
Nonsense About Ghetto Education I" The ~ Republic, CLVII (July 22, 
1967), PPo 18-2J. I 
51 See this chapter, pp. 216-217. 
President Johnson and Federal Aid 
(1966-69) 
The story of the politics of federal aid to education between 
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1966 and 1969 is not as dramatic as the episode in 1965, but that does 
not mean it is no less important. Obviously education would not again 
receive the national attention that it had in 196~-65. The launch 
was completed, the problem now turned to one of making adjustments to 
the program which appeared necessary. And 1 just as in the moon rocket 
journey, determining which phase of the trip was most important was a 
difficult, if not impossible, judgement0 Therefore, the relationship 
between President Johnson and Congress between 1966 and 1969 becomes 
more important if we view it as a period in which vital adjustments 
were being made to an ongoing program, which, without proper adjust-
ments, could fail and destroy all the dramatic efforts made in 1965. 
The coalition that formed in 1965 between the executive branch, 
interest groups, and congressional leaders 1 in order to pass the school 
aid bill was indeed a once in a lifetime situation. Leading that 
coalition was of course President Johnson. Without the President's 
expert planning no doubt the 1965 aid bill would not have passed Con-
gress as it did. However, it must also be admitted, without taking 
anything away from President Johnson, that environmental changes prior 
to 1965 played an important role in creating a situation which the 
President could exploit. 
1966 promised to be a different year however, as the central 
point concerning federal aid in 1966 was whether the President could 
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hold together the coalition that was formed in 1965. 
For example, the escalation of the Vietnam war was an important 
factor in changing the mood of Congress between 1965 and 1966. In 
January, 1965, there were less than 25,000 troops stationed in South 
Vietnam; but by the opening of the second session of the Eighty-Ninth 
52 Congress in 1966, there were close to 200,000o With inflation on 
the move, President Johnson was going to face a difficult problem in 
reconciling two types of spending programs. The question was one of 
whether the President could convince Congress to maintain both his 
Great Society program and his Vietnam policy without a tax increase. 
Such a problem certainly cut down on the manueverability of the Presi-
dent with Congress. 
And too, the rising number of violent race riots in the slum-
plagued cities across the nation changed the nature of the civil 
rights movement. Because of such violence, the cause of civil rights 
declined in popularity, and reopened old wounds on Capitol Hill. 
Proponents of federal aid found the going rough in keeping the com-
promises reached in 1965 maintained in 1966. Desegregation of the 
schools was bound to come up in connection with federal aid in 1966, 
and the outlook for a peaceful settlement looked glum. 
Also, as the President had forecasted earlier, the President's 
popularity with the American people was on the decline. 5·3 For example, 
,Johnson I s popularity was approximately seventy per cent when the 
school bill passed in 1965, but by 1966 it had dropped to below the 
52Eidenberg and Morey, p. 179. 
5JFor the President's early forecast concerning his popularity 
decline, see Chapter V, p. 190 e 
54.. fifty per cent mark. 
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Compounding the President's problems was the fact that 1966 was 
an election year, an off-year election which would certainly affect the 
House of Representatives. The attitude of the House toward any pro-
gram proposed by the President was summed up by Adam Clayton Powell: 
"The President is not running for re-election this year--we are. 1155 
The large Democratic majority the President had enjoyed in 1965 was 
bound to dwindle in 1966. Congressmen facing re-election were going 
to be more interested in their chances of returning than in supporting 
the President. 
Therefore, Congress was in a different mood in 1966 than in 1965. 
Because of environmental changes, the relationship between the Presi-
dent and Congress was certainly more strained. 
In addition, the implementation of any ·act of Congress was going 
to create some problems, but another key to the President's program in 
1966 was how many problems, and how much opposition, had been created 
as a result of the Elementary and Secondary Act's first year of aper-
ation. 
And too, the success of any federal aid proposal would, to a 
great extent, depend upon how well it could be kept separate from 
other controversial issues. The larger national issues which were 
discussed in relation to the President's proposal in 1965, were, in the 
54For the President's early forecast concerning his popularity 
decline, see Chapter V, p. 190s 
S5The New York Times (March J, 1966), p. 21. 
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main, 56 only solved for the moment. Most of these issues arose again 
in 1966, some more intense than others, and some in different contexts. 
In addition, a new issue appeared in 1966, an issue which replaced 
religion in its intensity and as a cause of conflict between pro-
ponents of federal aid. That issue was the increasing military build-
up in South Vietnam. 
Vietnam. Ironically, the history of federal aid reveals that, 
when connected with war, education has in most cases benefitted. 57 
President Johnson had even connected his education program with the 
"war on poverty." In the case of Vietnam however, President ,Johnson 
was faced with a problem of meeting rising military expenditures which 
threatened to endanger his Great Society program, of which education 
was a vital part. Thus 1 in this case, war threatened to cut down on 
federal aid to education--a complete switch of events. 
President Johnson did not dodge the issue of Vietnam, but instead, 
met it head on in his State of the Union Message in January, 1966. 
On the question of continuing both his domestic program and military 
policy, the President said: 11 I believe that we can continue the Great 
Society while we fight in Vietnam, 11 and, the President continued: 11 If 
the necessities of Vietnam require it, I will not hesitate to return to 
Congress for additional appropriations or additional revenues if they 
58 
are needed." It was obvious that the President was going to try to 
56see Chapter V., p. 159. 
57see Chapter II, p. 28. 
58 Johnson, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union," January 12, 1966, Public Papers, pp. 4-5. 
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continue both his foreign and domestic policies. 
The State of the Union Message did not contain any specifics in 
regard to education, so there was not too much reaction to the Presi-
dent's speech. Congress was apparently waiting until the President 
gave some details to see whether any cut in funds for education would 
be proposed. The details in regard to education came in the Presi-
dent's special message on health and education on March 1. In this 
message the President proposed the following: (1) extension of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act for an additional four years; 
(2) repeal and reduction of several provisions in impacted area legis-
lat.ion (this would eliminate aid to 1,200 of the 4,100 districts, 
and reduce funds from 466 million dollars in fiscal year 1966 to 206 
million dollars in 1967); (3) repeal of the incentive grant provision 
of Title I (this provision originally provided that if a school dis-
trict increased its expenditures it would receive an additional 
grant); (4) increase the coverage of the Act in 1968 by raising the 
income level for allocating aid to the poverty family to 3,000 dollars 
from the old figure of 2,000 dollars (the figure would remain at 2,000 
for 1967); (5) grant an additional five million dollars to districts 
to deal with~ facto segregation and planning school construction; 
(6) earmark additional money for children of American Indians And 
migrant workers.59 
The total allocation under the President's proposal, submitted in 
59Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on Domestic Health 
and Education," March 1, 1966, Public Papers, pp. 243-45. 
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60 his Budget Message, was 1.3 billion dollars. This was a slight in-
crease over his 1965 request of' 1.2 billion dollars. The President 
commented on the reason £or this small increase: 11 Even a prosperous 
nation cannot meet all its goals at once. For this reason, the rate of' 
advance in the new programs has been held below what might have been 
proposed in less troubled times. n61 The budget reflected 
modest increases under each title of' the 1965 bill £or the fiscal year 
of' 1967. Breakdown of' the President's request looked like this: 
(1) requested fonds for Title I totalled 1.07 billion dollars (959 
million was appropriated £or 1966); (2) requested funds for Title II 
totalled 105 million dollars (100 million dollars appropriated £or 
1966); (3) 145 million dollars requested £or Title III (100 million 
appropriated £or 1966); (4) 80 million dollars requested £or Title IV 
for 1967 (70 million appropriated £or 1966); (5) Title V requests 
totalled 22 million dollars (17 million appropriated £or 1966). 62 
Response to the President's proposal was immediate, and resulted 
mainly from differences of' opinion over the Vietnam issue. Represen-
tative Hugh L. Carey (Republican, New York) stated: 11 We are being 
forced to make a choice between books and bullets. 1163 Senator Morse 1 
who reluctantly introduced the Administration's bill in the Senate 
Subcommittee, made it clear that he was not impressed with the 
60 Johnson, "Annual Budget-Message to the Congress," January 24 1 
1966, Public Papers, pp. 47-68. 
61 Ibid. 1 p. 47. 
62Ibid., pp. 47-68. 
63Quoted in Education, USA (March 17, 1966), p. 1. 
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President's proposal: 11 The President can let down the school children 
of America; but the senior Senator from Oregon will not. 1164 
The actions of Senator Morse in regard to the education proposal 
in 1966 demonstrated the problem that Vietnam caused for the Presi-
dent's program. In 1965, Senator Morse had steered the Adminis-
tration's proposal through the Senate without any al!lendments. He hadj 
in order to accomplish this goal, avoided any mention of any conflicts 
65 
of opinion with President Johnson and supported the bill totally. 
However, in 1966 Morse completely reversed his position in regard to 
cooperating with the President. He deliberately pointed out his 
disagreement with President Johnson over Vietnam and continuously tried 
66 
to amend the education proposal in the Senate. As a result 1 the 1966 
Senate version of the Administration's bill contained more changes than 
the House ve:rsion--an incongruous turn of events which was unprece-
dented in the post-World War II history of federal aid. 
To further illustrate the change in congressional atmosphere in 
1966, it was not Senator Morse who represented the Administration's 
proposal on the floor of the Senate, but instead it was minority 
leader Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen (Republican, Illinois). This 
~as evident when, during the debates in the Senate over provisions 
which would exceed the President's proposal in total allocation, 
64congressional Record (March 2, 1966), p. 4727. 
65 See Chapter V, p. 195. 
66At one point Senator Morse filled more than sixty pages in the 
Congressional Record with evidence of the need for increased spending 
for Education. Congressional Record (October 5, 1966), pp. 25243-
25291. 
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Senator Dirksen introduced several amendments which would reduce the 
Senate version of the bill down to the President's request. In 
response to one Dirksen amendment, Senator Morse stated: 
In essence, the amendment from the senator from 
Illinois seeks to substitute the President's budget 
figures for the figures recommended to the Senate by the 
committee. Therefore, let us face it, it is a question 
as to whether or not the Senate, this afternoon, is 
going to substitute the President of the United States 
for the Senate, by rubber-stamping the President and 
make him the legislative body also. 67 
The situation was quite a reversal, as one writer put it: 11 We have 
the peculiar spectacle of a Democratic bill manager accusing a 
Republican leader of rubber-stamping a proposal made by a Democratic 
President! 1168 
The main attack in connection with Vietnam upon the President 
was aimed at the fact that he had recommended a cut in impacted funds 
which had traditionally been one of Congress's most popular programs. 
Certainly the President expected strong reaction from Congress •. He 
must have also expected strong reaction from educators. Instead he 
had made a calculated move, as summarized by one authority on federal 
aid: 
••• the President's proposal was a calculated 
scheme to put Congress over a barrel. The President 
wanted a larger budget than the one he submittedj but 
he did not want to be saddled with the unpopular task 
of requesting a tax increase to support it. There-
fore, he cut those items which he thought Congress was 
most likely to restore. Hence, if tl;:le.--Pe•storations 
67c . 1 R d (0 t .b 6 1966) 1 1- 1-57 ongress1ona ecor co er , , p. '*'* • 
68E· b M 2 1den erg and orey, p. 00. 
were made, the President coulg blame Congress for 
necessitating a tax increase. 9 
As further evidence of this strategy, when President Johnson signed 
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the G.I. Bill of 1966, which the Administration had opposed, the Wall 
Street Journal noted that "he took the setback with unusual joviality 
70 for a man with a reputation for getting his own way from Congress. 0 
This strategy paid off, as w±ll be seen, in that Congress did eventu-
ally fund more than the President requested. Thus, one major issue 
facing the President in regard to federal aid was surmounted for the 
moment. 
However, the President's proposal was such a mixed bag, that 
almost every section stirred up some type of opposition. For example, 
the least controversial of the President's requests was the four-year 
authorization request. But even more, Congress did not like the idea 
of authorizing any program that long, and cut the authorization back 
to two years. Also, the old issues facing federal aid discussed in 
relation to the 1965 bill were raised again. 
Race. Next to the Vietnam issue, the racial problem created some 
of the biggest headaches for President Johnson's education proposal. 
In 1965i the racial issue was a very minor one in relation to other 
problems. The Johnson strategy of playing down this potentially 
69Eidenberg and Morey, p. 188. 
70Quoted in Education Digest (April, 1966), p. 5~. Also of 
significance is the fact that as a result of the cuts, Alabama, the 
home state of th~ Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 
Senator Lister Hill, stood to lose six of its seven million dollars 
in impacted aid funds for 1967. 
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explosive issue worked successfully. 71 However, 1966 was a different 
story as debates over racial integration occupied a great deal of 
time, especially in the House of Representatives. 
The issue actually began to become a problem shortly after the 
Elementary and Secondary Act was passed. The reason for the problem 
was that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited the distribution 
of federal funds where racial segregation was practiced. As a result, 
the Office of Education had to write up guidelines which determined 
what constituted segregation. The Chicago incident with Mayor Daley 
illustrates some of the problems that this type of activity created 
for federal aid. 72 And too, racial disturbances in the cities in 1965 
and 1966 created uneasiness in regard to racial integration. The 
change in the mood of the country was reflected in a Gallup poll which 
reported in 1966 that 58 per cent of the adult white population be-
lieved that the Administration was pushing integration too fasto 73 
Thus, a potentially explosive atmosphere existed9 and evidence is 
abundant that the Johnson Administration was very concerned that race 
and federal aid would be linked together in 1966 and defeat the school 
proposal. 74 
Despite the Administration's concern over keeping the lid on the 
71 8 , ee Chapter V, p. 171. 
72s ee this chapter, pp. 216-217. 
'?JEducation Digest (November, 1966), p. 56. 
74 For an example of newspaper accounts. o.f, this. concern, see 
"Johnson Concedes Errors on Rights," The New York Times (October 71 
1966), p. 25. Also, the ce~munications betwe~resident Johnson and 
his staff in 1966 reflect this concern. See Executive-Legislative 
File 1 1966, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. 
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racial issue, it did erupt in the House of Representatives. The pro-
blem first arose during the first day of floor debate when Represen-
tative Horace Kornegay (Democrat, North Carolina) asked Perkins, the 
floor leader: 11 Is there any provision in the bill, as we have it here 
now, that would authorize funds which can be used for the purpose of 
busing school children from one schoolito another? 1175 Despite the 
fact that Perkins assured Kornegay that funds could not be used to 
force racial balance by busing school children, the issue was not dead. 
The next day, Representative Paul Fine (Republican, New York) launched 
an attack on Commissioner Howe for his activities in enforcing in-
tegration, and called him, among other things, a "sociological 
76 quack." 
In an effort to quiet the issue, Representative ,James O'Hara 
(Democrat, Michigan) introduced an amendment which would prohibit any 
department, agency, officer, or employee of the federal government from 
requiring "the assignment or transportation of students or teachers 
in order to overcome racial imbalance. 1177 The amendment was quickly 
adopted, but the controversy was not over. 
Following the adoption of the busing amendment, 0 1 Hara offered 
a second amendment to the bill which would eliminate the provision 
that gave special consideration to school districts trying to elimi-
nate racial imbalance. As in the first amendment, O'Hara was trying 
to protect the bill, as evident in his statement when the amendment 
75 Congressional Record (October 5, 1966), p. 24334. 
76Quoted in The New York Times (October 7, 1966), pp. 1, 25. 
77 Congressional Record (October 6, 1966), p. 25549. 
was introduced: 
Mr. Chairman, there has been a good deal of 'flap' 
over this, which I believe to be entirely unwarranted 
because if a school district has a serious problem of 
racial imbalance within its schools which it wants to 
correct because it believes doing it would improve its 
educational system, I think it might be entitled to a 
little special consideration, but since an effort has 
been made to take this simple provision and turn it 78 
intq some sort of ogre I am offering to take it out. 
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The second amendment by O•Hara was adopted, but as in the first, 
the issue was still not solved. 
The next amendment concerning the racial issue was introduced by 
Representative H. L. Fountain (Democrat, North Carolina) which would 
prohibit the Commissioner of Education from withholding funds for 
alleged practices of segregation without a hearing and an "expressed 
finding on record" of noncompliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 79 Despite efforts to block the amendment by the Adminis-
tration, it was adopted by a vote of 221 to 116. 80 This amendment 
later caused problems in a conference between the House and Senate 
81 because the Senate did not adopt this proposal. 
The hottest issue in connection with race was the problem over 
the Office of Education's guidelines in connection with what consti-
tuted racial segregation. 82 In the Northern sections of the United 
States, a great deal of segregation in the schools was a result of 
78congressional Record (October 6, 1966), p. 24543. 
79 Ibid., p. 25573. 
80Ibid., p. 25586. 
81 See this chapter, p. 241. 
82see this chapter, pp. 216-217. 
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housing patterns. The Office of Education guidelines were affecting 
these residential districts, as well as those in other areas of the 
country where segregation existed because of economic conditions. In 
' the Senate, these guidelines were the focal point of attack. For 
example, the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) 
stated publicly that he thought that the Department of Healthj Edu-
cation, and Welfare (of which the Office of Education is a part) was 
going 11 too fast" with its school desegregation guidelines. 83 In 
addition, the Senate Appropriations Committee's report in regard to the 
guidelines stated: 
The Committee believes that the revised education guidelines 
contravene and violate the leg.i slati ve intent of Congress 
in enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 •••• It has 
never been intended by this Committee that funds appropri-
ated by it be used by the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare to go -about the country harassing people who 
have shown every indication of abiding b4 the letter and 
intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 
Following the report of the Appropriations Committee, Senator 
Mansfield once again commented~ 
The policy of the Civil Rights Act was to declare se-
gregation by public officials unlawful. It was designed to 
prevent an unlawful act of segregatioD--not to implement 
an affirmative policy of integration.tl5 
The individual who was the center of most of the attacks, was the 
Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe II. As one writer put it: 
11 He has replaced Robert Kennedy as the Yankee most hated in the South," 
and that "He has acquired a new and unofficial title. He is·the U. S. 
83Quoted in Education Digest (November, 1966), p. 56. 
84Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
85Ibid., p. 58. 
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Commissioner of Integration. 1186 Commissioner Howe did not talce the 
criticism idly, as is here indicated in this excerpt from a speech at 
Hampton Institute in Virginia: 
I am urging you to ••• quiet down. I am urging on 
you the painful recognition that the Negro will win full 
citizenship in the same way that other American minorities 
have won it; not by blasting through closed doors in a 
few explosive moments, but by shoving those doors back 
inch by inch until the rust on our social hinges gives 
way. 87 
At any rate, as a result of the issue, Congress reduced the ap-
propriations for enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 
Those funds had been contained in thirty-eight separate accounts 
throughout the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, with a 
total funding level of 4.J million dollars. Congress cut the appro-
priations down to J.4 million dollars, eliminating seventy positions 
88 
within the Department in the process. 
In summary, the bill regarding school aid did pass in 1966, but 
not without a great deal of debate and bargaining over the issue of 
race; and it was also clear that, as in the case of 1965, racial pro-
blems were not solved by the 1966 amendments. Solved only for the 
moment, the debate over federal aid and racial segregation would 
probably reappear whenever Congress took up either problem. 
The Religious Problem. During the Senate and House hearings in 
1966, school administrators were questioned extensively over the 
86 James J. Kilpatrick. Quoted in Education Digest (November, 
1966), p. 57. 
87 Ibid. 
88 rbid. (December, 1966), P• 59. 
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relationship between private and parochial schools in regard to co-
operation in the use of federal funds. 89 Congress was still concerned 
over the relationship of church and state and wanted to see how the 
compromise reached in 1965 was working out. Most of the school of-
ficials indicated that there were no major problems with competition 
over the funds, and the discussion on this level was dropped. 
In addition, there were some die-hard interest groups still 
opposed to the separation of church and state regarding the formula 
reached in 1965, and testified again in opposition to the compromise. 90 
However, Congress was apparently more interested in waiting to see if 
the courts were going to uphold the constitutionality of the solution 
before committing themselves again, so the issue was dropped, at 
least for the time being. 
The issue of the separation of church and state was not dead. It 
did arise briefly in connection with Senate debates over the education 
amendments, but this time it was in connection with school prayer. 
This issue began in 1962 when the Supreme Court prohibited the state of 
New York from writing out or prescribing a prayer for recitation in the 
89see statements of Edgar Fuller, executive secretary, Council of 
Chief State School Officers; Harry Sparks, superintendent of public 
instruction, Kentucky; Floyd T. Christian, superintendent of public 
instruction, Florida; Ray Page, superintendent of public instruction, 
Illinois; and Paul F. Johnston, superintendent of public instruction, 
Iowa, in House, Hearings, pp~ 411-476. 
90see statements of Dr. Leo Pfeffer, special counsel, American 
Jewish Congress, and· Mrs. Bernard Koteen, member of national board, 
National Council of Jewish Women, in U. s. Congress, Senate, Sub-
committee on Education, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
Hearings on Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966 
(89th Cong":", 2nd Sess.,~66) (Washington, 1966), p. 1419 and~l42J. 
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public schools. 91 Following this decision, numerous amendments were 
offered in the Senate to legalize school prayer. 92 The leader of this 
effort was Senator Dirksen. Several times after 1962, he had offered 
in the Senate a proposed constitutional amendment regarding school 
prayer. In 1966, just prior to the beginning of floor debates on the 
education amendments, the prayer debate started again. This contra-
versy was connected with the education proposal when Senator Vance 
Hartke (Democrat, Indiana) introduced an amendment to the Senate 1 s 
version of the bill which called for the local school districts, if 
they wished to provide time for "prayerful meditation," providing that 
no public official recite the prayer. 93 The Hartke amendment was 
short-lived, as it was quickly tabled, but it did serve to re-open the 
debate on religion. 
The question was raised again late in the session when Senator 
Dirksen announced his intention to amend a United Nations Children's 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) resolution commending that organization. The 
Dirksen Amendment called for a Constitutional amendment to authorize 
voluntary prayers in public school classrooms. 94 The chief opponent to 
the amendment was Senator Birch Bayh (Democrat, Indiana). Bayh 
91Engel vs. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Located in Wallace 
Mendelson, .Th;-Consti tut ion and the Supreme Court (New York, 1968), 
pp. 580-85. 
92Eidenberg and Morey, p. 200: 11 Between June, 1962, and October, 
1966, there were almost two hundred resolutions1 introduced in Congress 
aimed at reversing this decision. 11 
93congressional Record (October 5, 1966), p. 25485. 
94Ibid. (September 19, 1966), p. 2306.3. 
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countered the Dirksen amendment with a bill encouraging school of-
ficials to permit periods of voluntary silent prayer but not requiring 
th . t" 95 is prac ice. At any rate, the Senate debated the issue for three 
days, and at times it became quite emotional. At one point, Senator 
Dirksen stated: "They teach the little children sex in the schools 
• they teach them about Communism. They even teach them ballet. 
Why not God Almighty? 1196 Eventually the debate ended as the Bayh 
amendment was defeated by a 52-33 vote, and tµe Dirksen amendment 
fell by a 48-37 vote.97 
The prayer debate serves to illustrate the ever present sensi-
tivity of the religious issue in connection with federal aid. And, 
the controversy was not ended, as indicated by Senator Dirksen fol-
lowing the defeat of his proposal: 11 The crusade will continue, and 
next time we will be better organized throughout the country.11 98 Also, 
the predicament that this debate placed upon a number of congressmen 
was reflected by Senator Bayh: 11 It 1 s pretty hard to vote against 
school prayer in an election year.11 99 Therefore, the next Congress 
would probably go through the debate all over again. 
95congressional Record (September 20, 1966), p. 23101. 
96Ibid., p. 23553. 
97rbid., pp. 23547, 23554. Even though the Dirksen amendment won 
a majority, it did not go into e.ff.ect, since a proposed constitutional 
amendment required a two-thirds vote. 
98Quoted in Education Digest (November, 1966), p. 59. 
99Quoted in Ibid. 
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States' Rights--Fear of Federal Control. In 1966, the federal 
control was not as hotly debated as in 1965. One of the reasons for 
this was that during the committee hearings in 1966, public school ad-
ministrators were thoroughly questioned concerning federal control, 
and the majority responded that they had not suffered any undue pressure 
f W h . t 100 rom as 1ng on. 
However, the federal control controversy was not settled. It 
simply was raised in a different context. For example, during the 
hearings on the amendments in 1966, quite a bit of opposition was re-
vealed in regard to the length of the application forms required to 
be completed before a school district could receive Title I funds. 
Senator Ralph Yarborough (Democrat, Texas) voiced the feeling this 
way: 
••• we (the Congress) have had complaints from school 
superintendents that claim that the forms that they are 
required to fill out under Title I are the longest and most 
difficult they have ever seen ••• from all I hear this 
seems to be a pretty serious question with a lot of dis-
tricts. They say they bog down in red tape. 101 
CommissionerHoweII replied to the criticism: 11 We have tried to 
simplify the forms, and the package of forms, if you want to call it 
102 
·that, has been considerably slimmed as we have worked on this. 
However, the increase in bureaucratic paper work appeared to some 
apparently as an increase in federal control. 
100 
House~ Hearings 9 1965, pp. 411-476. 
101 Senate, Hearings, 1965, p. 738. 
102rbid., also in connection with federal control, the Bailey BSSR 
survey asked the question of whether the complexity of the Title I 
application form had presented difficulties, and over 55.3 per cent of 
the nation's school districts replied that it hadQ 
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Also in connection with the development of guidelines for applying 
for federal funds, the Office of Education came under attack for its 
insensitivity to local control feelings. For example on one occasion 
the guideline stated: 
Without these criteria (for ranking) the State edu-
cational agency has no basis to judge whether the local 
educational agency is fulfilling its obligation and there-
fore, the State educational agency cannot approve the 
project applications without violating its assurance to 
the U.S. Commissioner of Education.103 
Such wording was not very conducive to quieting federal control fears, 
and resulted in part in a resolution from the Council of Chief State 
School Officers directed to the U.S. Office of Education which called 
for a curtailment of federal activity to only those activities required 
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 104 
Thus it can, be seen that federal control, like the issues of race 
and religion, was still present in 1966, creating an additional pro-
blem for the Johnson Administration to handle in order to promote 
federal aid. 
Rural-Urban Quarrel. The differences in outlook between the 
large, wealthy school districts, and the smaller, poorer school dis-
tricts were dramatically revealed in the House debates over the 1966 
school bill. For example, the large city congressmen from wealthy 
districts opposed the provision which called for the repeal of incen-
tive grants authorized under Title I. 105 The leader of this group was 
10
·
3Quoted in Bailey and Mosher, p. 111. 
104Resolution VII, adopted at the Annual Business Meeting of the 
Council of Chief State School Officers, Honolulu, Hawaii (November 12, 
1965) ~ Quoted in Ibid., p. 112. 
l05See this chapter, p. 223. 
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Representative Hugh L. Carey, who originally authored the provision in 
1965. Because of their ability to rapidly expand in expenditures, the 
wealthier states and districts stood to gain the most from this pro-
vision. 
The large city schools were also opposed to the allocation formula 
in the bill. Under the 1965 act, children from families receiving Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) were included in the allo-
cation formula based on 1962 dataw Carey and the big city group 
wanted more recent figures used. This would obviously benefit the 
cities with increasing populations. 
At the subcommittee stage, the large city forces were unsuccessful 
in their attempt to restore the incentive grant provision, but they 
were successful in attaching the Carey amendment requiring the use of 
updated data to the bill. 106 
The rural forces were led by Carl Perkins and Representative 
Albert Quie (Republican, Minnesota). At the full committee state they 
sparked the rural-urban split again by successfully proposing an amend-
ment which also altered the allocation formula. Under the 1965 act, 
the funds under Title I were allocated on a basis of taking one-half 
of the average expenditure per pupil in the state multiJ?lied times the 
number of school children from families with incomes less than 2 7000 
dollars. 107 The Quie-Perkins proposal amended the allocation formula 
so that the figure would be based upon one-half of the average ex-
penditure per pupil in the state, or in the nation~ whichever was the 
106:Eidenberg and Morey, p. 192@ 
l07S A · A 287 290 ee ppendix ., pp. - • 
greater. This would obviously benefit those states whose average 
108 
expenditure fell below the national average. 
Therefore, it can be seen from the problems arising over the 
rural-urban split, that the Johnson Administration was faced with 
another thorny problem to overcome in 1966. 
24o 
The Conference. The House and Senate versions of the 1966 edu-
cation bill, unlike the 1965 version, differed in both content and in 
cost. Therefore a conference between the two chambers was necessary. 
The most significant differences between the two bills were in Title I. 
The Senate had raised the low income eligibility figure from $2,000 
to $2,500 for fiscal year 1967, and then to $3,000 for fiscal year 
1968. The House version was identical with the President's original 
request of $2,000 for 1967, and $3,000 for 1968. This meant that the 
Senate version would cost more since more students would be eligible 
in 1967 for aid. The conference committee adopted the House version 
and left the income figure at $2,000 for 1967. 109 This was a signifi-
cant victory for the President. 
Other differences in the bill involved new additions to the 
coverage. The conference adopted two provisions of the Senate version 
which provided for: (1) allocating funds for new programs for handi-
capped children (2) and transferring basic education programs from the 
Office of Economic Opportunity to the Office of Education. 
108Eidenberg and Morey, p. 192. For example, Mississippi's ex-
penditure in 1966 was $273, and the national average was $500. Thus, 
the base figure for Mississippi would be raised from $273 to $500. 
109rbid., pp. 201-02. 
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Another basic difference in the two bills was in the total amount 
to be funded. The President had originally requested 1.2 billion 
dollars to fund his program. The Senate version authorized 2.7 
billion dollars, and the House authorized 2$1 billion dollars for the 
program. The conference committee finally fixed the figure at 2.4 
billion dollars for fiscal year 1967, a somewhat higher figure than the 
President had reques-ted. 
The conference involved the usual amount of give and take, but the 
biggest problem centered on the issue of race. The House had adopted 
an amendment prohil>i ting the Office of Education from withholding 
funds for alleged practices of discriminating without a hearing and an. 
"expressed finding" (Fountain Amendment). llO According to one source,, 
most conferees from both chambers were willing to abolish this amend-
ment completely; but, as one participant put it: "Our job was to 
decide what kind of compromise the House would buy. 11111 And the House 
of Representatives was in no mood for such an amendment to be deleted 
from the program. Finally, a new provision was substituted by Senator 
Jacob Javits (Republican, New York), which allowed the Commissioner of 
Education to defer funds for a ninety-day period, during which time a 
hearing was to be held: 
The conference bill was accepted by voice vote in 
the Senate. In the House it provoked some opposition on 
the floor~ mainly from Southerners, despite the fact that 
Representative Fountain sent word to the floor that he 
accepted the compromise language. The bill finally passed 
by vote of 185 to 76.112 
-------------··· ....... ,., ... . 
llOS th· h t 2JO 231 ee is cap er, pp. - • 
111Quoted in The New York Times (October 19 1966) 39 
-- -- -- --- ' ' p. • 
112E· b d M 202 iden. erg an orey, p. • 
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If a comparison is made with the final outcome in Congress and the 
President's original proposal, it can be seen that President Johnson 
did not fare too badly in 1966. To illustrate, let us look at how the 
President's requests fared in each category. First, the President 
requested a four-year authorization of the 1965 act--Congress cut this 
authorization down to two; second, the President requested a cut in 
impacted area aid--this Congress refused to do; third, the President 
requested repeal of the incentive grant provision of Title !--Congress 
repealed this provision; fourth, the President requested an increase in 
the income eligibility figure for 1968 to $3,000, and the figure to 
remain the same at $2,000 for fiscal year 1967--Congress adopted this 
proposal without change; fifth, the President requested additional 
money for school construction, and combatting de facto segregation--
Congress granted the money for planning school construction but cut 
some funds used for integration activities of the Office of Education; 
sixth, the President requested new funds for minority groups such as 
I 
the Ameri 1can Indians--Congress granted these funds; and finally, 
the President's total request was exceeded by Congress. 
Taking into account all of the problems that the Johnson Adminis-
tration faced in 1966, it is amazing that any type of federal as-
sistance to the schools was enacted. However, the Congress did enact 
a program, and this fact points out that Congress, as a result of the 
1965 victory for federal aid proponents, and continuing pressure to aid 
the schools by the President, was changing its concept of federal aid 
from one of debating the basic concept to one of arguing over the 
amount and means of allocation. This becomes especially evident in 
1967. 
The congressional atmosphere in regard to federal aid to education 
underwent a significant change between the years 1965 and 1966. The 
results of this change were pointed out in connection with the eventual 
changes made in the original version of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act during the second session of the Eighty-Ninth Congress. 
Just as the changes between 1965 and 1966 affected the Eighty ... Ninth 
Congress, changes between 1966 and 1967 presented a different context 
for federal aid in the first session of the Ninetieth Congress0 As 
one -writer has observed: 
A legislative enactment is seldom a clean decision of 
important issues. It is normally a verbal formula which 
the majority of congressmen find adequate as a basis for 
their continuing policy struggle. It sets up new ground 
rules within which the issues may be fought out. The 
ground rules will reflect the balance of forces, but the 
minority is seldom so weak on the major issue that it has 
to accept a once-and-for-all decision. The formula must 
usually offer them the chance of later reversal, keeping 
the big issue alive. 113 
The most significant change occurred in the House of Representa-
tives. As a result of the 1966 election, the Republican party gained 
some forty-seven seats. This expanded their number in the House from 
114 140 to 187 members. This significant gain enabled the Republicans 
to present a much stronger front against Democratic proposals, es-
pecially if they could align themselves with a few dissatisfied Demo-
crats. The potential of this coalition was demonstrated early in the 
113Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lewis A. Dexter, American 
Business and Public Policy (New York, 1963), pp. 426-27. 
114Eidenberg and Morey, p. 207. 
session when 69 Democrats joined 157 Republicans to repeal the twenty-
one day rule which had been incorporated into the House rules in 1965~15 
There were a number of other changes in the House which affected 
the "ground rulesll" pf the 1967 debate. Some of these were: ( 1) Repre-
sentative Howard W. 11 Judge 11 Smith (Democrat, Virginia) retired from 
Congress. For years Judge Smith had been a strong power to deal with 
as chairman of,the Rules Committee, and had been one of the reasons 
for the incorporation of the twenty-one day rule in 1965; 116 (2) at 
the beginning of the first session of the Ninetieth Congress, the 
status of Adam Clayton Powell was.uncertain because of his problems 
with the law, and before the session ended, the House had refused to 
seat the flamboyant Democrat. Thus, the chairmanship of the House 
Education an<l Labor Committee was vacated. During the 1966 session, 
the members of the House Education and Labor Committee, led by Repre-
sentative Sam Gibbons (Democrat, Florida), voted to strip Powell of 
most of his powers as chairman. The move had been made so that most 
of the power would go to the Subcommittee Chairman, Representative 
Carl Perkins, a staunch supporter of federal aid. In 1967, when 
Perkins succeeded to Powell's position as Chairman of the larger 
committee, the rules were not changed. 117 This left Perkins with very 
little room to work, and resulted in a setback for supporters of 
federal aid because an old nemesis of the Johnson Administration gained 
in strength: 
115congressional Record (February 28, 1967), P~ 4774. 
116 See Chapter V. , p. 187. 
117 Ibid. 
The de facto chairman of the Committee, as soon became 
apparent, was Rep. Edith Green (D. Oregon). By voting with 
the Republican minority on the Committee, accompanied by 
Representative Gibbons, she soon showed that she could shape 
any bill to her liking. 
The Administration filled Powell's place on the Com-
mittee with Rep. Carl Albert, Majority Leader of the House, 
who was one rung below the Speaker on the leadership 
ladder, but to no avail. Mrs. Green,8 strong-minded and 
often irascible, remained dominant.1 r 
(J) The House Appropriations Subcommittee for Education and Labor 
lost five of its members, including the chairman, Representative John 
E. Fogarty (Democrat, Rhode Island). Fogarty had been a consistent 
supporter of Johnson proposals. The content of this committee proved 
to be a major problem for the Administration, as appointments to fill 
tpe vacancies were in the hands of the full committee chairman, Repre-
sentative George Mahon (Democrat, Texas). Mahon was described by one 
observer as being 11 a conservative who has not previously displayed 
excessive fondness for the Great Society, or federal aid to education 
119 
either, for that matter. 11 , The Johnson forces would certainly have a 
problem if the chairman appointed five new members to the subcommittee 
who opposed federal aid to education. 
All of these changes led to a mood of uncertainty for federal aid 
in 1967, as described by one magazine in March, 1967: 11 Even now, as 
Congress gets down to work after its opening squabbles over committee 
assignments and seniority, education legislation faces an uncertain 
future, the most unpredictable outlook on Capitol Hill in several 
llBTh E . D. t (S b 6 ) e ducat1on 1ges eptem er, 19 7, p. 52. 
119rbid. (March, 1967), p. 55° 
120 years. 
21±6 
In 1966 Congress authorized the Elementary and Secondary Act for 
two years. However, that did not mean that it would not be taken up 
again, because Congress still had the power to amend the Act, re-
gardless of whether it had expired. Therefore, the remainder of this 
discussion will center on those major changes made in the Act, and 
Presidential strategy in relation to those changes. 
As far as President Johnson's strategy, it was basically the same 
. 66 121 as that employed in 19 • The technique the President employed 
prior to his message to Congress in 1967 is described as being one of 
playing with the budget balancing game: 
In the past few weeks President Johnson has played 
a now-familiar game with the press and the public--dropping 
hints that'his budget is ballooning so enormously that he 
is valiantly trimming andslashing to get it down to 1 
reasonable proportions before sending it to Congress. 22 
However, there was a perceptible change in the Administration's 
attitude in 1967. President Johnson apparently decided, along with his 
staff, that the general mood of the contry was against continued 
pressure for new programs. The pace in new legislation had been rapid 
in 1965, somewhat lessened in 1966, and the President decided that a 
general slowdown was in order for 1967. Therefore, the most successful 
policy would be to try to consolidate the gains made in 1965 and 1966@ 
Evidence of this change in attitude is found in the communications 
surrounding the task force reports in 1967, the Friday Task Force 
120The Education Digest (March, 1967) p. 55. 
1218 ee this chapter, pp. 227-228. 
122The Education Digest (January, 1967), p. 56. 
Report and the Interagency Task Force Report. 
On June JO, 1967, a task force chaired by William C. Friday, 
President of the University of North Carolina, submitted a report to 
the White House calling for federal aid for the operating costs of 
colleges, creation of a national social science foundation, federal 
support for tqe reform of undergraduate education, and vast expansions 
of federal aid for facilities, research, undergraduate-, graduate 
students, developing colleges, and the community-service activities of 
123 
colleges. Shortly following this report, Joseph Califano, a special 
assistant to the President, requested of John Gardner to set up a task 
force consisting of government agencies to look at ways in which the 
Friday recommendations could be implemented. Gardner organized the 
task force with Harold Howe, II, as chairman. Called the Interagency 
Task Force of 1967, the task force also included Douglass Cater, the 
White House advisor on education. The Interagency task force reported 
124 four months after the Friday task force, in September of 1967. The 
report warned against any bold new programs for fiscal year 1968, 
because the Administration was beginning to hear complaints that its 
education programs were promising too much and delivering too little. 
The task force report further warned that existing programs should be 
fully funded before the government started on any new programs such as 
those recommended by the Friday task force. Although the two task 
forces were mainly concerned with higher education, their reports, 
and the Presidential response, adequately reflects the changing 
123Friday Task Force Report, 1967 Folder, Johnson Papers, Johnson 
Library. 
124 Interagency Task Force Report, Ibid. 
attitude on the part of the President, as well as the reason for it. 
Apparently as a result of the Interagency task force report, President 
Johnson decided not to propose the Friday task force proposals to 
Congress. 
This change in attitude was not only present in the Administration, 
but in Congress as well. For example, in early 1967, the National 
Education Association, the American Association of School Adminis-
trators, the Parent Teachers Association, the National School Boards 
of America, and the National Association of State Board of Education, 
all agreed on a set of legislative recommendations and presented them 
to the Johnson Administration. The associations wanted "federal parti-
cipation in the financing of public education through substantial 
general support, with minimum limitations on its use, rather than 
. ,,125 through fragmentary categoP1cal channels. The reception to these 
recommendations was cool, both by the President and Congress. De-
scribing the congressional attitude, one magazine noted 11 there is not 
a chance that Congress will grc1nt this request, even if.the Adminis-
tration adopts the proposal as its own, which is not likely to 
126 happen." 
The Quie Amendment. One of the biggest arguments erupting in 
1967 involved an amendment by Albert Quie. The Quie amendment basi-
cally proposed to merge Titles I, II, III, and IV of the Elementary-
Secondary Act into an annual three billion dollar block grant, leaving 
each state free to decide for itself how to allocate the federal 
125Quoted in Education Digest (March, 1967), p. 56. 
126Ibid. 
funds. A.s wa.s easily noted, this amendment is similar to the proposal 
submitted by the interest groups earlier. 
The Quie amendment turned the House into an uproar. Hugh L. Carey, 
the spokesman for the Catholics, said the amendment would "create a 
holy war" between parochial and public schools. 127 The reason for 
this charge was that the aid would go to the states in a sort of 
general grant, which would cause the states to be in charge of deciding 
who, or what schools, would receive the funds; and this would affect 
the formula devised in 1965 regarding the religious compromise. 
Speaker McCormack, at the height of the debate took the floor and urged 
his fellow Democrats~ both North and South, to vote against the amend-
ment. His reasoning was that it would 11upset the delicately balanced 
compromises" reached in 1965. 128 Supporters of the amendment said the 
church-state problem was q 11 phony issue." Quie stated that he thought 
the issue was federal control, as he put it: 11Are we going to give, 
step by step, more control to the Commissioner of Education, or are we 
going to restore state control?"129 
The amendment had another provision which also aroused opposition, 
as described here: 
Quie erred in omitting provisions that would calm the 
fears of private school administrators that they would not 
continue to receive fede:r:al funds if his changes in the ESEA 
were adopted. In its opposition, the Administration claimed 
that nondiscrimination provisions would not apply if federal 
funds were turned over to states on a block grant basis, and 
127 . 1 6 ) /. Congressional Record ,May 22, 19 7, p. 133~2. 
128rbid. (May 24:, 1967), p. 13821. 
129Ibid. (May 22, 1967), p. 13346. 
this charge frightened some Congressmen. To Southerners, 
the Administration successfully argued that the Quie bi+l 
would reduce the sums going to the Southern states.130 
At any rate, the Quie amendment was defeated in the House by a 
131 teller vote. The significance of this amendment is that it was 
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basically a proposal supported by the urban groups, and opposed by the 
rural forces. Thus an old issue was revitalized. Also of significance 
is the fact that the alliance formed between the Republicans and the 
Democrats earlier in order to defeat the twenty-one day rule did not 
hold together on this amendment. 132 One of the reasons for this is 
that the Republicans were utilizing a different strategy. As Gerald 
Ford (Republican, Michigan) the Minority leader, described it, the 
"strategy is to drive Southern Democrats in the House into the arms of 
the Administration, where they belong, on votes that will hurt them in 
their home congressional districts. 11133 This strategy was employed 
because he felt that "it is far better to lose a few legislative 
battles and·win the next election. 11134 The Republicans were already 
focusing on the 1968 elections and hoping to embarrass a number of 
Southern Democrats in the process. 
The Green Amendments. The first of the amendments introduced by 
Edith Green occurred on the first day of floor debates in the House, 
May 23. This amendment proposed that the desegregation guidelines 
130Education Digest (September, 1967), p. 53. 
131A teller vote means that the position of individual congress-
man is not recorded. 
U2s ee this chapter, 243-244. 
l33Quoted in Eidenberg and Morey, p. 209. 
134Ibid. 
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under Title VI of the 196~ Civil Rights Act be enforced uniformly 
throughout the country. This amendment was aimed primarily at the 
Northern sections of the country where housing patterns formed all 
white neighborhood. schools. The issue had been hotly debated in 1966, 
and 1967 proved to be no different, as one authority described the 
situation: 
The Northern Democrats, who were still nursing their 
wounds from previous encounters with the gentlewoman from 
Oregon, immediately branded13ge Green amendment as a smoke 
screen to destroy the bill. 
After considerable debate on the issue, the Green amendment was adopted 
by a voice vote, but feelings were ruffledel36 
The other two Green amendments were not quite so hotly debated. 
The first of these amendments concerned Title III of the 1965 Act. 
Under the old provision, funds for innovative educational centers and 
services were granted for projects approved by Washington. The Green 
amendment concerning this program turned the approval of projects over 
to the state educational agencies (federal control again). Also, no 
school district was to receive less from Title III in the next fiscal 
ear than they had received in the past. 1 37 
The other Green amendment applied to Title V. First, the appro-
priation level was raised from 50 million to 65 million dollars for the 
fiscal year 1968, and 80 million dollars for fiscal year 1969. 
Secondly, the old provision had provided that 15 per cent of the funds 
would be reserved for distribution by the Commissioner of Education. 
l.35Quoted in Eidenberg and Morey, p. 210. 
136congressional Record (May 22, 1967), p. 13898. 
lJ?Ibid., p. 13859. 
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This was changed to provide that all of the money would go to the 
138 
state departments. 
Two other amendments of significance were adopted by the House in 
1967, both of which had been brought up in 1966. H. L. Fountain 
introduced again, and the House adopted, the Fountain Amendment. 139 
The other amendment involved the urban-rural quarrel over the allo-
cation formula. At the committee level an amendment was adopted which 
called for the changes in allocation regarding funds to be granted on 
the basis of the states average expenditure, or the national expendi~ 
ture, whichever is greater, to go into effect only g the funds ~ 
available. Representative Sam Gibbons successfully sponsored an amend-
. t th" . 140 ment which dele ed is proviso. 
Other changes in the 1967 amendments were minor in relation to the 
hotly debated Quie amendment. One item which might be of some im-
portance is the fact that Congress restored the incentive grant pro-
vision in Title I that President Johnson had successfully deleted in 
1966. In 1967 Congress added 50 million dollars to Title I for this 
purpose, and also added another 30 million for a new drop-out pro-
141 gram. 
One of the most significant changes that occurred as a result of 
the 1967 debates was the fact that most of the arguments were over the 
138c . 1 R d ongressiona. ecor (May 22, 1967), p. 13876. 
139rbid. (May 23i 1967) i p. 13605. See this chapter, pp. 2Jl-J2. 
140rbid., p. 13846. 
141Education Digest (February, 1968), p. 56. 
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method of implementing the Elementary and Secondary Act, not the basic 
concept of federal aid. As Tom Wicker of The New York Times put it 
when analyzing the vote on the block grant proposal (Quie Amendment): 
11 The most significant thing is that if the Republicans now intend to 
fight it out on this line then the real issue of American politics is 
11±2 
no longer whether government should act but how and at what level." 
In his annual message to Congress in 1968, President Johnson 
returned to an old theme that he had repeatedly stressed in 1961±, that 
of promoting federal aid for the underprivileged. He proposed that 
there should be a fifth freedom added to the four enunciated by 
Franklin Roosevelt during the 1930's. This fifth freedom, according 
• 1 f . 11±3 to the President, was I reedom from ignorance. 11 One of the reasons 
the President returned to this theme was the results of a report sub-
mitted in 1968 by the President's National Advisory Council on the 
Education of Disadvantaged Children which surveyed the status of pro-
grams authorized under the 1965 Act regarding disadvantaged students. 
The report concluded: 
The unevenness of our progress is not surprising. 
We have had to deal with the enormous variety of American 
communities. In some cases, the educational situation 
falls critically short of effectiveness® In a few cases, 
there are dramatic signs of hope. In all cases, we must 
look upon the education of the poor as a task needing a 
llic2The New~ Times (May 25, 1967)~ p. 1. 
llicJJohnson, "Special Message to the Congress: The Fifth Freedom," 
February 5, 1968, Public Papers, p. 171. 
gen~ration or more to accomplish 1 and requiring 144 
substantially larger funds over the years ahead. 
However, unlike 1965 1 most of the President's new proposals 
centered on higher education. The only new provision for the common 
schools was a proposed Partnership for Learning and Earning Act, which 
would streamline and strengthen vocational education. 
One of the reasons that the President could afford to propose an 
expanded program for higher education was that Congress had enacted a 
tax increase in the form of a surtax. This increase in federal revenue 
eased the pressure somewhat in regard to financing both the President's 
domestic and foreign programs. However, despite the tax increase, the 
President did not drop his old game of putting the pressure on Congress 
regarding spending programs for education. But this time Congress was 
ready for the President's budget game and anticipated his technique by 
passing the surtax the President asked for, but tacking on a provision 
that the President would have to cut six billion dollars from his bud-
get regardless of how much Congress might or might not appropriate. 
As one article put it: "Congress wants to take the credit for voting 
the appropriations and let the President get the blame for cutting 
them.11 145 In addition, Congress voted 91 million dollars for retro-
active aid to impacted areas for fiscal year 1967-68, and another 110 
146 
mil lion for fiscal year 1968-69. The President I s response to this 
144National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged 
Children 1 Annual Report to President Johnson (Washington, 1968), pp. 
23-24. 
145Education Digest (September, 1968), p. 56. 
146Ibid. 
255 
move by Congress was an unhappy one, as the President stated:" ••• 
Congress in one breath says you must cut $6 billion from your budget 
as you send it to Congress and while doing that we add another $200 
million over and above that budget. That would make $6.2 billion we 
147 
would have to cut out. 11 Then Congress surprised the President again 
when it enacted the Vocational Education Amendments by inserting an 
obscurely worded provision which exempted most of the Office of Edu-
cation's budget from the mandatory cost cutting. 148 Thus, President 
,Johnson's budget trimming would have to occur in other areas besides 
education. 
As a result, the President's budget for the fiscal year 1969 
contained 11.6 billion dollars for education, training, and related 
programs. This is compared with 10.8 billion for the year 1968, and 
5.2 billion in 1965. For education only, the budget contained a 
figure of 4.8 billion. This is compared with 1.6 billion in 1965. 
For elementary and secondary education the figure was 2.8 billion. 
This is compared with a request o.f 1.2 billion in 1965, and 1.3 billion 
in 1967. 14,9 
Just as changes in the a.ffected congressional debate in 1965, 
1966, and 1967 1 changes occurred in 1968 iri other areas which affected 
the outcome of' education legislation. For example, President Johnson I s 
popularity with the American people continued to decline. The Gallup 
147Quoted in Education Digest (September, 1968), p. 56. 
148rbid. (November, 1968) 1 p. 58. 
149rbid. (March, 1966), p. 5.li,. 
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Poll reported the President's popularity figure in 1968 had dropped 
150 to a low 38 per cent. Such figures reflected difficulties for any 
program the President sponsored. 
And too, President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, that he 
was not going to run for re-election. Since this announcement came 
while the education legislation was still in the cong;ressional stage, 
the results of Congressional action was a reflection of what Congress 
wanted to enact, and not so much a result of Presidential pressure. 
In other words, Congress knew President Johnson was not going to run 
for re-election, so they were not as responsive to his wishes as they 
otherwise might have been. 
Another item of significance in regard to the education amend-
ments of 1968 was that the racial issue was once again interjected 
into education legislation at an even hotter pace. The House enacted 
its version of the education legislation in June of 1968. The bill 
contained two amendments proposed by Representative Jamie L. Whitten 
(Democrat, Mississippi) in regard to race. In the enforcement of the 
provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the U.S. Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare had received heavy criticism in 
Congress for both the guidelines and the manner in which they had been 
applied. Against a background of charges that the Department had 
assumed powers not granted by the Congress, and had concentrated its 
enforcement actions in the Southern and Border States while ignoring 
patterns of school segregation in the North, Congress took up debate 
lSOE. Gld Th T d f L d J h (N Y k 1 6) ~r1c o man, ___!:.. rage y o yn on o nson ew or , 9 9 , 
P• 511. 
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on the so-called "Whitten Rider." The rider was aimed at preventing 
f d b . f t d t t h. t · l 5l orce using o s u ens o ac ieve desegrega ion.· 
The Whitten rider sparked some of the hottest debates in 1968 in 
regard to federal aid. In the House, Representative Emanuel Celler 
(Democrat, New York) spoke out in favor of the desegregation guide-
lines and against the Whitten proposal: 
With the Whitten proposal we walk backwards--backward 
to the time before the famous Brown decision; we walk back-
ward into the abyss of discord and disenchantment. 
We would encourage that racism that is splitting 
our society. 
We would aid with Federal grants to States that 
continue segregation contrary to the law. 
We would reward the guilty. 
We would thumb our nose at orderly, 152 lawful process. 
Charles Goodell thought the Congress ought to act before the courts 
forced them to do so: 11 I think it is critically important that we 
preserve the opportunity positively to attack this problem and not 
rely on the Court's decisions forcing various school districts to 
t k . , 153 a e action. 1 Commissioner Howe II also spoke out against the 
criticism leveled at his Office for aggressive action: 
151For a full discussion of the Whitten rider, see 11 Controversy in 
Congress over Federal School Desegregation Guidelines 1 11 Congressional 
Digest (February, 1969). 
Sec. 409. No part of the funds contained in this Act may be 
used to force busing of students, abolishment of any school, or to 
force any student attending any secondary school to attend a particu-
lar school against the choice of his or her parent. 
Sec. 410. No part of the funds contained in this Act shall 
be used to f'orce busing of students, the abolishment of any school or 
the attendance of students at a particular school as a condition pre-
cedent to obtaining Federal funds otherwise available to any State, 
school district, or school. 
152 0 Congress1.onal Record (-June 26, 1968), p. 18927. 
l.5Jibid. 
The basic reason for integration of the schools is 
the same reason for equality in voting rights, for equal 
access to public accommodations regardless of race, for 
employment opportunity without regard to race, religion, 
or national originl and for open housing. It is plainly 
and simply that segregation is un-American. 154 
Supporters of the Whitten rider were equally committed to their 
views, as reflected by Whitten's statement: 
Did you know the Department of Educa'tion, created 
by this Government solely and for the purpose of pro-
moting the cause of education ••• is withholding funds 
••• until school officials agree to run the schools to 
suit them. 155 
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Following floor debate on June 25 and 26, 1968, the House accepted 
the Whitten proposal and sent it to the Senate for action by that body. 
There the Whitten proposal was supported by a number of Senators who 
once again placed the blame on the Office of Education for its enforce-
ment guidelines. Senator Richard B. Russell (Democrat, Georgia) stated~ 
"I am frank to say that in almost 36 years as a member of this body I 
have never seen a greater abuse of Federal law by a Federal agency than 
the HEW 1 s high~handed administration of Title VI Senator 
John Stennis (Democrat, Mississippi) echoed this sentiment: 11 The en-
forcement has been the most open 9 brazen, deliberate, and willful act 
157 that I have ever seen in Government"" 
On September 4, the Senate adopted its version of the Whitten 
rider. Basically the Senate version was the same as the House with the 
exception of an added phrase on Section 409l which read: 11 In order to 
l54:Q · c · 1 n· t (F b 196 ) '-7 
· uoted in ongress1ona 1ges e ruary, 9 , p. '± • 
l55Congressional Record (June 26 1 1968), p. 18924. 
156 Ibid. (October 9, 1968), p. 30193. 
157 Ibid., p. 30195. 
overcome racial imbalance." So now the section read: 
No part of the funds contained in this Act may be used 
to force busing of students, abolishment of any school, 
or to force any student attending any secondary school to 
attend a particular school against the choice of his or her 
parent in order to overcome racial imbalance. 
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Different versions of the bill necessitated the appointment of a House-
Senate conference committee to resolve differences. House conferees 
successfully sought to remove the qualifying language added to the 
Whitten rider by the Senate--in particular, the phrase 11 in order to 
overcome racial imbalance"--in the belief that such a phrase diluted 
the intent of the rider and offered an escape clause. However, when 
the bill reached the floor of the House, Representative Jeffery 
Cohelan (Democrat, California) succeeded in sponsoring an amendment 
158 
which restored the weaker Senate language. 
The amendments in 1968 also contained another item in regard to 
the racial issue. As a compromise to Southern Democrats, a require-
ment was placed upon the office of Education that they assign as many 
staff members in the Northern and Western states, as in the South, to 
work on the enforcement of Title VI, and to report back to Congress 
by March~ 1969 on 11 the results achieved in establishing this com-
. t" 1 b . 11159 pl1ance program on a na 1ona as1s. 
Congress in 1968 also authorized a new program under Title III of 
the 1965 Act for "educationally deprived children." Funds under this 
program, aimed mostly at aiding vocational education programs~ would 
go to local school districts for the purpose of purchasing classroom 
158congressional Record (June 26, 1968), p. 18924. 
l59Education Digest (November, 1968), p. 58. 
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equipment. The funds would go to both public and parochial schools 
based upon the 1965 allocation formula for allocating funds to both 
types of schools. Under this program $84.4 million was authorized for 
1968-69, and $160 million for 1969-70. 160 One should be quick to note 
that Congress still felt in 1968 that the church-state compromise 
reached in 1965 was valid, and that they were going to continue using 
that formula unless the courts ruled differently. 
Also, as a result of earlier complaints by schoolmen that the 
application procedures for obtaining money under the Elementary and 
Secondary Act were confusing, Congress directed Commissioner Howe 
to compile and publish a directory of federal aid with clear advice 
to schoolmen on how to claim the aid. He was also directed to con-
duct a feasibility study on the possibility to Congress his findings by 
161 
the end of 1969. 
On January 3, 1969, the Ninety-First Congress convened. Like its 
predecessor, the new Congress would be controlled by Democrats. But 
unlike the old Congress, there would be a Republican in the White 
House. Despite the fact that he had less than one month to serve, 
President Johnson continued to make unprecedented moves. For the 
first time since John Adams, in 1801, an outgoing President presented 
160Education Digest (November, 1968), p. 58. See Appendix B., 
p. 292. 
161 Ibid. 
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162 his final state of the union message in person~ In his address, 
President Johnson gave his reasons for appearing in person: 110ne was 
philosophical. I wanted to give you my judgement on some of the items 
before our Nation as I see them. The other was sentimental. Most of 
my life as a public official was spent in this building. 11163 Despite 
the fact that President Nixon would have his own legislative proposals, 
President Johnson presented several recommendations to the Congress. 
The recommendations ranged across the face of his Great Society pro-
gram, and although he knew that most of these programs would not be 
supported by President Nixon, the President did have a reason for sub-
mitting them. As one magazine put it: "President Johnson's recom-
mendations are expected to serve as possible alternatives to the Nixon 
164 program which must face a Democratic Congress." 
The President also gave education a boost, as well, as giving to 
Congress some possible alternatives, at a session with educators who 
had called upon him in early 1969 to thank him for the sixty major 
measures enacted during his Administration. The President's statement 
at this session reflects to a certain extent the concern for education 
the President exhibited throughout his tenure as President: 
I was looking at a statement of the Secretary of the 
Interior this morning about the oil companies not believing 
in the oil shale development process enough to really make 
adequate bids on oil shale out in parts of our country. I 
thought that if we could just take these resources, and all 
the other resources that are yet undeveloped, and somehow 
. 162 ... 
Congressional Digest (February, 1969), p. 1. 
163 Johnson, 11Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union," January 14, 1969, Public Papers, p. 1269. 
164congressional Digest (February, 1969), p. 33. 
or other commit them to an education fund, how wonderful 
it would be. We are not taking enough of our resources 
of our gross national product, and committing it to the 
improvement of our minds, to the training p[5 our children, 
to the preparation of our future citizens. 
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In summary, despite inflation, a constrained budget, an expanding 
war in Southeast Asia, racial disturbances in the cities, a decline 
in popularity, a dwindling hold on Congress, and numerous other minor 
difficulties, President Johnson in 1966, 1967, and 1968, managed to 
continue to increase the amount of money appropriated each year for 
the common schools. Although these budgetary and political pressures 
did prevent President Johnson from requesting the sort of massive 
expenditures in behalf of education he envisioned, his accomplishments 
in the face of these obstacles is worth significant praise. Federal 
aid for the common schools, although still controversial, was not the 
burning issue in 1969 that it was in 1965. As the President prepared 
to leave the White House in 1969, an era of unprecedented Presidential 
initiative on the behalf of federal aid to the common schools ended. 
165Johnson, "The President's Remarks to Educational Leaders Upon 
Being Honored for His Contribution in the Field of Education~" 
December 27, 1968, Public Papers, p. 1212. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Three M1 s: Money, Management, or Method? 
On January .22, 1973, Lyndon Baines Johnson died of a heart attack 
at his ranch near Austin, Texas. On January 23, 1973, just a little 
over twenty-four hours later, President Richard M. Nixon announced to 
the American people that peace in Vietnam had finally been achieved. 
The 11 Education President" had lived to see the culmination of peace 
efforts that he had initiated in his announcement not to run for re-
. election in 1968. 1 
It will be left to future historians, and Americans; to decide 
President Johnson's place in history in regard to his handling of the 
Vietnam war. However, there is little doubt about his rank as a pro-
moter of federal aid. The common schools, as well as higher education, 
took giant strides during the Johnson Administration. Before 1965, 
federal aid to public elementary and secondary education was limited 
to certain vocational ed~cational programs, assistance to school lunch 
programs, and impacted area funds. Following 1965 however, primarily 
as a result of President Johnson's leadership and initiative, the 
federal government assumed responsibility for providing aid to public 
l Although President Johnson died before the peace settlement was 
officially announced, President Nixon, according to Mrs. Johnson·, had 
informed ·her husband of the peace settlement on January 20, 1973. 
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26/,i, 
schools serving large numoers of low-income children, as well as 
attempting to strengthen the entire scope of the public school system. 
The description of the efforts of President Johnson to promote 
federal aid for the common schools between 1963 and 1969 is an im-
portant story if only because of the significance of the issue. In 
addition, present and future proposals regarding federal aid, regard-
less of their nature, will out of necessity encompass some of the 
experiences of the Johnson period. 
There are several unanswered questions which plague the common 
schools today. For example, there are some who question the over-
riding need for more federal money. They claim that this goal over-
estimates the learning which money can buy and misses the true needs 
of curriculum reform, greater efficiency, and an end to socio-economic 
. . 1 t" 2 and racial 1so a ion. 
Others dispute this claim and maintain that more expenditures in 
large amounts and focused on well designed programs can make a dif-
ference, especially in regard to programs for the disadvantaged. They 
argue that the only source of such added funds is the federal govern~ 
ment since local and state sources are already overburdenea. 3 
Another argument over school finance revolves around the issue 
of school management. Some say that duplication of administrative 
2The classic study often cited in support of this point of view 
is J. S. Coleman, et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Wash-
ington, 1966). Also note Daniel B.Moynihan, 11 Can Courts and Money 
Do It?H The New York Times: Annual Education Review (January 10, 
1972), p."°Tl-. - --
3James w. Guthrie, George B. Kleindorfer, Henry M. Levin, and 
Robert T. Stout, Schools and Inequality (Cambridge, 1971). 
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costs, and of small expensive programs, can be cut in certain areas by 
district consolidation or inter-district sharing of facilities. They 
point out that, if nothing else, program budgeting can force schools 
to define goals and sharpen educational philosophies. This would pre-
vent schools from implementing costly programs simply because federal 
funds are available. 4 
This issue is connected with a related topic of the preservation 
of a private system of elementary and secondary education. In the 
1970-71 school year, private school receipts from the federal govern-
ment totalled five billion dollars. 5 Most of this money came in the 
form of indirect aid, since most proposals to assist private schools 
are constrained by constitutional prohibitions against direct aid to 
parochial schools. The argument centers around the fact that private 
school enrollment has been on the decline in recent years. For example, 
in 1965 there were seven million school children enrolled in private 
schools, as compared to 5.4 million in 1972. 6 Some argue that without 
further federal assistance the private school will gradually disappear, 
which would be a detriment to the entire educational system. For 
example, The National Educational Finance Project estimated that all 
school costs would rise by ten per cent if all private school children 
were to be absorbed into the public system. 7 
4see Na.tional ... Educational Finance. Project, Al ternati.ves for 
Financing .. Edu.cat.ion .. (Flori.da, .. 1971.) ,- PP-•- 33,,,_3~. 
5National Education Association, Committee on Educational Finance, 
Financial Status of~ Public Schools (Washington, 1971), p. 21. 
6Ibid., p. 11. 
7National Educational Finance Project, Alternatives for 
Financing Education, p. 343. 
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To offset the religious quarrels involved in granting federal aid 
to private schools, a proposed voucher system has been quite heatedly 
debated recently. The voucher system would place all schools on a 
competitive basis. Public funds from whatever source would go, not 
to the schools, but to parents in the form of a voucher, or grant. 
Parents would then enroll their children and spend their vouchers at 
the school of their choice. 8 
Another issue facing federal aid to education currently is the 
question of the equal distribution of educational resources, or 
equality of educat~onal opportunity. The Serrano vs. Priest case 
which held that the property tax was in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, will definitely raise 
further questions about the equality of per pupil expenditures in the 
public schools. Similar findings have been brought in Rodriquez vs. 
Edgar (Texas) and Van Dusartz vs. Hatfield (Minnesota). 9 Such cases 
leave several unan·swered questions: 
Will the Serrano ruling preclude one district from 
spending more on its schools than another if it wants to 
make an extra effort? Would "~uality" be preserved if 
only the tax bases were equalized, allowing unequal 
spending so long as it resulted only from unequal tax 
8For a debate of both sides of the issue, see "Controversy Over 
Feder.al Experimentation With Equcation Vouchers," Congressional Digest 
(August-September, 1972), pp. 210-224~ 
9For information on these cases, see Harold Howe,II 11 Anatomy of 
a Revolution," Saturday Review, LIV ('November 20, 1971), p. 78; and 
Richard M. Pious, "The Judiciary and Public School Financing," Current 
History, LXIII (Augusti 1972), pp. 53-57, 86. The Rodriquiz case 
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973. See Chapter I, p. 
rates or eff-arts? Isn't it likely that rich districts 
would still choose to spend more (i.e., tax themselves 
at a higher rate) than poor districts? 
Can we afforq to 'level up' all poorest schools 
to the expenditure level of the richest schools; and 
could we justify any 'leveling down?' 
Will tax base disparities among rich and poor 
states, as well as between rich and poor districts 10 
within specific states, also be held unconstitutional? 
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Also, in connection with equality of educational opportunity is 
the curreht issue of busing as a means of achieving equal educational 
opportunities. Totally unsettled, the problem was an issue in the 
1972 ~residential race and prompted President Nixon to declare a mora-
11 
torium on new busing to achieve racial desegration on March 17i 1972. 
Whatever decisions are made regarding current questions involving 
the financing of the public schools, the proposed solutions will have 
to take into account the political considerations involved~ Poli.tics, 
as demonstrated by President Johnson, is, and will continue to be, a 
vital part in any program involving the public schools. Most of the 
questions which were dealt with during President Johnsoh's term of 
office are still being deba,ted in Congress. For example, on August 4,, 
1971, Edith Green stated: 
Today, no one would deny that our schools are plunged 
in a crisis of unprecedented severity. Funds are no longer 
available for adequate professional staffing, proper lea,rn-
ing facilities, satisfactory compliance with court orders, 
or sufficiently long school sessions. Our public schools 
are 'rapiqly decaying, their downfall hastened by a social 
10n. Bruce Johnstone, 1'Financing American Education Today: An 
Overview," Cu;rent History, LXII (June, 1972), p. 278. 
11Richard Milhouse Nixon, "The President's Message to Congress 
on Equal Educational Opportunity, 1972, 11 March 17, 1972, quoted in 
Ibid., p. 305. 
upheaval threatening cities and suburbs alike • 
• • • The very stron1 need for general aid to schools 
has been overlooked. 2 
On the other hand, Senator William .B. Saxbe (Republican, Ohio) 
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on the floor of the Senate on December 9 1 1971, stated: 11 1 have long 
believed that Federal funds should only be used when absolutely neces-
sary, and immediate direction and control should come from State and 
13 local governments~" 
Such debates over federal control, general aid, states' rights, 
race, and religion are reminiscent of the Johnson years. However, the 
fact that this would at first glance appear that nothing was solved 
during those years would be an erroneous conclusion. There is one 
major difference. Almost everyone accepts the fact that federal aid 
is necessary to the operation of the public schools; the differences 
of opinions occur over the amount and means of distribution, a 
significant difference which without President Johnson's leadership 
would not have been, at least at this time. 
Also, the question of how much support the United States is 
giving, or should give, to the support of its educational system is 
an interesting postscript to the Johnson Administration" The best 
comparison to money along this line was made by Representative Roman 
Pucinski (Democrat, Illinois) on March 16, 1971, in a speech before 
the House: 
The United States likes to pride itself on its support 
of education, but the facts speak differently. Our country 
12Quoted in Congressional Digest (August-September, 1972), p. 200. 
13congressional Record (December 9, 1971), p. 21031. 
is spending from all sources and from all levels of 
government a little more than six per cent of its 
national income on education while Canada and Israel 
are spending 9.6 and 9.2 per cent, respectively. In 
fact, most of the other highly industrialized countries 
are spending far more than the United States; for 
example, Denm~rk 8.1 per cent, Sweden 7.9 per cent, 1~ 
Netherlands 7.6 per cent, and the U.S.S.R. 7.1 per cent. 
If such a spending trend is true, there is little doubt that the 
question of public funding of our common schools will continue to be 
an issue of national significance. 
Finally, there is little doubt that the method of financing our 
common schools is in for a dramatic change in the decade ahead. And 
that change would not be possible without the catalyst that was pro-
vided by the Johnson Administration. Whether this change will be good 
or bad, would be pure speculation. One can only hope that such a 
change will bring the common schools one step closer to the goal of 
providing for every child all of the education he has the "ability 
to receive." 
1
~Congressional Record (March 16 1 1971), pp. 6755-56. 
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Title I: Financial assistance to local educational agencies for the 
education of children of low-income families• 
Policy: To provide financial assistance to local educational 
agencies serving areas with concentration of children from low-income 
families to expand and improve their educational programs by various 
means (including pre-school programs) which contribute particularly 
to meeting the special needs of educationally deprived children. 
Duration: July 1, 1965 to June JO, 1968. 
Distribution: The allocation to each county is computed by adding 
(a) the number of children aged 5 to 17 from families with incomes of 
less than $2,000 to (b) the number of children aged 5 to 17 from fami-
lies-receiving·an--annual income in excess of $2,000 from payments 
through the program of aid to families with dependent children under 
Title IV of the Social Security Act and (c) multiplying the sum_by one-
half the state average per pupil current expenditure during the school 
year 1963-64. 
Administration: Local educational agencies may receive funds for 
any fiscal year only upon application approved by the appropriate state 
educational agency, upon its determination: 
(1) that payments will be used for programs and projects of 
sufficient size, scope, and quality to give reasonable promise 
of substantial progress toward meeting the special educational 
needs of children from low-income families; 
(2) that a public agency will administer the funds and 
property acqtJ,ired under the title; 
(J) that- the local agency has made provision for including 
special educational services and arrangements (such as dual 
enrollments, educational radio and television, and mobile 
educational services and equipment) in which low-income children 
attending non-public schools can participate; 
(4) that the construction of school facilities under the 
title be consistent with overall state plans for the construction 
of school facilities; 
(5) that effective procedures will be adopted for evaluating 
at least annually the effectiveness of the program in meeting 
the special needs of educationally deprived children; 
(6) that the local educational agency will make an annual 
report to the State educational agency including the above 
information. 
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Amendments: In 1966 Congress raised the low income figure to 
$3,000 to take effect in fiscal year 1968. In 1966, Congress also 
allowed any state to use the national average expenditure per school 
child, instead of its own expenditure figure. For other changes, see 
Chapter V of this paper. 
Title II: School library resources, textbooks, and other instructional 
materials. 
Policy: To establish a program for making grants ~or the ac-
quisition of school library resources, textbooks, and other printed 
materials for the use by children and teachers in public and private 
elementary and secondary schools. 
Duration: July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966. 
Distribution: Each State will receive a proportion of the total 
grant that is equal to that state's proportion of all public and non-
public school children enrolled in elementary and secondary schools. 
Administration: In order to participate, a state would submit 
to the. Office of Education a plan spelling out cri t:eria to be used in 
alloca1ting funds within the state. The plan must take into considera-
tion the need of children and teachers for such material and provide 
assurances that such materials would be provided on an equitable basis 
for all elementary and secondary school children and teachers. Control 
and administration vested only in a public agency. 
Amendments: Unchanged. 
Title 'III: Supplementary education centers and services. 
Policy: To establish a program for making grants to supplementary 
educational centers and services, to stimulate and assist in the pro-
vision of vitally needed educational services not available in suf-
ficient quantity or quality, and to stimulate and assist in the 
development and establishment of exemplary elementary and secondary 
school educational programs to serve as models for regular school 
programs. 
Duration: July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966. 
Distribution: Each state would receive a flat grant of $200,000. 
In addition, each state would receive two more grants based on their 
proportion of children 5 to 17 and their proportion of the total 
national population. 
Administration: Under this program the local educational agency 
or agencies apply for a grant through the state department of education. 
The plan, in the establishment and carrying out of the program, must 
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include the participation of persons broadly representative of the 
cultural and educational resources of the area to be served. The plan 
may include such educational services as guidance and counseling, 
remedial instruction, school health services, dual enrollment programs, 
and specialized instruction in subjects not taught in the local schools. 
Amendments: In 1967 Congress rewrote the program to give most of 
the control to state education agencies. State plans for use of the 
funds were to be drawn up, and after fiscal 1968 the state agencies 
would distribute all of the money. However, 15 per cent of the funds 
were to be spent on special programs for handicapped children. 
Title IV: Education research and training. 
Policy: Authorize the use of funds for the construction of 
national and regional research facilities. In addition to the con-
struction funds there is provision for expansion of the current 
research programs administered by the Office of Education. 
Duration: July 1, 1965 to June JO, 1970. 
Administration: Grants would be distributed for construction 
and programs of national and regional research laboratories. Proposals 
for such grants would be developed by groups representing the state 
departments of educatio11, local school systems, and universities. 
Programs would basicallj be located.. in areas of population concen-
tration where an adequate operating staff may be assembled, but labo-
ratory activities would extend throughoµt each region. 
Amendments: No major changes. See Chapter V of this paper 
for minor alterations. 
Title V: Grants to strengthen state departments of education. 
Policy: To 
and assist states 
state educational 
establishment and 
i 
e~ucational needs 
establish a program for making grants to stimulate 
in strengthening the leadership resources of their 
agencies, and to assist those agencies in the 
improvement of programs to identify and meet the 
of the state. 
Duration: July 1, 1965 to June JO, 1966. 
Distribution: Each state shall receive a $100,000 flat grant 
and a proportion of 85 per cent of the remaining funds that is equal 
to its proportion of all public school pupils. 
Administration: State departments, when applying for grants, 
would review their present programs and indicate their greatest need. 
Grants could be utilized to improve educational planning; identify 
special educational problems and needs; evaluate educational programs 
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and any number of projects that would improve the operation of state 
departments of education and the services they provide to the local 
educational agencies. 
Amendments: Originally, 85 per cent of each appropriation was 
to be allotted directly to the states and 15 per cent reserved. In 
1967 the Commissioners' share was reduced to 5 per cent. See Chapter V 
for further discussion on this Title. 
Source: Part of this summary taken from Eugene Eidenberg and 
~oy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York, 1969)~ 
-.---
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II. ADDITIONAL TITLES ADDED TO ESEA 1966-1969 
Title VI: Enacted in 1966, this title authorized federal funds to 
assist the states in the education of mentally and physi-
cally handicapped childr~n. It was expanded in 1967 to 
include funds to improve the recruitment of personnel for 
the field, to establish ~egional resource centers and model 
centers for deaf-blind children. 
Under the state ~rant program a number of services 
were provided for the: first time; mobile units for rural 
areas, work-study programs, and special transportation 
arr~ngements, for example. Nearly 225,000 children were 
helped under the program in its first two years. 
Ti tl~ VII: Enacted in 1967, ,this title authorized federal funds to 
assist i.n the education of children from non-English-
speaking families. The emphasis was on teaching children 
of Mexican and Puerto Rican background, although there were 
requests from states proposing projects in 17 different 
languages. The states of California and Texas were 
especially benefitted under this program. 
Title VIII: Two programs came'under.this title in 1967. One author-
ized grants for local programs to prevent school dropoutse 
The demonstration programs were to focus on schools which 
have a high concentration of children from low-income 
families and a high dropout rate. The second program 
authorized a small technical assistance project for rural 
schools to help them apply for federal aid. In 1968 this 
was replaced by a more general provision for collection and 
dissemination of information which was written into the 
Vocational Education Amendments of 1968. 
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SCHOOL-AID AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEARS* 
Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act: 
Title I: Educationally 
deprived children 
Special incentive grants 
Title II: Libraries and 
textbooks 
Title III: Supplementary 
education 
Title IV: Cooperative 
research 
Title V: State edu-
cation departments 
Title VI: Handicapped 
children: 
Regional resource centers 
Deaf-'blind children 
Recruitment 
Captioned ;films 
Grants to states 
Title VII: Bilingual 
education: 
Aid to school districts 
Teacher training 
Title VIII: 
Rural area information 
Dropout prevention 
*Figures in millions 
1966 
$100 
25 
3 
1 Funds available for five-year period. 
30 
3 
50 
1 
1 
1968 
$2,563 
154 
515 
65 
7 
1 
1 
8 
15L.i: 
15 
11 
2 Funds available for fiscal 1968 as well as fiscal 1969. 
$2,725 
50 
167 
528 
80 
8 
3 
1 
8 
167 
30 
10 
294= 
1970 
$2,862 
50 
206 
566 
80 
10 
7 
1 
10 
206 
4:o 
10 
4 
30 
Source~ Congress~ the Nation, II, Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1970, p. 712. 
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A RESPONSE TO THE 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 1 S .COMMENTARY 
ON 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION LEGISLATION 
On January 12, 1965, following the President's Education Message 
the Administration's Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
H. R. 2362, was introduced. 
Ten days of hearings were conducted during the latter part of 
January and the first two days of February, following which time, the 
Subcommittee and Full Committee spent seven full days in Executive 
Session oii. the measure, ordering the bill reported as amended on 
March 2. 
During this period o·f time, there was a wide dissemination of in-
formation with respect to the nature of the legislation and the amend-
ments which had been adopted in Subcommittee and in the Full Com-
mittee. 
It was not until March 17, when the bill was before the Rules 
Committee of the House, that the Committee or any Members received any 
comments from the United States Chamber of Commerce. It is no news 
to any one that the United States Chamber of Commerce has opposed every 
general federal aid to education bill which has been proposed. It was 
certainly expected that their views would be no different than they 
have been in the past on this subject. 
However, the very late hour that the Chamber has chosen to express 
its viewpoint can leave one only with the impression that the Chamber 
does not desire that Members have an opportunity to analyze and check 
the accuracy of the ruthless charges made against the legislation. 
When these charges are examined by Members who have worked closely 
in the development of the legislation, it is hard to believe that they 
are talking about H. R. 2362 as reported by the committee. 
The Chamber of Commerce maintains: 
(1) "It establishes a general aid to education program in the 
guise of a poverty measure." 
In the same breath, the Chamber states - "It is not designed to 
meet just the needs of educationally and economically deprived children 
as stated in its declaration of policy." 
Answer - The descriptive title of the bill as printed on the first 
page, reads: "To Strengthen and Improve Educational Quality and Edu-
cational Opportunity in the Nation's Elementary and Secondary Schools." 
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The policy statement referred to by the Chamber is contained in 
Title I of the bill, which authorized $1.06 billion to local public 
school districts where there are concentrations of children coming 
from low-income families. 
These funds in Title I are directly focused into the school dis-
tricts where there are concentrations of such educationally deprived 
children and the use of the funds is specifically prescribed by 
Section 205 which reads: 
11 (1) That payments under this title will be used for 
programs and projects· (including the acquisition of 
equipment and where necessary, the construction of 
school facilities) (A) which are designed to meet 
the special educational needs of educationally deprived 
children in school attendance areas having high concen-
trations of children from low-income families and (B) 
which are of sufficient size, scope, and quality to give 
reasonable promise of substantial progress toward meeting 
those needs, and nothing herein shall be deemed to pre-
clude two or more local educational agencies from entering 
into agreements, at their option, for carrying out 
jointly operated programs and projects under this title." 
(2) The Chamber of Commerce chargesg - 11 This is the most 
direct and far-reaching intrusion of federal authority into our local 
public school systems ever proposed in a bill before Congress." 
Answer - This charge is completely without any foundation of 
fact. The truth of the matter is that the grants to local public 
school !districts under Title I will give local public educational 
agencie·s a real opportunity to strengthen elementary and secondary 
educational opportunities in the poorer schools in a wide variety 
of ways which are not now open to them because of a lack of local 
financial resources. 
(3) The Chamber charges that this bill would expand the Impacted 
Area Education concept to 11 94:.6% of the nation's counties and 90% of 
all school districts." 
Answer - This accusation is not true since the bill makes no 
substantive changes in the Impacted Area program. 
(4:) The Chamber maintains - 11 There is no evidence that 90% of 
our school districts need or desire federal assistance to provide 
instruction appropriate for low-income children." 
Answer - This statement is simply not in accord with the facts. 
The hearings on the legislation referred to previously have compiled a 
record of 2100 printed pages, much of which is devoted to the need for 
providing additional educational services in school districts where 
there are concentrations of educationally deprived children. In not a 
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single instance is there any evidence that any school district would not 
use grant funds under the bill for the purpose of strengthening edu-
cational opportunities in these schools. 
(5) The Chamber maintains - 11The amended House bill has been ex-
panded in many sections beyond President Johnson's original request." 
Answer - The original authorization request by the administration 
was for approximately $1,255 billion. The Subcommittee amendments 
called for a $1.32 billion program. No major changes were made in the 
legislation with respect to the programs to be authorized. 
(6) The Chamber maintains - 11Distribution formulas are inequi-
table, ambiguous, and subject to change at any time. 11 
Answer - This statement is completely false. The formulas author-
ized by H. R. 2362 are fixed for the fiscal year 1966 and cannot be 
altered or changed. For subsequent fiscal years, the Congress must 
prescribe the formula for the distripution of funds. 
(7) The Chamber ,maintains - 11 The $2,000 or less annual family 
·income figure used as a basis of eligibility for the first year's 
program does not talce into consideration differences in costs of living 
from region to region, nor does it talce cognizance of other tangible 
assets which supplement income." 
Answer - This statement completely ignores the other factor in the 
formula which would pay 50% of the average per pupil expenditure in 
a State ·for each child coming from a family_whose income is less than 
$2,000 per annum. This per pupil expenditure factor reflects, on the 
basis of the only uniform and accurate data available, the varying 
differences in standards of living from State to State as well as the 
differing costs of providing educational services and programs. 
(8) The Chamber maintains - "The only data available for de-
termining low-income families is six years old and will not be com-
prehensively updated until;the 1970 census. 11 
Answer - Admittedly, 1960 census data would not be as accurate or 
as useful as 1965 census data if such were av.ailable. However, it is 
the most reliable and accurate data uniformly applicable to all of the 
States on which to ma.k;e a distribution. In fact, the so-called minority 
substitute tax credit proposal would malce use of the same census data 
for its proposed extremely modest distribution to 3 - 8 year old 
children. 
(9) The Chamber maintains - 11The distribution formulas are 
drawn in such a way that wealthier states spending six to seven hundred 
dollars per pupil would receive more federal dollars than states 
spending only three to four hundred dollars. 11 To support their con-
tention, they cite the case of 10 wealthy counties in the United States 
as compared to 10 poor counties. 
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Answer - Wha-t the Chamber has concealed in their analysis is the 
impact of federal funds under Title I on the local school district's 
elementary and secondary education programs in these same 20 counties. 
For example, in the 10 wealthy counties cited by the Chamber, the 
total expenditures for 1962 for public elementary and secondary school 
purposes was $446,ooo,ooo. Under the terms of Title I, these 10 
counties would receive approximately $8.9 million, or 1.9% of their 
operating school budgets. On the other hand, the total school budget 
for the 10 poor counties cited by the Chamber is approximately $13.2 
million. The payments to these poor districts under Title I would be 
approximateLy $4.5 million, or 34.2% of their 1962 school expenditures. 
(IO) The Chamber maintains - "Wealthier states are demonstrating 
that they desire and are able to meet their public school needs at 
elementary, secondary, and college levels. They should be excluded 
from benefits under the bill, as Congressmen recpmmended in committee 
discussions." 
Answer - This ill-considered·and callous commentary which follows 
the recommendations of some of the minority Members, ignores the fact 
that there are ITTany very poor school districts in the heart of affluent 
urban and industrialized areas where there are concentrations of edu-
cationally deprived children. The Chamber's recommendations as well as 
~he minority members who have advocated it would eliminate 3,000,000 
chi.ldren who are unmistakably, by any calculation, children of poverty. 
(11) The Chamber states - 11 Use of public money for nonpublic 
schools and colleges is deemed unconstitutional and a transgression of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." 
Answer - No provision of the bill makes available any money for 
nonpublic schools and colleges. Title IV of the bill extends and 
broadens the provisions of the Cooperative Research Act which, since 
its enactment July 26, 1954, has authorized contracts for jointly 
financed cooperative arrangements with universities and colleges, both 
public and private, for the conduct of research service and demon-
strations in the field ofleducation. Funds under this program are not 
for the support of any educational program but rather are for the 
furnishing of research services in the field of education similar to 
research activities in the fields of science, health, defense, and 
agriculture. 
(12) The Chamber maintains - "The language of the bill is 
phrased in ambiguous terms so that it is impossible, without inter-
pretation by the United States Office of Education, to know exactly 
how much aid is intended to go directly or indirectly to nonpublic, 
religiously affiliated schools, thei.r pupils, or their parents~ Such 
aid may cause serious injury and lead to fragmentation of the public 
school system." 
Answer - This statement is not true. No funds go directly or 
indirectly to nonpublic schools, religious or otherwise. The bill 
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does specifically authorize local public educational agencies to 
broaden their educational programs to enable participation by edu-
cationally deprived children who do not attend public school full time. 
The bill does authorize library resources, textbooks, and other in-
structional materials to be loaned to elementary and secondary school 
pupils and teachers, but only if such materials do not supplant those 
being provided children. 
(13) The Chamber makes other statements indirectly suggesting 
the presence of a constitutional question in H. R. 2362. 
These matters have been answered in particular on pages 7, 13, 14, 
15, 16, and 17 of the Committee Report. Moreover, the committee has 
had the benefit of an analysis by the Office of the Attorney General in 
the Department of Justice, indicating that the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act has been reviewed carefully and that it conforms with 
constitutional requirements. In addition, the hearings gave the com-
mittee the benefit of extensive testimony of constitutional lawyers, 
religious group representatives, and other organizations in setting 
forth assurances of the maintenance of the principle of separation of 
church and state in the legislation. 
(11±) The Chamber makes a long and inaccurate charge as to federal 
control of education carried in the bill. 
Answer - The Chamber has completely ignored Section 604 of the 
legislation which reads as follows: 
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to 
authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of 
the United States to·exercise any direction, supervision, 
or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, 
administration, or personnel of any educational institu-
tion or school system, or over the selection of library 
resources, textbooks, or other printed or published in-
structional materials by any educational institution or 
school system." 
In addition, the Chamber completely ignores the fact that plans 
submitted by local public<educational agencies for the use of funds 
under Title I are reviewed by State educational agencies which have in 
turn, entered into plan agreements with the Office of Education. These 
assurances that funds will be used to carry out the purposes of th€ 
Act are closely parallel to the provisions of the Vocational Education 
Act of 1963 and its predecessors. This program has functioned to the 
broad public acclaim and acceptance since 1917 even though the Chamber 
has not approved of the legislation. 
(15) The Chamber maintains - 11 If the United States Commissioner 
of Education deems that a State does not need federal funds he arbi-
trarily can cut off or reduce that State's portion of the funds and 
redistribute these federal dollars to other States which he determines 
are needy." 
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Answer - This statement is false. Any local public educational 
agency which submits a plan pursuant to Title I or Title III and any . 
State educational agency which submits a plan pursuant to Title II or 
Title V shall be given a grant according to its entitlement under the 
formula for those titles. 
Only in the case of the failure to submit an application for funds 
or in the case of the failure to submit an application meeting the 
requirements under the law may the Commissioner reapportion a State's 
allotment. The re-allotment provisions of this legislation conform to 
the re-allotment provisions of previously enacted legislation pro-
viding grants to States for educational purposes. The bill contains 
adequate administrative and judicial review provisions to assure con-
formance to the provisions of the Act, in the submission and approval 
of plans. 
( 16) The Chamber maintains - 11This federal aid program is _not 
needed. A majority·of Americans wants (sic) to provide educational 
opportunities for underprivileged children and adults, but the federal 
government does not need to take on this task. 11 
Answer - This statement is characteristic of the historical 
position of the Chamber •. It apparently is formulated without any 
reference to an actual study of the need or the ability of local pub-
lic school agencies to finance elementary and secondary education. 
Even in the most affluent States where State average per pupil ex-
penditures are high there is a great variance from district to district 
on school expenditures per pupil. One Member has commented that the 
per pupil expenditure in some districts of his State were as high as 
$700 per pupil and less than $200 per pupil in others. 
As has been previously observed, even in the most affluent States 
there are areas where educationally deprived children are concentrated 
in sizeable numbers. The Chamber has chosen to ignore significant 
national problems inherent in educationally deprived children which are 
translated in terms of high school drop-out rates, high draft rejection 
rates for educational deficiencies, hard~core unemployment problems, 
and the presence of over 8 million American adults who do not have a 
fifth grade education. 
(17) The Chamber maintains - 11 This bill does not meet the identi-
fiable needs of underprivileged children for early childhood education. 11 
Answer - In making this statement the Chamber blindly follows the 
mistake made in the minority report which was written without reference 
to the precise language in the bill covering pre-school education. In 
Section201 - the very first section of the bill - it is provided 
"The Congress hereby declares it to be the. policy of the United States 
to provide financial assistance ••• to local educational agencies 
serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families 
to expand their educational programs by various means (including pre-
school programs), which contribute particularly to meeting the special 
educational needs of educationally deprived chi 1 dren." (Emphasis ours) 
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The Chamber as well as the minority views chooses to ignore page 6 
of the Committee Report No. 143, where pre-school programs are given as 
a specific illustration of one of the types of programs that can be 
conducted by federal funds under the Act by local public school agen-
cies in increasing educational opportunities for educationally deprived 
· children. 
(18) The Chamber maintains - "Rushing the bill through Congress 
without adequate time for the bill to be properly studied and without 
identifying the amendments makes accurate analysis by the Congress and 
the general public very difficuit. 
Answer - For many Congresses, House and Senate Committees have 
probed the problem of strengthening elementary and secondary education 
in this country. Many proposals for federal assistance have met with 
failure because such legislation did not receive broad public support 
and because other issues became inextricably woven into the general 
legislation. 
Extensive hearings were held during the 88th Congress by more than 
one Subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee and by 
the Labor and Public Welfare Committee of the Senate, in an effort to 
get together all points of view concerning elementary and secondary 
educational needs. From :these hearings and: from extensive study by 
many agencies, the recommendations in H. R. 2362 came into being. 
It has received the broadest public support of any elementary and 
secondary education proposal in' the history of the Congress. All of 
the major education associations have expressed support for the legis-
lation. 
In addition, the extensive hearings conducted by the General Sub-
committee on Education during this Congress have elicited expressions 
of approval as to the terms of the legislation from representatives of 
major religious groups whose counsel and suggestions have been followed 
in framing the final language of the bill. An account of the ex-
tensive nature of these hearings and considerations is given on page 23 
of the report. 
The Chamber's criticism of the work of the Subcommittee and of the 
Full Committee, can be simply reduced to a criticism of the exercise 
of responsible and diligent conduct of the legislative business of the 
Congress. To have extended the hearings when there were no more wit-
nesses to be heard, to have conducted further study of an already 
adequately probed field of investigation, would have amounted to un-
reasonable delay and procrastination. 
(19) The Chamber maintains - 11 The bill overlaps existing pro-
grams." 
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Answer - 1.tbe Chamber ign@res the fa'Ct 1that no existing federal 
legislation provides grants tb local public school districts for the 
purpose of strehgthening elementary and secondary education programs 
where there are concentrations of educationally deprived children. It 
is true that the Federal Government in very recent years, has enacted 
a number of pieces of legislation dealing with adult employment train-
ing, vocational training, and higher education which have greatly 
strengthened the:se aspects of.American education. However, the lack 
of financial resources to finance good quality education in the schools 
where there are concentrations of educationally deprived children 
weakens the foundation upon which all higher and vocational education 
programs are based. This fact is obvious to the most casual educational 
observer but apparently not to.,,the Chamber. 
Source: Samuel Halperin to Douglass Cater, March 22, 1965, Executive 
Files, The Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Johnson Library. 
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MEMORANDUM 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Washington 
March 8, 1965 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 
FROM: Larry O'Brien 
I suggest that the magnitude of your victory in the House Education 
and Labor Committee last week and the difficulty in obtaining it is 
not generally understood. 
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Certainly the press understands neither, which, at this point, is just 
as well. 
The greatest danger to this bill ii; that enactment will be stalled 
enough for religious and racial problems to arise. 
The big hurdle to quick committee action, aside from the remarkable 
behavior of the Chairman, was dissent among Democrats as to who gets 
the money. 
As you know, Perkins pushed the subcommittee night and p.ay and did a 
tremendous job in achieving a mark up on Friday, February 5th. 
Powell made firm committments both to the Speaker and me that he would 
take up the bill in full committee on Monday, February 8th. 
·But he cancelled the meeting and for several days refused to return 
telephone calls either from me, or the Speaker. 
Powell went to Puerto Rico and his staff alerted offices of the members 
of the committee to be prepared for formal notice of a meeting of the 
full committee on the Education bill for Wednesday, February 17th, 
which was the day following consideration by the House of a rule favor-
able to. the Education and Labor committee on expense money. 
This rule came out of Rules committee only as a resul.t of total pressure 
by the leadership on the Rules Committee and reversed preliminary votes 
of 9-1 and 9-2 unfavorable to Education and Labor. 
But after this favorable action both in Connnittee and in the House, 
Powell let the 17th come and go without a meeting. 
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From the time the bill came out of subcommittee we had to be consider-
ing how to take the committee away from Powell if necessary. 
Problems with this were: 
1. The Republicans thoroughly understood the game and 
were backing Powell to the hilt. 
2. Powell very cleverly used as a shield his game on 
money f.or the committee, and there yet remained action 
by the full committee on House Administration and 
ratification thereof by the Housee 
3. At least half the Democrats either were hoodwinked 
by the committee solidarity gambit or were just determined 
not to cross the Chairman in this fashion. 
4. Haste was not especially indicated except for our real 
purpose, and if we pressed that too hard· we would defeat 
ourselves. 
The two devices for taking th~ committee from the Chairman were: 
1. To give three days notice signe·d by a majority of 
the committee, or 
2. To have a workable majority and a physical quorum 
on hand at the next regular meeting day of the full 
committee and to have adopted there a resolution to 
keep the committee in session· from day to day until 
the Education bil'l was reported out. 
We chose the latter course. 
The next regular meeting day was Thursday, February 25th. We had at 
that time a majority and a quorum on hand and a resolution drawn, 
all of which Powell well knew. 
We also pulled out his props by securing on Wednesday the 24th action 
of' the House Administration Committee on money for Education and Labor 
and later the same day action: on it by the House. 
So on Thursday morning, Powell had to rush to get in front of the 
troops. 
Meanwhil'e we had attempted to count the Committee also on substance. 
This was difficult. 
307 
There was a general feeling that the subcommittee had moved so fast 
that alternative proposals were not adequately considered and that 
Perkins' device of having all witnesses for the morning testify before 
questions could be put to any of them left something to be desired by 
way of shedding light on content. 
So the committee was in a mood to behave like a subcommittee. 
The formula was heavily slanted toward the southern states because 
that is where the need is. 
Here, for example, are several states under Title I: 
New York 
Texas 
California 
North Carolina 
Pennsylvania 
Louisiana 
Illinois 
Georgia 
Michigan 
Mississippi 
New Jersey 
Massachusetts 
Oregon 
$75,127,295 
74,580,048 
60, 137,510 
48,496,960 
44,890,181 
37,904,234 
37,288,765 
34,517,871 
29,765,556 
28,028,704 
17,777,548 
11,908,492 
6,853, 177 
There are twenty-one Democrats and ten Republicans on the full com-
mittee. 
Of the twenty-one Democrats, only Scott of North Carolina and Gibbons 
of Florida are from southern states. 
To further complicate the problem, members generally were motivated not 
so much by what their States were getting but by what their districts 
were getting. 
Many formulas were drafted to alter the balance from the South toward 
the North. 
Other special considerations arose. 
Pucinski insisted that children be included who were from families 
drawing welfare in excess of $2,000. 
Sickles was concerned about the workings within the state as between 
state and local governments. 
Patsy Mink wanted some way or other to get more than two million 
dollars for Hawaii. 
Mrs. Green attempted to work a delay of several weeks, and failing 
that, to work up a substitute with the Republicans. 
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Gibbons and Hathaway were opposed to the parochial aspects and voted 
against Title II. 
Also Hathaway proposed and Gibbons supported an amendment which would 
have permitted each state to use at its option either the state ex-
penditure per pupil or the federal expenditure per pupil, whichever 
was higher. 
This would have added $200 million to the cost of the bill. 
Jim O'Hara was the spokesman for another group and especially for 
Ford and to a large extent Sickles. 
He represents a suburban district which is more concerned than anything 
else with classroom crowding--construction money--especially· for non-
slum areas. 
Introduction of that thesis would have destroyed the whole theory of 
the bill and have completely unzipped the religious consensus. 
Scheuer, representing a Jewish constituency, was jumpy about t~e test 
book Title. 
Dent was extremely vociferous about more money for the North. 
On Thursday the committee began going through all the bill except 
Title I, which contains the formula and the big grants. 
By early afternoon on Friday, all the bill had been completed except 
Title I, but the committee could not proceed with it because Gibbons 
and Mrs. Green were in Florida with Mrs. Johnson and had elicited 
promises that it would be delayed until they returned. 
Meanwhile, it had become apparent that to hold a majority together 
on formula so that it could survive not only the committee but the 
House floor we would have to put in a little more money for the 
cities. We figured fifty million dollars was as little as we could 
get awaywith. 
So, in conjunction with Hugh Carey, who had been designated by Powell 
as his agent, we worked out an amendment to authorize the Commissioner 
of Education to work up figures reflecting im-migration of poor 
children for the past five years and to distribute $50 million ac-
cordingly, with a ceiling on the amount to go to each state. 
The plan was to hav:e Powell introdv.ce this as his amendment at nine 
o'clock Saturday morning at a causµs of committee Democrats, have the 
caucus adopt it, and then roll it on through the full committee which 
was scheduled to meet at nine forty-five. 
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Two problems: 
1. Powell was late to the caucus, and Pucinski had to introduce 
the amendment, and 
2. There had leaked out of the Department and into general use 
a table of state participation under an amendment adding 
$63,000,000 which was the additional cost for adding to the 
formula those children from families drawing over $2,000 for Aid 
to Dependent Children. 
Result was that our $50,000,000 amendment was rejected in caucus and 
the $6J,OOO,OOO amendment was accepted. 
This was not a real loss, but the $50,000,000 device would have been 
preferable. 
The $63,000,000 figure then, was accepted in full committee prior to 
adjournment and remains in the bill. 
As you know, the adjournment motion carried by one vote. 
I was pretty unhappy about it at the time, but in retrospect, and in 
light of the subsequent committee action, it probably is just as well 
that the committee now can feel that it acted with due deliberation. 
Another problem we had was that the original Administration proposal 
inadvertently omitted from the incentive portion of Title I the words 
"per pupil". 
This had the effect of adding a very great deal of prospective money. 
The subcommittee added the words, then took them out, and then we had 
to get the committee to add them. 
Also, the Administration proposal carried estimated county figures 
both as to the number of children from families with less than $2,000 
income and as to the amount of money to be paid the county. 
Sam Gibbons felt sure that the figures relatively for his county, 
Hillsborough, which is Tampa, and for Pinellas, which is St. Peters~ 
burg, were badly off. 
Our table showed 11, 520 children for Hillsborough and 12, 725 for 
Pinellas. 
We had the Census people work all one night to verify this and the 
a,ctuaI figures showed Hillsborough with 97-~5 and Pinellas with only 
5218. 
Th1s occurred because our table was based on assumptions and averages 
and Pinellas has many retired families and Hillsborough has many 
Cuban and Latin families. 
But incidents such as this shake faith in our figures. 
The Speaker called me Saturday afternoon after the adjournment and 
told me he had talked with Jim 0 1 Hara and with Mrs. Green. 
He said that all 0 1 Hara wanted was a definite committment about the 
nature of a bill you would send up next year. 
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The Speaker said Mrs. Green just wanted to change the bill in several 
respects and he told her I would talk with her about it. 
Cater talked with her. 
The Speaker further said that he learned.that she was scheduled to 
make a speech in San Francisco Monday night and thus would be out of 
town on Monday and Tuesday, but the Speaker prevailed upon her to 
cancel her speech and thus to be in Washington on those days. 
It was a busy Monday and Tuesday for Mrs. Green: 
1. She argued .passionately on Monday in caucus and on Tuesday 
in committee for a delay of several weeks in reporting out the 
Education bill; 
2 •. She negotiated with the Repµblicans to work out a substitute 
proposal; 
3. She began agitations to stir up the religious issue which 
culminated Friday in her calling Protestant leaders into her 
office to tell them this bill will put Catholic priests in the 
public schools; 
4. She spent over an hour in the caucus Monday afternoon de-
manding and getting a caucus motion to push for a substantial 
amendment to the Appalachia bill. And it took considerable 
effort on our part to unravel this one • 
.5. She delayed consideration of our Water Pollution bill for an 
entire week by telling the leaders of the Public Works Committee 
she would vote against the Appalachia bill unless they displaced 
Water Pollution the week of March 8th so. as to conduct hearings 
on the Northwest Flood Control bill. So they displaced Water 
Pollution and are going ahead with Northwest Flood Control. 
And she then voted against Appalachia. 
' I 
The Jim O'Hara problem worked out well. 
The sub-committee had tacked on to the Administration bill two year 
extensions beyond the present statutory date of June 30, 1966 for 
PL 87lic, which is operating expense for federally impacted areas. 
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Extension -0£ PL 8i5 was deleted in committee. This assured O'Hara 
that he will have another whack at expanding this into a general aid 
bill next year. 
Also the impacted area lobbyists do not object because this promises 
possible expansion of their constituency. 
So 0 1 Hara now is totally aboard and working hard for the bill as it is. 
But he was confronting us earlier with an impossible situation. 
Had he succeeded either in changing the formula to reflect construction 
needs of suburban communities or secured a committment for the 
future to that effect, the Catholic spokesmen, we were amply notified, 
would have shot the whole bill down in mid-air. 
I think we now are in quite strong position on the formula. 
The South cannot object. 
The Republicans are in the dilemma that if they follow the Bill Ayres 
course of more for the poor counties, less for the rich counties, they 
either must take money from their own districts or authorize a great 
deal more money, neither of which they can afford to do, and if they 
try to shift the formula North the South will solidify against them. 
The big problem of keeping North Democrats from insisting on more 
favorable formulas appears to be largely won because the nineteen 
northern Democrats on the committee are so broadly representative 
in this area. 
So I suggest that as time moves on the action in full committee may 
prove to be the landmark achievement with the legislation. 
I don't mean to say that all our problems are solved. 
Even on formula, certain of the committee Democrats still are restive. 
Mrs. Green's industry continues. 
Sam Gibbons still is seeking a new handle and complaining about White 
House pressure. 
Hathaway is working with both of them. 
Also the religious matter continues to be troublesome, and the B 1nai 
B 1 rith and other religious groups are contacting their congressmen. 
And it's hard to believe we'll get through this without racial 
trouble. 
So the need for early action is as compelling as ever. 
Meanwhile we're devoting the major part of our time to contacting 
members, stimulating pressure groups, and putting out the fires we 
discover on this bill. 
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Source: Executive Files, The Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, ,Johnson 
LinraryG 
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MEMORANDUM 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Washington 
TO THE PRESIDENT 
Legislative Program for Education 
Basic Strategy: By proposing a package of legislative programs, not 
including "general aid" as usually defined, you will provide a middle 
way through the church-state conflict which has stalemated aid to 
lower education in the past. Commissioner Keppel believes this 
package could be more effective educationally and larger fiscally 
than previous "general aid" proposals. The Office of Education es-
timates that non-public schools could receive as much as 10.1% to 
13.5% of the dollars contained in this package. (Parochial schools 
have 15% of total school enrollment). For most of the titles the 
Office of Education has submitted "high" and 11 low11 authorization 
request. Budget Bureau estimates FY 1966 expenditures at approximately 
one-third these figures. NOA and expenditures will rise markedly 
in subsequent years. 
BILL# 1 Progra111 for Elementary-Secondary Education 
Title I A Direct School Aid for Low Income 
Children through Expansion of 
"Impacted" Area Legislation 
(P.L. 871.t) 
High: $1500 Low: $750 million 
To provide payments based on number of low income children in 
counties. This would be the largest single item in the education 
package. The high recommendation would amount to four times the 
present impacted program. (An increase of approximately six per cent 
of total expenditures for public lower education). Most school 
districts in the country would receive payments after submitting plans 
to state educational authorities to assure funds are spent for im-
proving schools serving the poor. Special encouragement would be 
given to 11 shared services" for children in non-public schools. No 
matching requirements. 
Opposition: Since no aid provided directly to parochial schools, 
Cardinal Spellman and others in Catholic hierarchy may attack this 
Title. (Other parts of the package provide more direct help to 
private schools). Office of Education is exploring ways of making 
"shared services" more attractive to Catholics, especially through 
supplementary education centers described in Title III. 
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Support: Senator Morse, Congressman Dent and others in Congress will 
likely give support. The National Education Association will probably 
endorse as a first giant step toward general aid. 
Title I B Reform of P.L. 815 and P.L. 874 
Impacted Area Legislation 
-$4:o to -$60 million 
These savings could be made by am:endments already presented to 
Congress which are supported by Edith ~reen and others@ This would 
be in line with your effort to eliminate waste while launching bold 
new programs. 
Opposition: Undoubtedly, reforms will stir up some Congressmen 
whose districts benefit from present impacted area support® 
Question posed for you is whether to delay reforms until HEW study 
of this legislation, now in progress, is completed early next summer. 
Title II A New Program.for Instructional 
Materials Available to Public and 
Private Pupils 
$300 million 
Books and other materials, chosen under public auspices and held 
under public title, would be available to all students through a 
state agency. Representative Hugh Carey, of New York, and other 
Catholics have shown a lively interest in such a program. No matching 
requirements. 
Opposition: The best estimate is that this would be the least contro-
versial part of the program so long as federal government is not in-
volved in selection of instructional materials. Provides most direct 
form of aid to parochial students. Justice Department lawyers believe 
constitutional issue will depend on mechanisms used by states. 
Title III Create New Supplementary 
Educational Centers 
High: $300 Low: $100 million 
This was the major 11new 11 idea of the Task Force headed by Jopn 
Gardner. These centers, established by consortia of public and private 
schools in each community, would develop according to community needs. 
To be financed by federal planning grants, 50-66% federal matching, 
thereafter. Two roles: 
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1. to provide badly needed services--physical education, music 
and language training, advanced science courses and laboratories, 
remedial reading, television equipment instruction, etc.--to improve 
the caliber of all schools in the area. 
2. to introduce teaching innovations into the schools. 
"High" recommendation would finance approximately 150 centers, Keppel 
believes these centers will receive Catholic support and encourage 
greater cooperation between public and parochial school education. 
Opposition: The proposal has not been tested in Congress or any of 
the education groups. Possibly the public school administrators may 
be hosti;I_e to an innovation which they may think challenges their 
control. Department of Justice attorneys voice optimism about the 
constitutionality of this approach to aiding parochial students. 
Title IV Strengthen State Departments 
of Education 
High: $75 Low: $10 million 
Baised on recommendations by the Task Force and James B. Conant 
for major reform in the management of our school system, federal 
grants would be provided for specialized personnel and R&D funds to 
state departments of education. Keppel believes it will give neces-
sary leverage to make education administrators more responsive to the 
new federal program. Federal share: 100% first year, 50-66% there-
after. 
Opposition: The White House review rated this low on the priority 
list for education. It will be vigorously supported by state com-
missioners of education and their friends in Congress. 
Title V Expansion of Laboratories for 
Educational Research and 
Development 
$45 million 
Four prototype centers of this type have been established at the 
Universities of Oregon, Pittsburgh, Harvard, and Wisconsin. This 
Title would finance between fifteen and twenty additional laboratories 
to carry on programs of research in education, development of pro-
cedures, new curricula, field testing, and demonstration programs--in 
the pattern of the Morrill Act and Hatch Act for agriculture. They 
would provide the innovations to backstop the supplementary centers 
proposed in Title III. Federal share to vary by project. 
Pre-School Education for Low-
Income Children 
(Part of iconomic Opportunity Act 
to be Included in Education Message) 
High: $400 Low: $200 million 
(Funded elsewhere in budget) 
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To increase appropriations under the Economic Opportunity Act for 
education of pre-school children through public or private auspices. 
The program is aimed at reaching the child at the formative stage 
before delinquency habits develop. There has been no constitutional 
challenge to funneling this assistance to private as well as public 
schools. Federal matching, 90% for 1966, 50% thereafter. 
Opposition: 
budgeted to 
content :for 
Secretary Wirtz has suggested the :funds should be 
HEW rather than OEO. Secretary Celebrezze says he is 
OEO to receive the :funds and allocate them through HEW. 
Source: Executive Files, The Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson 9 Johnson 
Library. 
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March 22, 1965 
1. Mrs. Green voted with all the other Democrats to report this 
elementary and secondary school bill out of Committee. 
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2. In the event she urges that a judicial review clause be added to 
the bill--and only in the event she makes this suggestion--it 
should be noted that she strongly opposed such a clause being 
added to her own Higher Education Facilities Bill in 1963, although 
that bill provided Federal grants to church-related institutions, 
which this elementary and secondary school bill does not. 
J. Mrs. Green raised no church-state issµe before either the General 
Subcommittee on Education or the full Committee, but she did raise 
a question about inequities in the formula. Never until after the 
bill was reported did she raise the church-state issue® It should 
be pointed out in connection with the church-state problem that 
this bill has been endorsed by the following groups: National 
Council of Churches, American Association of School Administrators 
(this is public school administrators), The National Catholic 
Welfare Council, United Presbyterian Church, the Episcopal Church 
Bishops, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, American Jewish 
Committee, N.E.A., American Federation of Teachers, Baptist Joint 
Cammi ttee on Public Affairs. 
~. Although Mrs. Green's objections to the present allocation formula 
was that it did not put enough money in the poorer Southern states, 
the fact is that approximately ~0% of the funds in Title I go into 
11 Southern states. 
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5. It should be noted that Mrs. Green voted to support the Pucinski 
Amendment, it provides additional assistance to the large urban 
states by adding some $60 million for families receiving more 
than $2000 from Aid for.Dependent Children programs. 
Source: Samuel Halperin Memorandum, March 22 1 1965, Executive Files, 
The Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Johnson Library. 
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I. Legislative Box Scores, 1953-68 
Year Proposals Submitted Approved by Congress Per Cent Approved 
1953* 
1954 232 150 65% 
1955 207 96 46 
1956 225 103 46 
1957 206 76 37 
1958 234 110 47 
1959 228 93 41 
1960 183 56 31 
1961 355 172 48 
1962 298 133 45 
1963 401 109 27 
1964 217 125 58 
1~5 469 323 69 
1966 371 207 56 
1967 431 205 48 
1968 414 231 56 
*Figures for 1953 are n.ot comparable to those for subsequent years. 
Before 1954, Congressional Quarterly used a different system, grouping 
Presidential requests in relatively broad categories. Congress and 
the Nation (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1970), 
~625. 
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II. PRESIDENT JOHNSON I S STAFF--A CAPSULE SUMMARY 
Position and Name 
Special Assistant 
Pierre Salinger 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
Jerome B. Wiesner 
Ralph A. Dungan 
Kenneth A. O'Donnell 
Lawrence F. O'Brien 
McGeorge Bundy 
Richard N. Goodwin 
Bill ·D. Moyers 
Jack J. Valenti 
Walter W. Jenkins 
George E. Reedy 
David Lawrence 
Horace Busby, Jr. 
Esther Peterson 
Donald F. Hornig 
Roger L. Stevens 
S. Douglass Cater 
W. Marvin Watson 
Joseph A. Califano, Jr. 
Robert W. Komer 
Robert E. Kintner 
Walt W. Ro stow 
George E. Christian 
Betty Furness 
William Leonhart 
E. Ernest Goldstein 
James R. Jones 
Special Counsel 
Theodore C. Sorensen 
Myer Feldman 
Lee C. White 
Harry C. McPherson, Jr. 
Larry Eugene Temple 
Staff Members 
Appointed 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1963 
1963 
1963 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1965 
1965 
1966 
1966 
1966 
1966 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1968 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1966 
1967 
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Resigned 
1964 
1964 
1964 
1965 
1965 
1965 
1966 
1965 
1967 
1966 
1964 
1966 
1966 
(died) 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1968 
1967 
1967 
Position and Name 
Legislative Counsel 
E. Jake Jacobsen 
Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr. 
Administrative Assistant 
Henry Hall Wilson, Jr. 
Mike N. Manatos 
Special Consultant 
Eric Goldman 
Stan Musial 
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor 
John P. Roche 
James A. Lovell 
Charles A. Murphy 
Appointed 
1961 
1961 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1967 
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Resigned 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Source: Congress and the Nation,II (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1970), p. 655. 
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